Working Together: Exploring the Factors that Influence Interorganizational Cooperation by Wukich, R. Clayton
  
 
WORKING TOGETHER:  











R. Clayton Wukich 
B.A, Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania, 2001 










Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs 
in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of 









University of Pittsburgh 
2011 
 
  ii 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 

















It was defended on 
April 7, 2011 
 
and approved by 
Dr. George W. Dougherty, Ph.D., Assistant Professor 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh 
 
Dr. David Y. Miller, Ph.D., Associate Professor 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh 
 
Dr. Robert Skertich, Ph.D., Assistant Professor 
Point Park University 
 
Dissertation Advisor: Dr. Louise K. Comfort, Ph.D., Professor 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh 
 
  iii 
  
Copyright © by R. Clayton Wukich 
2011 
  iv 
WORKING TOGETHER:  
EXPLORING THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE INTERORGANIZATIONAL 
COOPERATION 
 
R. Clayton Wukich, Ph.D. 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2011 
 
Administrative and policy failures increasingly occur because of the inability of organizations to 
facilitate collective action in the absence of a central, hierarchical authority.  I explore how 
organizations achieve (or fail to achieve) voluntary, self-organizing collective action that is not a 
direct result of external control, presenting a polycentric system of governance within a set of 
public, nonprofit, and for-profit agencies operating in the policy domain of emergency 
management.  Using a complex adaptive systems framework (Axelrod and Cohen 1999), I 
identify the patterns of variation, interaction, and the choices made among agencies that 
determine whether organizations work together.  I develop a model of an integrated, 
interdependent system of emergency management facilitated by a knowledge commons, as 
opposed to the established sequential cycle of disaster response.       
The research problem addressed, collective action without hierarchy, is fundamentally an 
issue of decision making.  The ability of decision makers to recognize key situations in their 
environments and develop strategies for action, i.e. cognition, is critical.  Analysis of network 
data and semi-structured interviews finds that urgent need, proximity, and professional capital, a 
concept developed in this dissertation, promote and sustain cooperation.  I show how these 
factors increase the capacity of heterogeneous networks to accomplish shared goals.   
Even if the conditions of urgent need and proximity are satisfied, situations exist where 
agencies fail to cooperate.  Key standards of professional performance—appearance, levels of 
  v 
staffing, past performance, response time, and the quality of equipment—influence the decisions 
of emergency managers to work together.  I present the concept of professional capital to 
describe how these recognized standards of professional performance demonstrate competence 
and justify the decisions of managers to interact.  Professional capital transcends jurisdictional 
and disciplinary boundaries, influencing the confidence of decision makers and shaping 
judgments based on expectations of performance.  This concept adds a missing component to 
social capital theory, which currently focuses on the roles of pre-established trust and norms of 
reciprocity in promoting collective action.   
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1.0   HOW ORGANIZATIONS ACHIEVE COLLECTIVE ACTION WITHOUT 
HIERARCHY 
The present study explores how organizations achieve voluntary, self-organizing collective 
action that is not a direct result of external control.  Administrative and policy failures 
increasingly occur because of the inability to facilitate collective action in the absence of a 
central, hierarchical authority.  The complexity of many policy problems prevents single 
organizations from single-handedly defining and resolving critical challenges (Churchman 1967; 
Haas 1990; Fountain 2001; Ackoff and Rovin 2003; Weber and Khademian, 2008).   
The size and scope of many problems require people to work together to find common 
solutions.  Achieving collective action without hierarchy (or interorganizational cooperation), 
however, is not a simple task (Bardach 1998; Comfort 1999; Chisholm 1989).  Within a 
dynamic, complex system, factors ranging from the demands of the external environment to 
components of administrative structure and process shape and constrain organizational policy 
decisions.  Some of these components represent standards of professional performance used to 
decide whether to engage in collective action.  These standards encompass what I label 
“professional capital” and become the basis in many cases for the creation and maintenance of 
cooperative relationships.   
The problem addressed, collective action without hierarchy, is fundamentally an issue of 
decision making.  The ability of decision makers to recognize key situations in their 
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environments and develop strategies for action, i.e. cognition, is critical.  As Herbert Simon 
(1997) argues, if decision makers fail to recognize problems, they will most likely fail to design 
administrative arrangements to solve them.   
Varying abilities of decision makers to identify shared problems, make sense out of what 
they see, and devise strategies for collective action exist at different levels of organizations 
(Klein 1993; 2000; Weick 1995; Hutchins 1995).  The task of the present study is to design an 
inquiry that models the component parts of cooperation to account for the varying-levels of 
cognition within a system and gain an improved understanding of the factors that promote and 
inhibit collective action. 
I present a polycentric system of governance within a set of public, nonprofit, and for-
profit agencies operating in the policy domain of emergency management.  I develop a model of 
an integrated, interdependent system as opposed to the established sequential cycle of disaster 
response.  Using a complex adaptive systems framework (Axelrod and Cohen 1999), I identify 
the patterns of variation, interaction, and the choices made among agencies that determine 
whether agencies work together.  Across these agencies, information infrastructures allow 
decision makers to assess their situations, develop what they consider to be appropriate courses 
of action, and communicate these strategies to others.  The resulting knowledge commons (Hess 
and Ostrom 2007) promotes situational awareness and creates a common operating picture 
among organizations.  The resulting system of governance includes a range of operational and 
administrative relationships that vary in terms of their levels of intensity and commitment.   
The recognition of urgent need largely drives cooperation in the field study area.  The 
ability to recognize need is developed through past experiences and the search and exchange of 
critical information within the knowledge commons.  Once need is recognized, decision makers 
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decide whether to cooperate with others or rely on their agency’s internal capacity to cope with 
problems.  Close proximity (geographic and conceptual), as outlined in Chapter 7, influences this 
decision.  However, adjacent agencies at times fail to work together despite the recognition of 
urgent need.   
While factors such as competition between agencies and personality disputes inhibit 
cooperation, the present study argues that key standards of professional performance used by 
decision makers to decide whether to work with other agencies represent a critical concept.  I use 
this concept, professional capital, to explain how standards of professional performance 
demonstrate competence and justify the decisions of managers to interact.  These evaluative 
criteria include the conditions of equipment, the appearance of personnel, the ability of personnel 
to work well with others, and the results of past performance.  Professional capital transcends 
jurisdictional and disciplinary boundaries, influencing the confidence of decision makers by 
shaping judgments based on expectations of performance.  This concept adds a missing 
component to social capital theory, which currently focuses on the roles of pre-established trust 
and norms of reciprocity in promoting collective action.  
1.1 DEFINING COOPERATION, COORDINATION, COLLABORATION, AND 
COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES 
 
Cooperation, coordination, and collaboration, as a continuum of action, are processes of bilateral 
or multilateral problem definition, direction setting, and implementation (Cigler 1999; Gray 
1989).  Facilitated by communication and cognition, they are emergent processes that change as 
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patterns of interaction and information exchange foster trial-and-error learning.  People and 
organizations engage in different degrees of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration in 
contexts that vary in size (in terms of numbers of agencies), complexity (in terms of tasks and the 
demands of the external environment), and levels of urgency. 
 The present study defines interorganizational cooperative activities as any multiparty 
initiative between agencies intended to achieve operational or administrative goals.  The 
definition is intentionally broad in order to explore multiple types of collective action.  
Cooperation on one activity may influence cooperation on another.  The present study 
acknowledges multiplexity, the existence of multiple types of relationships between any two 
agencies (Isett and Provan 2005), in order to understand the influence of other agencies within 
what Ostrom (2005) calls a nested set of organizations.   
The present study’s definition includes the concepts of cooperation, coordination, and 
collaboration as defined by other studies that describe a continuum of action, ranging from the 
loosely coordinated pursuit of a common goal to more intense, problem-solving activities in 
which innovation occurs.  Simon (1997) uses the term cooperation “for [an] activity in which the 
participants share a common goal,” and the term coordination “for the process of informing 
[participants] as to the planned behaviors of others” (p. 81).  The act of coordination to Chisholm 
(1989) is “to place or arrange things in proper position relative to each other and to the system of 
which they form parts…” (p. 13).  Chisholm’s definition assumes that the participants’ goals and 
strategies have already been more or less established prior to the act of coordination.   
For more ambiguous or emergent situations, collaboration is defined as an intensive 
problem-solving process between two or more participants in which innovation occurs (Agranoff 
and McGuire, 2003; Denise, 1999; Shrage, 1995).  This notion of collaboration fits Comfort’s 
  5 
(2007) definition of self-control where self-organizing, adaptive actors engage in reciprocal 
patterns of interaction driven by “the capacity to keep actions focused on shared goals” and 
recognize when to engage in collaborative problem solving and when to disengage (Comfort, 
2007, p. 195).  
Cooperative activities, in general, manifest along a continuum ranging from cooperation 
to coordination to self-controlled collaboration.  Cigler (1999) explains this continuum, which 
includes a range of purposes, intensity, and formality in terms of official agreements.  
Each continuum type differs in complexity of purposes (e.g., information sharing vs. 
complicated, joint problem-solving), intensity of linkages (based on common goals, 
decision rules, shared tasks, and resource commitments), and the formality of agreements 
reached (informality vs. formality of rules guiding operating structures, policies, and 
procedures)… (p. 87).   
 
Interorganizational cooperative activities are more complex than simple binary 
representations of whether participants interact.  Defining interorganizational cooperation 
broadly and studying the concept within a complex adaptive systems framework allows the 
present study to more aptly model this dynamic process of information exchange, feedback, and 
decision making. 
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE POLICY PROBLEM: COLLECTIVE ACTION 
WITHOUT HIERARCHY 
The inability to facilitate collective action without hierarchy is a fundamental problem in 
political science, public administration, and public policy as interorganizational cooperation and 
horizontal models of governance continue to gain prominence in both theory and practice 
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(Ostrom 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2003; Feldman and Khademian; 2002; Chisholm 1989).1  
Identifying the factors that influence cooperation is significant because it improves our 
understanding of the structures and processes of governance and improves our operational ability 
to respond to change.  It allows us to initiate policies that promote governance structures that 
focus on organizations voluntarily solving shared problems.  Goverance, after all, is considered 
to be a “collective decision-making process” between organizations across sectors and levels of 
government (Miller and Lee 2011, p. 126).  The focus on voluntary cooperation, following 
Bardach’s (1998) notion of “getting agencies to work together” and Comfort’s (1999) vision for 
self-adapting organizations, represents an alternative to traditional, hierarchical administrative 
strategies such as command-and-control.  I explore how organizations achieve a unity of effort 
without necessarily creating a clear unity of command. 
The increasing complexity and interdependency of policy arenas (Ackoff and Roven 
2003; Ostrom 2005; Dunn 2008) and the corresponding increase in horizontal administrative 
arrangements (Feiock and Scholz 2010; Miller 2002; Salamon, 2002; Kettl, 2002) necessitate an 
improved understanding of what promotes and what inhibits collective action without a clear 
hierarchy.  Whether in the public, private, or nonprofit sectors, the ability to cooperate 
increasingly distinguishes an organization’s capacity to adapt to changing conditions.  The 
present study’s goal is to create a model of how organizations can interact more effectively and 
efficiently and offer possible alternatives on how to create more effective, less expensive 
delivery of public services through cooperation, which will be a contribution to the governance 
                                                 
1 Practitioners and theorists alike recognize the increasing importance of cooperative arrangements across 
sectors, ranging from information sharing to more collaborative, resource-intensive activities (Agranoff, 2007; Kettl 
2002; Salamon 2002; Cigler 1999).     
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and institutional collective action literatures.  I present a model of a polycentric system of 
governance that through many cooperative activities serves the needs of a specific policy arena, 
emergency management. 
1.3 THEORETICAL QUESTIONS: EXPLORING THE FACTORS THAT 
INFLUENCE COLLECTIVE ACTION WITHOUT HIERARCHY 
The present study uses complex adaptive systems theory as well as work on administrative 
decision making, particularly the role of cognition, as a theoretical basis on which to explain 
how, when, and why organizations cooperate.  It uses the three concepts of variation, interaction, 
and selection to characterize how systems operate without a central authority, applying Axelrod 
and Cohen’s (1999) broad framework to a specific domain of administrative practice.  It 
advances administrative theory by using a complex adaptive systems lens through which to view 
the structure and process of cooperation in a particular field study setting.  I identify variation 
within the system, the interaction that takes place, and the decision making process in which 
agencies either select or reject the strategy of collective action.  
The first theoretical question posed in the present study explores the variation that exists 
in terms of agencies, their missions, the demands of the external environment, and their ability to 
engage in collective action.  Variation among agencies and their environments creates different 
strategies for action as well as abilities to recognize need, which may present barriers to 
cooperation or may serve as a source of innovation depending on the system’s ability to adapt.  
The second theoretical question focuses on the interaction that occurs within the field study area.  
Patterns of interaction (who interacts with whom, to what extent, and for what purposes) 
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influence information exchange and shapes and constrains the decision making of organizations.  
The present study models the patterns of interaction that occur to identify the structure of the 
system.  Finally, the third theoretical question explores the factors that promote and/or inhibit the 
decision to engage in collective action.  This is fundamentally a question of selection.  What 
factors influence the selection of specific strategies for collective action?  The results are 
comprised of a mix of external demands as well as components of administrative structure and 
process.  Several of these components amount to professional capital, which becomes the basis 
for collective action.  These decisions serve as the building blocks for a polycentric system of 
governance. 
1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The present study is divided into ten chapters.  Chapter 1 outlines the problem of collective 
without central authority and the theoretical questions of variation, interaction, and selection.  
The significance in terms of policy salience and timeliness demonstrates the importance of the 
study.   
Chapter 2 reviews what has been written about collective without central authority.  The 
range of literature is considerable.  Many notable thinkers have addressed the problem.  
Perspectives include theories of collective action both inside and outside of the context of the 
policy domain of emergency management.  Ostrom’s (2005) institutional analysis and 
development (IAD) and complex adaptive systems are reviewed for relevance and evaluated 
regarding their contributions to identifying factors that promote cooperation.  Understanding that 
interorganizational cooperation is a strategy used by actors to adapt to changing conditions is 
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critical in framing the issue in a dynamic context and hopefully adds to the available body of 
knowledge.   
Chapter 3 explores the challenge of matching limited methodological tools with the 
complex, dynamic nature of the research problem and the field study area.  The advantage of a 
mixed-methods approach is reviewed as are the research questions, methods, and available data.  
Chapter 3 also devotes considerable attention to the operationalization of constructs and their 
implications with respect to validity and reliability.   
Chapter 4 outlines variation in terms of the demands of the external environment and the 
available strategies for managing risk and organizing administrative tasks.  It identifies the 
variation that exists among system participants, their roles and functions, their exposure to risk, 
their vulnerability, and their ability to reduce risk.  This variation creates heterogeneity across 
agencies with respect to their strategies for action. 
Communication between agencies helps to create a common knowledge base.  This 
information facilitates the recognition of opportunities for collective action.  Chapters 5 and 6 
model patterns of interaction, identifying the levels of system integration achieved through 
interorganizational cooperation.  Chapter 5 outlines the various types of cooperative activities in 
the field study area and identifies which agencies engage in them.  In Chapter 5, I argue that 
cooperative activities are the building blocks for polycentric systems of governance.  I present a 
model of an integrated, interdependent system of emergency management as opposed to the 
established sequential cycle of disaster response.   
Chapter 6 focuses on the existing patterns of interactions among agencies during one 
specific cooperative activity, response operations during emergencies.  It identifies key actors as 
well as the architecture of the system, describing it as both a small-world and a scale free 
  10 
network (Watts and Strogatz 1998; Barabási and Albert 1999).  The structure demonstrated is 
characterized by several subgroups of densely connected agencies (a small world model) linked 
together by a core group of highly connected boundary spanners (a scale-free network).  These 
findings reveal what I label as a neighborhood-centered network model for emergency 
management. 
Chapter 7, 8, and 9 explore why managers select various cooperative strategies or fail to 
do so.  The policy decision to cooperate is influenced by elements of both administrative 
structure and process.  Components of structure include organizational designs, goals, resources, 
and rules.  It also encompasses the technical infrastructure used to store and communicate 
information.  Components of process include organizational culture, leadership, and the role of 
interpersonal relationships.  Decision makers recognize these components at different rates and 
in different ways.  Chapter 7 explores the elements of administrative structure.  Chapter 8 
investigates the components of administrative process.  Chapter 9 identifies the key threshold 
points that influence the decision to cooperate.  In this chapter, I identify the standards of 
professional performance that demonstrate competence and justify the decisions of managers to 
cooperate.  I label this concept professional capital. 
Chapter 10 reviews the present study’s major findings and implications.  It offers policy 
recommendations to promote collective action, such as the injection of information technology 
and other best practices.  Finally, I identify theoretical questions and suggest paths for future 
research. 
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2.0  CONCEPTS THAT PROMOTE OR INHIBIT COLLECTIVE ACTION WITHOUT 
HIERARCHY 
This chapter identifies the key factors that influence interorganizational cooperation as found in 
the extant literature dealing primarily with public and nonprofit agencies.  Several studies 
demonstrate that collective action does indeed occur in the absence of a command-and-control, 
centralized authority on both the individual level (Axelrod 1984) and the organizational levels 
(Chisholm 1989; Mattessich and Monsey 1992; Bardach 1998).  Various studies have introduced 
factors as either individual variables or as components of larger, interdependent systems.  The 
first sections of this chapter identify several variables.  The final sections review relevant 
research on dynamic systems that offer approaches to understand cooperation within complex, 
multi-level policy arenas.  Ostrom’s (2005) concept of nested sets and Axelrod and Cohen’s 
(1999) model of complex adaptive systems prove to be particularly appropriate for the present 
study. 
Olson’s (1965) initial work on collective action theory provides the foundation upon 
which others, such as Institutional Collective Action (ICA) theorists, build.  Problems of free 
riding and cost minimizing, as identified in the literature, remain major obstacles to collective 
action (Bardach 1998).  Williamson’s (1975) research on transaction costs and subsequent work 
(Brown and Potoski 2003; Feiock 2007; Feiock, Steinaker, and Park 2009) provide useful ideas 
on some of the constraints faced by decisions makers in deciding whether to work across 
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organizational boundaries.    
Other research on interorganizational cooperation indicates that shared and/or interrelated 
problems as well as complementary goals are important factors (Gray 1989; Bardach 1998; 
Cigler 1999).  Complex adaptive systems (CAS) research tells us that the proximity of two actors 
both in terms of physical space and conceptual space also increases the likelihood of cooperation 
(Axelrod and Cohen 1999). 
Several factors either promote or inhibit cooperation depending on the context of the 
situation.  These factors include formal incentives to act and the state of cognition, i.e. the ability 
of decision makers to recognize and understand key elements in their environments.  Factors also 
include the organizations’ capacity for learning and various community attributes that constrain 
possible actions and outcomes. 
The sections below introduce several interrelated concepts dealing with complexity and 
how they represent the architecture of cooperation.  These concepts—complex adaptive systems, 
scale-free networks, and the small-world model—hold implications for identifying the factors 
that influence interorganizational cooperation.  Elinor Ostrom’s (2005) work also offers an 
effective conceptual framework to explore cooperation in multi-level systems.   
2.1 FACTORS THAT PROMOTE COOPERATION 
2.1.1 Shared and/or Interrelated Problems as Opportunities to Cooperate 
Shared and/or interrelated problems create opportunities to pursue joint gains and common goals 
(Bardach 1998; Gray 1989) and reduce shared risk (Comfort 1999).  The recognition of shared or 
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interrelated problems creates a rationale for joint action.  Where common ground, i.e. the clarity 
of common purpose between organizations, is established, multilateral approaches can be 
developed to affect change (Bardach 1998; Gray 1989; Schermerhorn 1975).  Clearly defined 
problems enable the creation of goal consensus, which is helpful in promoting cooperation 
(Agranoff 2007; Goldsmith and Eggers 2004).  However, goal consensus is not necessary for 
collective action as specific individual goals can differ, but interrelate and promote interaction 
(Provan and Kenis 2008).   
Ill-structured problems—where actors exhibit conflicting and/or different perspectives 
and cannot reach common ground—represent a major barrier to collective action (Weber and 
Khademian 2008; O’Toole 1997).  When decision makers fail to reach consensus on identifying 
a problem, an agreement on joint strategies for action is less likely.  The recognition of 
interrelated problems, therefore, offers an important impetus for collective action.  The mutual 
recognition of shared and/or interrelated problems can be prompted by several factors including 
fiscal stress, focusing events, and/or threats to the stability of organizations posed by dynamic, 
changing conditions.  
2.1.1.1 Fiscal Stress 
In circumstances where organizations experience or anticipate fiscal stress, cooperative 
arrangements offer strategies to ensure organizational survival and maintenance (Cigler 1999).  
For example, organizations have the option to “contract out” the production and/or provision of 
goods and services to other agencies to achieve cost savings (Savas 1987).  Also, resource 
sharing is a common strategy in which organizations share personnel, information, and 
equipment in order to achieve cost savings (Kearns 2000).   
A central challenge faced by local government agencies, for example, is to provide 
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needed services in the face of fiscal pressure (Carr, LeRoux, Feiock, and Shrestha 2007).  Fiscal 
stress or perceived stress encourages cooperation as decision makers attempt to reduce costs or 
maintain several levels (Cigler 1999; Sonenblum, Kirlin, and Ries 1977; Joassart-Marcelli, and 
Musso 2005).  Lack of revenue forces officials to adapt and find other strategies to address 
service provision needs.   
High per capita property taxes are considered an indication of municipal fiscal stress 
(LeRoux and Carr 2007).  Interestingly, LeRoux (2006) and Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) find 
that both very low income and very high income encourages cooperation.  Increased federal and 
state revenue are considered an indicator for cooperation (Krueger and McGuire 2005; LeRoux 
and Carr 2007).  High levels of intergovernmental revenue may indicate fiscal stress and in some 
instances may be contingent upon cooperation. 
2.1.1.2 Focusing Events 
Focusing events (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Kingdon 1984) such as disasters 
(Comfort 1999) direct attention to problems and lead to cooperation between organizations 
(Cigler 1999).  They provide opportunities for organizations to recognize urgent need and 
develop strategies to address specific problems.  They also create environments in which more 
people are willing to contemplate strategies not previously considered feasible and take steps to 
initiate change (Keeler 1993).    
2.1.1.3 Vulnerability 
Organizations attempt, in varying degrees, to balance the exploitation of existing 
strategies with the exploration for innovation (March 1999; Axelrod and Cohen 1999).  
Organizations that achieve an appropriate balance are more likely to recognize risk and 
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vulnerability as they attempt to reconcile their internal goals and capabilities with the changing 
demands of their external environments.  Identifying an organization’s vulnerability to any 
number of risks prompts the formation of innovative strategies, including cooperative 
arrangements, intended to mitigate negative consequences (Mileti 1999; Comfort 1999).   
2.1.2 Complementary Goals 
Shared and/or interrelated problems create common cause.  Complementary goals and missions 
offer opportunities for cooperation between organizations (Kearns 2000; Cigler 1999).  In certain 
cases, organizations and people are willing to overcome costs and invest their time, energy, and 
resources to achieve goals, whether they are directed toward specific mission-driven outcomes, 
the desire for survival/maintenance, or the increase in the existing stock of knowledge, skills, 
and/or number of external relationships.  For the most part, participants expect to gain some sort 
of value-added benefit as a result of cooperation (Schermerhorn 1975; Gray 1989).  However, 
depending on the mission and culture of the organizations, what constitutes a perceived benefit 
ranges from the desire for material gain to other goals such as increased public visibility, the 
advancement of a community-oriented mission, the creation of synergies to achieve more with 
less, and the elimination of duplicated services (Kearns 2000).   
With respect to the goal of organizational survival and maintenance, resource dependence 
theory anticipates that organizations lacking materials or expertise will pursue relationships with 
organizations that possess them (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  In this case, there is a motivated 
organization that seeks out assistance from a more powerful actor that may receive renumeration 
in return for services.  Their goals, while not the same, complement each other and facilitate 
cooperative arrangements. 
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Cost saving represents one of the most prevalent expectations that motivate cooperative 
arrangements between local governmental agencies (Sonenblum, Kirlin, and Ries 1977; Stein 
1990; Hamilton 1999; Hodge 2000; Post 2004).  In addition to cost saving, local government 
agencies see cooperation as a means to improve the quality and effectiveness of their public 
goods and services (Stein 1990; Thurmaier and Wood 2002; Post 2004).   
Local government agencies use cooperative arrangements to ensure service continuity 
across jurisdictional boundaries.  Service continuity reduces the likelihood that residents will 
leave for neighboring communities that offer better goods and services (Ugboro, Obeng, and 
Talley 2001; Post 2004).  Common goals clearly motivate certain agencies to work together. 
2.1.3 Immediate Benefit 
Cooperation is more likely, according to Axelrod (1984), if participants perceive the attainment 
of an immediate benefit as it provides justification for interaction and an incentive for future 
work.  The anticipation of an immediate benefit reduces ambiguity and the apparent risks of 
investing in a cooperative relationship.  Axelrod (1984) does not argue that an immediate benefit, 
as opposed to a long-term benefit, is necessary for cooperation, but rather immediate payoffs 
increase the likelihood for collective action. 
2.1.4 Trust 
Preexisting trust is seen as a major factor that facilitates interaction (Axelrod 1984; Putnam 
2000; Gulati and Nickerson 2008).  Trust emerges in situations where actors are familiar with 
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each other, interact over time, and develop respect for one another (La Porte and Metlay 1996).  
Trust lowers transaction costs and other barriers to cooperation (Feiock 2007). 
2.1.5 Norms of Reciprocity and the “Shadow of the Future” 
More than trust, Axelrod (1984) finds that reciprocity in anticipation of future interaction 
facilitates cooperation.  To maintain cooperation, two key conditions are that “cooperation [is] 
based on reciprocity and that the shadow of the future is important enough to make this 
reciprocity stable” (Axelrod 1984 p. 173).  Actors decide to cooperate largely with the 
expectation that their cooperation will be reciprocated in time or they will be repaid in some way 
(Ostrom and Walker 2003).  Thurmaier and Wood (2002) argue that local government personnel 
are motivated, not solely by cost benefit ratios, but by their desire to help their neighbors and 
engender reciprocity for future interaction.   
The concept of “the shadow of the future” represents the extent to which actors envision 
future interaction.  Increased frequency of interaction increases the likelihood that actors 
anticipate future cooperation, thus the stability and durability of a relationship may be 
strengthened by more interaction. 
2.1.6 Network Management Skills 
In public management networks, top-down administrative skills often fail to achieve key 
processes in terms of attaining group consensus, organizing work, and making other types of 
decisions especially in situations where power is shared, but not necessarily equal (Kickert and 
Koppenjan 1997; Milward and Provan 2000; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Arganoff 2007).  
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Cooperation is more likely when managers exhibit effective network management skills such as 
“big-picture thinking, coaching, mediation, negotiation, risk analysis, contract management, 
ability to tackle unconventional problems, strategic thinking, interpersonal communications, 
project and business management, and team building skills” (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, p. 
158).  While considerable gaps remain in the literature regarding how administrators manage 
networks (at different levels and with various purpose), communication skills and the willingness 
to share information represent key characteristics, particularly by people who demonstrate 
knowledge in their organizations’ activities, regulations, and abilities.  Knowledge of 
organizational capacity facilitates the recognition of opportunities to cooperate or the potential to 
improve existing arrangements (Agranoff 2007, p. 105).  Network management skills bolstered 
by knowledge and experience promote interorganizational cooperation. 
2.1.7 Proximity (Physical and Conceptual) 
It is logical to assume that an actor is more likely to cooperate with others that are in close 
proximity to them in terms of both physical space (geography) and conceptual space (a set of 
categories related to ideas, missions, and goals) simply because they have a greater chance of 
coming into contact with them (Axelrod and Cohen 1999).  In social networks, actors exhibit the 
tendency to interact with others who share similar characteristics (Holland 1995).  Lazarsfeld and 
Merton (1954) coined the expression homophily to describe the phenomenon, based on Burton’s 
(1927) observation that “birds of a feather flock together.”  Organizations follow this pattern at 
times.  For example, “applied to local government institutions, homophily suggests that one 
jurisdiction will only cooperate with another if the characteristics of the communities are 
similar” (LeRoux 2006, p. 34).  Physical and conceptual proximity (in terms of spatial closeness 
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and mission similarity) offer organizations similar characteristics that “consistently facilitate the 
formation of aggregates...” (Holland 1995, p. 12), i.e. they promote cooperation.    
In Institutional Collective Action (ICA) research, variables based on geographic location 
are often included to measure the institutional supply of potential cooperative partners.  These 
geographic variables include the concepts of adjacency (LeRoux 2006; Feiock 2007; LeRoux 
and Carr 2007; Post 2004), density within a given geographic area (Ferris and Graddy 1986; Post 
2004), and collocation within the same metropolitan statistical area (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991; 
Krueger and McGuire 2005).  The literature suggests that increased adjacency and density 
increase the likelihood for cooperation (Post 2004).2  
2.2 FACTORS THAT INHIBIT COOPERATION 
2.2.1 Transaction Costs 
Cooperative arrangements exact costs in terms of time, energy, information, and resources.  
These transaction costs represent major barriers to decision makers considering collective action.  
Five types of transaction costs affecting decision makers in public agencies have been identified.  
They include bargaining costs, information/coordination costs, negotiation/division costs, 
enforcement/monitoring costs, and agency costs (Feiock 2007).  According to Feiock, Steinaker, 
and Park (2009, p. 257), decisions makers face the following costs in organizing and 
                                                 
2 Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) find that a local government unit’s location in an MSA increases the 
likelihood for cooperation, while Krueger and McGuire (2005) find the opposite.    
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administering a cooperative agreement: 
• Personnel face bargaining costs in negotiating arrangements.   
• Personnel face information costs while collecting information to identify the preferences 
of other stakeholders and predict possible outcomes. 
• Personnel accrue negotiation/division costs when deciding how the final good or service 
will be allocated among participants. 
• Personnel face costs in enforcing and monitoring the production and distribution of the 
good or service.  Accountability mechanisms would be included in this category.    
• Personnel confront agency costs when public representatives do not fully represent the 
preference of those they govern.  Any effort to gauge the will of the constituents on a 
subject is considered an agency cost.     
 
Information helps organizations to overcome transaction costs.  Proponents of transaction 
cost theory argue that decision makers weigh the costs and benefits of each type of transaction in 
deciding to cooperate.  “The necessary condition for any cooperative agreement is an increase in 
benefits, and the larger that gain, the more likely it will outweigh the transaction costs necessary 
to achieve it” (Feiock, Steinacker, and Park 2009, p. 258).  Cooperation occurs when actors find 
it in their self-interest (Mattessich and Monsey 1992; Feiock 2004).  The ability to seek out, 
exchange, and act upon information helps to determine whether organizations choose to 
overcome costs.  This type of decision making requires timely, accurate information to make 
informed choices.  
With respect to the provision of services among local governments, for example, the 
quality and timeliness of information affects the ability of government officials to decide 
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whether to produce a service in-house or select some other alternative, i.e. contracting out 
(Brown and Potoski 2003).  It has been argued that critical information useful to make an 
informed decision regarding joint service provision or the co-production of a public good 
includes asset specificity and measurability (Williamson 1975; Brown and Potoski 2002; Feiock, 
2007).  The ability to clearly identify asset specificity, i.e. the level of unique investment needed 
to produce a good or service, and measurability, i.e. the ability to measure that good or service, 
reduces uncertainty and, in turn, lowers transaction costs (Williamson 1975; Andrew 2006).   
2.2.2 Free Riding and Cost Minimizing 
The now classic conception of collective action identifies the free-rider problem as a major 
impediment to cooperation in which several actors consume a public good without contributing 
to its production.  In this context, actors who engage in production eventually are disinclined to 
use their resources when others fail to reciprocate (Olson 1965).  Situations in which the 
exclusion of consumers is costly creates the potential for free riding as actors have a strong 
incentive to enjoy the public good at little to no cost (Olson 1965; Ostrom 2005).  In some 
circumstances, organizations that are not free riding attempt to minimize their contributions to 
the production effort.  Efforts to minimize and/or shift costs occur frequently in 
interorganizational cooperation and inhibit future interaction (Bardach 1998).   
2.2.2.1 Accountability in Cooperative Activities 
Free riding and cost minimizing limit the viability of cooperative arrangements, as actors 
willing to contribute to the common project face the prospect of either giving away valuable 
resources or paying additional costs in terms of establishing an accountability regime to ensure 
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group compliance (Kearns 1996).  Group members also worry about the attainment of goals and 
the risk of failure.  There is no one-size-fits-all accountability strategy for cooperative 
relationships (Kearns 2011).  In situations in which clear principle-agent relationships exist, 
traditional accountability strategies apply.  However, when a hierarchy is not obvious, other 
strategies are needed (Koliba, Mills, and Zia 2011; Gugerty 2009; Goldsmith and Eggers 2004).  
In certain situations, accountability models such as the adherence to professional standards of 
performance (Bardarch 1998; Smith and Lipsky 1993; Romzek and Dubnick 1987) and the need 
to fulfill public expectations (Behn 2001; Kearns 2011; Mulgan 2000) provide baseline 
assurances that enable agencies to overcome the fear of free riding and cost minimizing without 
making major investments in accountability regimes.  These types of accountability mechanisms 
depend on either direct or indirect peer pressure or pressure from outside constituents to assess 
performance and enforce standards. 
2.3 FACTORS THAT EITHER PROMOTE OR INHIBIT COOPERATION 
2.3.1 Incentives 
Individual incentives and externally-generated incentives motivate or inhibit people within 
organizations to enter into cooperative arrangements (Bardach 1998; Cigler 1999; Andrew 
2006).  Organizations do not have to share the same incentives in order to reach common ground.   
Incentives—whether exactly the same across organizations or simply complementary—promote 
either action or inaction and ought to be identified to understand the factors that promote 
cooperation.   
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Potential benefits that prompt action are shaped by both pre-established policies and 
emergent rules created during the process of interaction (Comfort 2002; Gray 1989; Ostrom 
2005).  Identifying the actions that participants are allowed to take within a given situation and 
identifying the incentives, as outlined by relevant organizational policies and rules (both 
internally and externally-produced), help us to understand the process of cooperation (Ostrom 
2005).  
2.3.1.1 Externally-generated Incentives 
Externally-generated incentives such as selective benefits and/or coercion from outside 
actors affect cooperation (Post 2004).  Federal and/or state grants, for example, motivate third-
party governance activities, which include cooperative arrangements (Goldsmith and Eggers 
2004; Salamon 2002a; Osborne and Gaebler 1992).  Olson (1965) concludes that only coercion 
can keep large groups together.  However, this maxim has not held up to empirical testing 
(Axelrod 1984; Feiock 2004).  Regardless, external incentives, in general, remain a viable, 
though not necessary, motivation for cooperative arrangements (Post 2004).  
2.3.1.2 Individual Incentives 
In addition to externally produced incentives, participants may be motivated to cooperate 
by various individual inducements.  Bardach (1998) identifies three primary individual purposes 
to act, including careerist, bureaucratic, or value-creating incentives.  A careerist incentive 
motivates the individual actor who seeks “ease, security, income, prestige, and power in the work 
setting” (Bardach 1998, p. 32).  This type of incentive is characterized by the classical 
conception of the self-interested, utility maximizer.  Bureaucratic incentives motivate individuals 
to “protect or enhance the [organization’s] resources” (Bardach 1998, p. 32).  Careerist and 
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bureaucratic incentives prompt people to follow established rules and maintain the status quo 
within organizations.  Both sets of incentives intertwine, especially as an individual gains 
bureaucratic turf and, at the same time, expands his or her power and influence.     
A value-creating purpose “aim(s) to improve the effectiveness or productivity of a 
program or agency in regard to its espoused mission…” (Bardach 1998, p. 32).  Value-creating 
incentives drive participants to pursue collective benefits that represent the public good (Bardach 
1998; Moore 1995).  The careerist and bureaucratic notions of incentives fail to account for the 
possibility that people genuinely desire to work creatively toward innovation.  Thurmaier and 
Wood (2002) assert that local government personnel are motivated, not solely by cost benefit 
ratios or careerist incentives, but by their desire to “be good neighbors.”  Nonprofit organizations 
often depend on employees and volunteers that donate time, money, and resources to achieve 
organizational missions (Salamon 2002b; Bryson 2004).  This value-creating incentive is a 
motivation that requires further investigation to gauge its effect on interorganizational 
cooperation.  
Careerist-Incentives for Professional Administrators 
In addition to altruistic purposes, some professional administrators initiate cooperative 
ventures to demonstrate innovative leadership, which may propel them to career advancement 
and promotion.  Paid personnel have greater access to information (such as state-of-the-art 
innovative strategies) and are more likely to interact with their counterparts in other local 
governments than are elected officials (Frederickson 1999).  Their information costs in initiating 
a new practice are much lower than other stakeholders as their search for information is 
facilitated by their professional network (Brown and Potaski 2003).  They do not share the same 
aversion to risk as elected officials.   
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Careerist-Incentives for Elected Officials 
Elected officials are risk adverse because voters hold them accountable every two to four 
years; therefore, they are generally reluctant to alter existing patterns of interaction and service 
provision practices (Frederickson 1999).  However, aspirations for higher office motivate elected 
officials to pursue cooperation (Feiock, Steinaker, and Park 2009).  Limited turnover (Feiock 
2007; Clingermayer and Feiock 2001) and greater tenure (LeRoux 2006; Frederickson 1999; 
Feiock 2007) are considered to be positive indicators of cooperation as stability and job security 
ease apprehensions to initiate change.  
2.3.2 Cognition 
Decision making, itself, is an important factor in understanding how organizations make the 
choice to cooperate.  As stated above, the ability to recognize common problems and cause 
facilitates collective action.  Cognition relates to the awareness, intuition, and reasoning of both 
individuals and groups and is a vital component for the decision making process, representing 
the extent to which people recognize key elements in a situation, relate them to past experiences, 
and formulate action strategies to cope with changing conditions (Klein 1993, 2000).  The ability 
to comprehend the nature of a situation and how particular actions might affect the environment 
improves decision making considerably (Comfort 2007; Hutchins 1995).  It is as simple as 
Simon’s (1997) recognition that people cannot create what they do not understand.  The 
recognition of a problem is a fundamental step to dealing with change.  Without recognizing the 
problem, people cannot develop strategies for action that engage group participation across a 
distributed system.  The ability to make sense out of a situation (Weick 1995) and recognize 
where and when collective action is advantageous is a major factor in determining what 
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organizations cooperate, with whom, and when.  
2.3.2.1 Recognition 
People make sense of ambiguity by considering history, interacting with others, and 
taking cues from their surroundings.  They focus on making plausible interpretations that 
facilitate the recognition of problems and corrective action (Weick 1995).  Klein’s (1993; 2004) 
recognition-primed decision making (RPD) model criticizes the rational decision-making 
framework in which people carefully consider alternatives based on complete information.  
Instead, “the focus is on the way [decision makers] assess the situation and judge it familiar” 
with past experiences (Klein 2004, p. 30).  People link what they are witnessing with elements of 
prior experiences or things they have seen in the past.  They take what they recognize and put the 
pieces together in a new way that helps them to interpret a given situation.  It is after they 
recognize, or make familiar, a situation that they develop a strategy for action, which may 
include cooperation.   
2.3.2.2 Developing a Strategy for Action 
According to Klein (2004), decision makers imagine the execution of possible scenarios 
to deal with recognized problems.  The first workable option, as formulated by decision makers, 
is usually selected, as opposed to the best option from a list of alternatives.  This process is 
facilitated by a decision makers’ intuition.  “Intuition depends on the use of experience to 
recognize key patterns that indicate the dynamics of the situation” (Klein 2004, p. 31).  Past 
experience and training help to develop this type of decision making ability (Flin 1996).  
Exploring the experience of leaders and frontline personnel alike facilitate an understanding of 
the role of intuition in decision making.  If decision makers have not experienced and/or learned 
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of positive cooperative arrangements relative to a specific situation, they are less likely to choose 
a cooperative strategy.   
2.3.2.3 Distributed Cognition 
Cognition takes place not only on the individual level, but also within a system where 
knowledge is distributed (Hutchins 1995).  In Cognition in the Wild, Edwin Hutchins (1995) 
acknowledges that “the complexity of a system may make it impossible for a single individual to 
integrate all the required information” (p. 241).  Hutchins (1995) recognizes that knowledge is 
distributed and that people require decision support to understand complex environments and to 
coordinate multifaceted tasks.  This decision support involves people crossing boundaries and 
interacting with others as well as with technical systems to acquire valuable information.  As 
Louise K. Comfort (2009) puts it “distributed cognition acknowledges that no one individual 
possesses the knowledge, skills, or capacity to manage rapidly evolving, interdependent events” 
(Comfort 2009, p. 1).   
In short, distributed cognition creates a group process of sharing, comprehending, 
correcting, and learning as people pursue joint strategies.  As information is shared, each 
additional piece of information represents a potential catalyst for change as people enlarge their 
understanding of relevant problems and potentially identify new strategies for action.  
Organizations that demonstrate robust patterns of communication and problem solving capacities 
should be more flexible and therefore able to identify cooperative strategies. 
2.3.2.4 Socio-technical Systems 
Technical systems facilitate cognition and the social processes of information search and 
exchange.  Socio-technical approaches to understand system dynamics recognize the uniqueness 
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of both social and technical systems, but they also recognize their interdependence and the need 
to design systems that facilitate an appropriate balance (Comfort 2007).  These systems are often 
complex and “consist of large-scale physical infrastructures (such as transportation systems and 
power distribution grids) embedded in a dense web of communication and computing 
infrastructures whose dynamics and evolution are defined and driven by human behavior” 
(Vespignani 2009 p. 425).  If the interplay between social processes and technical structures are 
understood then, theoretically, it is possible to anticipate the behavior of these systems. 
Organizations increasingly depend on information technology to facilitate 
communication.  “A socio-technical system integrates humans, computers, and organizations in 
an interactive system that transmits, receives, stores, and acts on information from the 
environment” (Comfort 2002, p. 35).  It is clear that organizations depend on technical systems 
for communication and information processing (Hutchins 1995; Simon 1996; Fountain 2001).  
These organizational arrangements are critical components to organizational learning (Argyris 
1993; Argyris and Schön 1995).  It is recognized that system performance often depends on a 
robust communication process and data repository that transmits information to the key decision 
makers in a timely fashion and allows for feedback to correct error and/or to anticipate 
uncertainty (Graber 2003; Argyris 1993; Schein 1992).    
Communication is critical to cooperation (Graber 2003; Chisholm 1989; Gray 1989; 
Axelrod 1984).  How technology facilitates cooperation depends not only on the capabilities of 
the technology itself, but also the social processes inherent in the organization and in the system.  
The internet, for example, does not in itself foster cooperation, but it contributes as a facilitator 
of communication.  “The internet allows networked organizations to extend control and 
coordination more easily across organizations. Information technology does not, and cannot by 
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itself, create social capital or cooperation, in the absence of a base of trust; but if easier 
communication and coordination lead to enhanced trust, then the Internet contributes” (Fountain 
2001, p. 79-80).  Understanding the dynamics implicit to socio-technical systems is critical to 
initiating and managing cooperation. 
2.3.2.5 Importance of Cognition 
Understanding cognition is a key to understanding how decision makers select a specific 
strategy, i.e. whether to cooperate or not.  People and groups have varying levels of cognition.  
High levels enable decision makers to recognize problems, effectively develop solutions, and 
communicate strategies throughout the system.  Understanding cognition on the individual and 
group levels as well as identifying the key threshold points where decision makers decide to 
cooperate are critical tasks for the present study.   
Determinants based on either structure or process are insufficient in recognizing the 
factors that affect cooperation without acknowledging cognition because cognition offers a 
glimpse into a person or group’s ability to solve problems.  Identifying cognition also facilitates 
the identification of a person’s priorities and thresholds that tell us what a person will tolerate in 
terms of the status quo and conversely, what motivates a person to act, including entering into 
cooperative arrangements. 
2.3.3 Capacity for Organizational Learning 
Entering into interorganizational cooperative activities requires varying degrees of change both 
with respect to managerial procedures and frontline operations.  Cooperation, therefore, requires, 
to a certain extent, a willingness to change and learn.  The capacity of organizations to learn as 
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demonstrated by their technical infrastructure, flexibility, and culture facilitates their ability to 
adopt cooperative arrangements, especially in the face of dynamic, external environments.   
In assessing an organization’s ability to adapt to changing conditions, three indicators are 
particularly useful: 1.) The type of technical infrastructure that organizations use to seek out, 
exchange, and retain information, 2.) The degree of flexibility embedded in a.) Organizations’ 
policies that affect personnel’s ability to initiate change, b.) Patterns of formal and informal 
information exchange (including feedback loops), c.) The possession of smart/best practices 
(Bardach, 1998), and d.) Personnel’s experience and training, and 3.) The components of 
organizations’ culture, including a.) The extent to which they value of information sharing, b.) 
Their commitment to the public good, c.) Their openness to new information, d.) The ability of 
leaders to challenge fixed organizational culture in times of change (Schein, 1992), and e.) The 
prevalence of defensive routines (Argyris 1993) versus the willingness to recognize and correct 
mistakes (Comfort 1999).   
2.3.3.1 Technical Infrastructure 
The organization’s technical infrastructure used to seek out, exchange, and retain 
information provides an initial measure to evaluate a group’s ability to cooperate and/or 
coordinate activities.  Information technology and other pieces of communication equipment can 
facilitate a system-wide common operating picture, where interdependence and shared risk is 
acknowledged.  The presence or absence of interoperable information technology and 
appropriate levels of access to information plays a critical role in determining cooperation 
whereas the presence or absence of key pieces of information affects the outcome of decision 
making (Comfort 2007).  The extent to which organizations possess and use information 
technology, however, varies (Comfort 1999; Alberts, Garstka, and Stein 1999; Fountain 2001; 
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Comfort and Wukich 2009).  Organizations that participate in information sharing with other 
agencies, whether via information technology or not, engage a potential network of partners for 
future endeavors.    
Information technology not only facilitates communication across groups and systems, 
but it also offers unprecedented storage capacities that can serve as organizational memories 
(Fountain 2001).  Personnel across organizations have opportunities to identify their 
vulnerabilities to risk and communicate their findings across organizational boundaries (Comfort 
2007).   
Well-designed communication networks facilitated by information technology go a long 
way in promoting cooperation (Comfort, Sungu, Johnson, and Dunn 2001; Drabek and McEntire 
2002; Comfort and Kapucu 2006).  Open access to information creates informational capital that 
facilitates the creation of a common operating picture (Comfort and Wukich 2009) and 
encourages appropriate levels of collective action (Fountain 2001).   
2.3.3.2 Organizational Flexibility 
In changing, uncertain conditions, flexibility and the ability to improvise are considered 
important qualities (Mendonça 2007).  An organization’s flexibility is affected by its ability to 
initiate change, its patterns of formal and informal information exchange (including feedback 
loops), the possession of smart/best practices (Bardach 1998), and  varying levels of personnel 
experience and training.  The decision to enter into cooperative arrangements requires a certain 
level of organizational flexibility as cooperation requires adjustments to established practices. 
Rules 
Policies, both formal and informal, affect patterns of communication and subsequent 
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organizational flexibility in dealing with emergent external demands (Comfort 1999).  
Understanding the formal, espoused policies and rules of an organization as well as the informal 
theories-in-use, or working rules, that facilitate action are critical in identifying the factors that 
facilitate and impede decision making in an organization (Argyris 1993; Ostrom 2005).   
Patterns of Communication 
Information exchange empowers organizations to make informed decisions regarding 
potential problems and helps to build system-wide consensus regarding a problem.  The capacity 
to cooperate is enhanced significantly by the ability to seek out information, exchange it, and 
learn (Comfort 1999).  However, once information is gathered, asymmetric information flows 
and asynchronous dissemination of information constrains the development of a common 
operating picture (Comfort 2007).  In other words, actors often view problems from separate 
perspectives.  Separate perspectives generate varying views of risk and opinions regarding the 
importance of cooperative activities.  If actors within a system fail to reach a common 
understanding about a problem, cooperation is less likely to occur (Gray 1989; Comfort 2007). 
Information exchange is critical to organizational learning where actors detect and correct 
error.  Mapping the flows of information identifies who receives, or does not receive, essential 
information.  “Channels of communication vary in the number of people they connect and in the 
character of the information flows they carry.  Flows may be predominantly in one direction, 
taking the form of commands, or they may be reciprocal, involving exchanges of information 
among individuals” (Graber 2003, p. 17).  Organizations with rigidly, asymmetric flows of 
information risk missing opportunities to correct error or initiate action. 
Information flows to the appropriate personnel facilitate feedback organizational learning 
(Argyris and Schön 1995; Comfort 2007).  Single-loop learning occurs when an error is detected 
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and behavior is altered, but the values of an organization remain the same.  Double-loop learning 
occurs when the effects of action (products of learning) represent both a change in strategy and a 
change in organizational values and norms (Argyris 1993; Argyris and Schön 1995).  
Organizational learning is a key component to organizational flexibility.   
Smart Practices 
Smart practices represent the available strategies for pursuing cooperative activities.  
Bardach (1998) identifies several smart practices, including collocation of personnel, the 
adoption of shared information technology, and the practice of self-awareness exercises to 
encourage personnel to recognize the extent to which cooperating organizations are 
interdependent.  Obstacles to cooperation include challenges to implementation and the 
vulnerability of smart practices once implemented.  The disruption to current operations, the loss 
of reputation, and turf protectiveness, in general, make up significant obstacles to applying smart 
practices to the work place (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; Bardach 1998).   
Experience, Education, and Training 
Experience, education, and training facilitate the intuition, cognition, and action of 
personnel within an organization (Klein 1993; Flin 1996).  “Intuition depends on the use of 
experience to recognize key patterns that indicate the dynamics of the situation” (Klein 2004, p. 
31).  Past experience and training help to develop this type of decision making ability (Flin 
1996).  Exploring the experience of leaders and frontline personnel alike allows for an 
understanding of the role that intuition—and experience—play in decision making.  Decisions to 
cooperate in certain situations are made by personnel whose experiences, whether positive or 
negative, influence their choices.   
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Not only does experience provide positive and negative views regarding cooperation, but 
it also brings different repertoires of action to draw upon when faced with a problem or 
opportunities to act.  Organizations engage in numerous types of cooperative activities.  
Agranoff and McGuire (2003), for example, identify an array of nontraditional management 
experiences, including “seeking out policymaking information, negotiating partner arrangements, 
practicing interorganizational policymaking, leveraging and arranging multiple-source financing, 
creating financial incentives, contract management, finding and operation formal partnerships, 
and using and giving technical assistance of various kinds” (p. 97).  Managers with diverse 
experiences will have more upon which to draw when faced with problems.  Experience, 
education, and training, therefore, play key roles in determining organizational flexibility. 
2.3.3.3 Organizational Culture and Leadership 
The organization’s culture plays a key role in determining the ability to adapt to changing 
conditions.  The extent to which personnel value information sharing, their level of commitment 
to the public good, their openness to new information, their ability to lead in times of change, 
and the presence/absence of defensive routines (Argyris 1993) versus their willingness to 
recognize and correct mistakes (Comfort 1999) represent key indicators.  Organizational culture 
and leadership can either promote or inhibit an organization’s willingness to seek out and 
exchange information.  Regardless of an organization’s technical capacity, personnel must be 
willing to enter into cooperative arrangements with other organizations and organizational 
culture may influence this decision.  This concept is explored, to some extent, above with respect 
to incentives. 
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Organizational Culture 
Schein (1992) describes organizational culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions 
that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, 
that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members 
as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (p. 12).  Culture can 
either promote or inhibit cooperation.   
Defensive routines impede the recognition of error and the identification of possible 
solutions (Argyris 1993).  They represent a major impediment to organizational learning and 
effective performance (Argyris 1993; Argyris and Schön 1995).  If defensive routines are 
pervasive, an organization’s ability to enter into new relationships may be constrained.  The 
willingness of organizations to exchange information, their openness to new information, and 
their commitment to the public good offer indications of the general openness of their culture 
and their willingness to cooperate (Comfort 1999; Kapucu 2006).  In addition to defensive 
routines, vulnerabilities to cooperation exist in organizational culture in terms of high turnover 
and the prevalence of turf protection (Bardach 1998; Kearns 2000). 
Organizational Leadership 
Leadership is the “ability to step outside the culture that created the leader and to start 
evolutionary change processes that are more adaptive” (Schein 1992, p. 2).  An effective leader 
recognizes a problem, articulates a goal, and communicates an action strategy to solve the 
problem.  The key to coordinate an action strategy is to communicate, in a way people 
understand, both an understanding of the problem and the steps thought necessary to solve it.  
Again, Simon’s (1997) assertion that we cannot build what we do not understand acknowledges 
the basic cognitive functions of recognizing a situation and creating an action strategy to deal 
  36 
with it.   
Exercising visible leadership offers personnel an example to be emulated.  In conditions 
characterized by change, personnel may not recognize what organizational routines should be 
employed, so emulation of leadership represents a common sense alternative (Axelrod and 
Cohen 1999).  Strong support from a leader along with material support facilitates cooperative 
arrangements (Kearns 2000).   
2.3.4 Social Capital 
The ability to seek out information is also influenced by existing relationships.  Social capital, 
i.e. the development of trust and norms of reciprocity, facilitates cooperation (Putnam 1993, 
2000; Coleman 1988, 1990).  The desire to establish trust, engender norms of reciprocity, and 
encourage future interaction is a significant factor in initiating and maintaining collective action 
(Axelrod 1984; Chisholm 1989).  These interactions are the foundation for social capital theory 
(Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993, 2000).   
2.3.4.1 Bridging Social Capital 
Bridging social capital is emblematic of boundary spanners and policy entrepreneurs who 
build weak-tie relationships connecting disparate networks into larger systems (Agranoff 2007; 
Schneider, Teske and Mintrom 1995).  Membership in a professional organization, for example, 
links local government officials across jurisdictions and provides potential links for future 
interaction (LeRoux 2006; Brown and Potoski 2003; Thurmaier and Wood 2002; Carr, LeRoux, 
and Shrestha 2009).   
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Conventional wisdom held that power, influence, and access to information emanated 
predominantly from close relationships existing within closely connected networks.  These 
relationships are indeed vital to organizational operations (Krackhardt 1992).  Acquaintances, or 
“weak ties,” however, offer access to information and resources not otherwise available in a 
close-knit group.  Granovetter (1973) hypothesizes that weak ties form bridges to other social 
groups and offer access to new information otherwise unavailable.   
2.3.4.2 Bonding Social Capital 
Bonding social capital is characterized by tightly-clustered networks connected through 
strong ties.  Strong ties exhibit established trust that facilitate sustained interaction (Krackhardt 
1992).  Multiplexity offers a useful variable in identifying strong ties.  Isett and Provan (2005) 
explain that “multiplexity refers to the existence of multiple ties between a pair of nodes…  A 
multiplex relationship is stronger, and thus, more likely built on a foundation of trust, than a 
relationship linked by only one tie” (p. 158).  Local governments, for example, are able to 
interact with others on several issues, such as the participation in the same regional council of 
government, the provision of services, and/or the sharing of facilities.   
The stability of cooperative relationships is improved, according to Axelrod (1984), with 
increased frequency of interaction.  Multiplexity offers participants additional opportunities to 
develop trust, norms of reciprocity, and an expectation for future interaction.  Feiock, Tao, and 
Johnson (2004), for example, find that governments that cooperate in service delivery 
arrangements are more likely to work together on economic development projects.  Shrestha 
(2008) recognizes the potential of multiplexity for exploring how local governments reduce 
transaction costs, build trust, and encourage cooperation. “Analyzing multiple service relations 
simultaneously will help improve our understanding as to how the transacting jurisdictions 
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utilize these cross-policy nested relationships to respond to the transaction problems involved in 
public service provision” (Shrestha 2008, p. 121).   
2.3.4.3 Criticism of Social Capital 
 One criticism of the prevailing notion of social capital is that while it offers a 
predisposition to act, social capital theorists have been unable to explain how to sustain that 
predisposition when actions are taken, but not acknowledged or rewarded.  Social capital 
provides the initial condition for cooperation, but when actors defect from the cooperative 
agreement and trust is lost, other factors are needed to promote interaction (Axelrod 1984).  
When the anticipation of the future and existing levels of trust dissipate, social entropy 
characterizes the system and cooperation fails. 
2.3.5 Context 
Organizations operate within larger systems where external variables influence the options 
available to decision makers (Simon 1996).  Several community-level attributes have been 
identified to represent the context in which organizations interact.  Ostrom (2005) outlines a 
number of biophysical attributes that constrain what options are possible in a system.  “The 
structure of the action situations is affected by a diversity of attributes that affect how rules 
combine with physical and material conditions to generate positive or negative incentives” 
(Ostrom 2005, p. 26).  Attributes identified by Ostrom (2005) include the “values of behavior 
generally accepted in the community; the level of common understanding that potential 
participants share (or do not share) about the structure of particular types of action arenas; the 
extent of homogeneity in the preferences of those living in a community; the size and 
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composition of the relevant community; [and] the extent of inequality of basic assets among 
those affected” (Ostrom 2005, p. 26-27).  
With respect to provision of local government services, for example, researchers have 
found that population and community characteristics represent constituent demand for 
cooperative arrangements (Joassart-Marcelli and Musso 2005).  These attributes, such as 
economic status and age, may be viewed as proxies for the expectations placed on governmental 
officials by their constituents (Carr, LeRoux, Feiock, and Shrestha 2007; LeRoux 2006; Joassart-
Marcelli and Musso 2005; Oakerson 2004; Ferris and Grady 1986; Morgan and Hirlinger 1991; 
Feiock 2005; Cigler 1999). 
2.4 APPROACHES TO UNDERSTAND COMPLEX, MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEMS 
The emerging science of networks as well as Elinor Ostrom’s work on polycentric systems offer 
useful approaches to understand complex, multi-level systems.  Several relevant concepts are 
explored in the sections below.  They offer the present study a focus on systems that expands 
upon the siloed independent variables addressed in much of the existing literature.  
2.4.1 The Science of Networks 
Social science has long relied on linear models to explain phenomena.  This has constrained the 
boundaries of political science, public administration, and public policy with respect to the 
investigation of complex systems.  Relatively recent work on the “science of networks” offers 
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valuable heuristics to explore various policy arenas, heuristics that have been in large part 
ignored by the fields of political science, public administration, and public policy.   
In practice, complex systems “consist of diverse entities that interact in a network or 
contact structure…” (Page 2011, p. 25).  Researchers have identified several key structural 
features of complex systems.  Scale-free models demonstrate that some networks are dominated 
by hubs, and some hubs are more important to the maintenance and development of their systems 
than others.  Scale-free networks display a distribution of connections characterized by a power-
law and identify key participants that exhibit control within a system (Barabási and Albert 1999).  
Researchers have also identified very high levels of clustering where actors are closely 
connected with each other via relatively short paths (Watts and Strogatz 1998; Watts 2003; 
Strogatz, 2003).  This so-called “small-world effect” has powerful implications to cooperation 
whereas this structure facilitates social influence and emergence that either promotes or inhibits 
cooperation.     
Complex sociotechnical systems are not static.  Their diversity allows them to react and 
change to dynamic environmental pressures.  They are, therefore, adaptive.  Complex adaptive 
systems (CAS) research explores the structure and process of large groups and reaffirms the 
concepts included in the sections below.  Axelrod and Cohen’s (1999) model of variation, 
interaction, and selection, in particular, describes the basic dynamics in which collective action 
without hierarchy takes place.  
2.4.1.1 Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) 
The factors outlined above are components of the structure and process of the complex 
adaptive systems in which cooperation takes place.  In Harnessing Complexity: Organizational 
Implications of a Scientific Frontier, Axelrod and Cohen (1999) characterize adaptation within 
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complex adaptive systems as a three-step process that includes variation, interaction, and 
selection.  Understanding the variation of agents and resources within a system, the factors that 
drive interaction, and most critically how agents come to select their actions ties together the 
factors identified in the previous sections of this chapter.  The variation, interaction, and 
selection model helps to explain how, why, and when organizations decide to cooperate in 
conditions devoid of a central authority.   
Variation 
The adaptability and power of a complex adaptive system derives from the variety of 
actors within it.  Adaptation requires varying perspectives and capacities to facilitate change 
(Axelrod and Cohen, 1999).  The present study identifies heterogeneity in previous sections in 
terms of actors, goals, incentives, and other attributes.  The heterogeneity of a system increases 
the possible actions available to participants (Holland 1995).   
Interaction 
Interaction in a complex adaptive system answers the question of what actors interact 
with who and when.  Interactions facilitate the exchange of ideas feedback processes that are 
vital to learning and change (Argyris, 1993; Argyris and Schön, 1996).  “When the conditions 
are right, the players can come to cooperate with each other through trial-and-error learning 
about possibilities for mutual rewards, through imitation of other successful players, or even 
through a blind process of selection of the more successful strategies with a weeding out of the 
less successful ones” (Axelrod 1984, p. 182).  
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Selection 
Variation provides strategies for innovation.  Interaction diffuses these strategies and 
helps to create new ones.  Selection represents the process of deciding what strategies to copy 
and what strategies to eliminate.  Individuals choose what strategies to adopt and what strategies 
to dismiss.  Regardless of the context, the choice to cooperate comes down to individual actors.  
The capacity to select strategies represents a key factor that leads to cooperation.   
Several issues are relevant in selecting what strategies to perpetuate and what strategies 
to end, including: 1.) Defining criteria for success, 2.) Determining whether selection is at the 
level of agent or strategies, 3.) Attributing credit for success or failure, and 4.) Creating new 
agents or strategies (Axelrod and Cohen, 1999, p. 118-119). 
2.4.1.2 Scale-Free Networks 
Examples of Barabási’s (2009) scale-free network model follow a power-law distribution 
due to the existence of a few central nodes that connect with a disproportionate number of lesser-
connected actors.  These hubs represent critical nodes on which the system depends.  Because of 
their centrality within the network, they possess the opportunity to exert high levels of control 
over other actors.  Identifying the central hubs of a scale-free network represents a key step in 
recognizing the critical components of a system. 
2.4.1.3 Small-World Model 
Watts and Strogatz (1998) demonstrate that certain networks are comprised of actors 
closely-connected through relatively short paths.  If organizational networks exhibit small-world 
tendencies then there are implications with respect to cooperation.  In highly-connected groups, 
actors exhibit social influence over each other.  Actors take cues from the failures and successes 
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of others.  In densely-connected networks in which actors influence each other, strategies emerge 
and spread without a central authority directing the action (Watts 2003).   
2.4.2 Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) 
The present study employs elements of Ostrom’s (2005) framework to model scalable, nested 
sets of organizations explored in the field study area.  A critical assumption in the present study 
is that actors in a given action situation are influenced not just by their immediate counterparts, 
but also by actors that exhibit control over the larger policy system at varying levels (Ostom, 
2005).  One example cited above is the influence of federal and state agencies in promoting 
cooperation between local government agencies.  According to Ostrom (2005), the position an 
actor assumes in a situation, the actions that they are allowed to pursue, the potential outcomes of 
action, the control that other actors exhibit over them, and the potential costs and benefits of 
initiating action shape participant expectations and subsequent actions.  These factors are 
constrained by the nature of specific events and the attributes of the actors and the communities 
involved. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Scholars have paid considerable attention to the problem of achieving collective action without 
hierarchy.  The models presented above offer varying perspectives on how to explain the 
phenomenon and how to identify its impediments.  Understanding how structural factors, i.e. 
available resources, rules, etc., influence decision making is useful.  However, only relying on 
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structural factors as measured through linear methods is insufficient in identifying the factors 
that promote collective action.  Transaction cost and social capital literature provides process-
related variables on which to expand such as trust and the availability of key pieces of 
information.  Still, the problem is not fully addressed if we neglect the multiple scales of 
interaction in which agencies operate.  This is where Ostrom’s (2005) institutional analysis and 
development framework as well as the emerging science of network models assist in 
characterizing the complex dynamic of many policy systems.  Using new methods of analysis to 
approach the research problem, I demonstrate how organizations overcome hierarchical rigidities 
and develop a set of common strategies to pursue their goals. 
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3.0  RESEARCH METHODS 
The present study explores the factors that influence cooperation among emergency management 
organizations, using a set of agencies operating in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania as a specific 
field study area.  This system includes municipal, county, state, and federal agencies.  Using a 
mixed methods approach, the present study employs both quantitative and qualitative methods 
with the assumption that together these methods offer a more effective strategy than any single 
method to understand the research problem (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007).  I use these 
research methods to explore and establish a new model, a nonlinear model, to explain the policy 
decisions of managers to cooperate with other agencies.  The limited operationalization of 
interorganizational cooperation in the literature necessitates an improved understanding of the 
available range of cooperative activities and the factors that influence whether they occur.3  The 
interpretation of data derived from domain expert interviews provides insight as well as 
validation for the statistical, network, and documentary analyses described below.  Network 
analysis clearly demonstrates the patterns of collective action that occur and provides insight to 
explain the phenomenon.   
                                                 
3 Institutional collective action literature largely focuses on formal agreements between local governments 
regarding the decision to produce a public good or service in-house or contract out and, generally, regress these 
variables against a limited set of measures (Feiock 2004).   
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3.1 FIELD STUDY AREA 
3.1.1 Emergency Management Networks 
Emergency management represents a classic shared problem and provides a unique area of study 
because of the ability of organizations to shift very quickly from routine management activities 
to operations in dangerous, uncertain environments, and back again.  This provides an ideal area 
to explore the factors that influence cooperation as changing demands produced by dynamic 
environments create opportunities to cooperate at greater frequency than normal, administrative 
conditions.  For further justification of emergency management as an appropriate field study 
area, please see Chapter 4.    
3.1.2 Allegheny County, Pennsylvania 
The present study focuses on one field study location—Allegheny County, Pennsylvania—which 
is appropriate because of its size, complexity, and diversity.  While it is just one county, it has a 
range of organizations characterized by much heterogeneity in terms of size, fiscal capacity, 
experience, training, exposure to risk, and the ability to reduce risk.  The large number of 
organizations and the range of organizational characteristics allow the researcher to explore 
several propositions regarding cooperation.  County governments generally lack the legal 
authority to mandate compliance from municipal agencies, which further justifies the field study 
area as an appropriate example for exploring collective action without hierarchy.  For additional 
justification of Allegheny County as an appropriate location, please see Chapter 4.    
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3.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The present study focuses on identifying the factors that influence interorganizational collective 
action without hierarchy, including components of administrative structure and process.  The 
present study also explores a range of emergency management activities as well as public safety-
oriented and traditional administrative activities to identify the types of cooperative activities that 
occur and the extent to which they occur.       
What are the factors that influence interorganizational cooperation? 
1. What variation exists within the system in terms of vulnerability, the participants, 
their roles, and their organizational capacity for action? 
• Who are the participants? 
• What are the participants’ roles? 
• What is the variability in terms of the external environment, i.e. the social, physical, 
and built infrastructures? 
• What is the variability of the organizations’ operational capacity in terms of 
experience, training, and technical infrastructure? 
 
2. What types of cooperative activities do organizations pursue? 
 
3. To what extent do emergency management organizations cooperate or fail to do so? 
 
4. What are the existing patterns of interactions among agencies during response to 
small-scale to medium-scale emergency management incidents? 
• What are the key measures of the network (degree centrality, density, distance, 
betweenness)? 
• What organizations appear to be influential and what are their characteristics? 
• Does the network exhibit scale-free and small-world tendencies?  
 
5. What are the components of administrative structure—both espoused and in-use—
that affect interorganizational cooperation? 
• What problems and goals provide the opportunities and constraints for collective 
action? 
• What rules influence the decision to cooperate? 
• What incentives—both formal and informal—provide the motivation to cooperate or 
not to cooperate? 
• What is the role in technical infrastructure, i.e. communication and information 
technology, in facilitating cooperation? 
• What is the role of geographic and conceptual proximity? 
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• What control do actors at various levels of the system exert over other participants? 
 
6. What are the components of administrative process—both espoused and in-use— 
that affect interorganizational cooperation? 
• What are the formal and informal patterns of communication that occur both during 
agency-related activity and outside of the official duties and how do they affect 
whether organizations cooperate? 
• To what extent do individual positions accrue influence and how does this influence 
affect interorganizational cooperation?   
• To what extent does organizational culture affect interorganizational cooperation?   
 
7. What are the key threshold points that influence decisions to cooperate or to not 
cooperate? 
• What factors promote or inhibit cooperation and what are the key threshold points 
that influence action? 
• How do emergency managers make decisions to cooperate or fail to do so? 
• What factors are recognized at different levels of jurisdiction (municipal, county, 
state, and federal) and what factors are similar across jurisdictions? 
3.3 PROPOSITIONS FROM THE LITERATURE 
The literature provides a number of propositions to explore collective action in situations without 
a central authority.  The present study, primarily exploratory, does not focus on the empirical 
testing of hypotheses.  Instead, the researcher concentrates on identifying propositions for future 
research.  Propositions from the literature (outlined in Tables 1-4) provide initial guideposts 
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Cooperation is more likely when organizations experience serious fiscal stress 
(Cigler 1999; Sonenblum, Kirlin, and Ries 1977; Joassart-Marcelli, and Musso 
2005).  
Cooperation is more likely when organizations either experience serious fiscal 
stress or enjoy high levels of revenue (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991).  
Focusing events increases the likelihood of cooperation (Comfort 1999; Cigler 
1999).       
The recognition of organizational vulnerability to various risks increases the 
likelihood of cooperation (Mileti 1999; Comfort 1999).   
Complementary 
Goals 
The desire to achieve cost savings increases the likelihood of cooperation 
(Sonenblum, Kirlin, and Ries 1977; Stein 1990; Hamilton 1999; Hodge 2000; Post 
2004). 
The desire to improve the quality and/or effectiveness of the public goods and/or 
services provided increases the likelihood of cooperation (Stein 1990; Thurmaier 
and Wood 2002; Post 2004). 
The desire to ensure service continuity across jurisdictional boundaries increases 
the likelihood of cooperation (Ugboro, Obeng, and Talley 2001; Post 2004).   
 Organizations lacking materials or expertise are more likely to pursue 
cooperative arrangements (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).   
Immediate Benefit 
Cooperation is more likely if participants perceive the attainment of an 
immediate benefit as it provides justification for interaction and an incentive for 
future work (Axelrod 1984). 
Trust 
Cooperation is more likely when pre-established trust exists between potential 
partners (Axelrod 1984).   
Norms of 
Reciprocity and the 
“Shadow of the 
Future” 
Cooperation is more likely when potential participants desire to reciprocate for 
past interaction (Axelrod 1984). 
 Cooperation is more likely when potential participants expect future interaction 
(Axelrod 1984; Ostrom and Walker 2003).  
Network 
Management Skills 
Cooperation is more likely when managers exhibit effective network 
management skills such as "big-picture thinking, coaching, mediation, 
negotiation, risk analysis, contract management, ability to tackle unconventional 
problems, strategic thinking, interpersonal communications, project and business 
management, and team building skills" (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, p. 158).  
Proximity (Physical 
and Conceptual) 
Organizations are more likely to cooperate if they share a close physical proximity 
in terms of adjacency (LeRoux 2006; Feiock 2007; LeRoux and Carr 2007; Post 
2004), density within a given geographic area (Ferris and Graddy 1986; Post 
2004). 
Organizations that share ideas, missions, and goals are more likely to cooperate 
(Axelrod and Cohen 1999). 
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Table 2: Propositions from the Factors that Inhibit Cooperation 
Concept Proposition 
Transaction Costs 
Cooperation is less likely when participants perceive the transaction costs of 
pursuing agreements and strategies as too high. 
The ability to clearly identify asset specificity, i.e. the level of unique investment 
needed to produce a good or service, increases the likelihood of cooperation as 
organizations recognize the benefits of achieving economies of scale (Shrestha 
2008; Carr et al. 2009; Brown and Potoski 2003). 
If organizations question the stability of their cooperative arrangements and/or 
the value of a potential long-term commitment then high asset specificity will 
inhibit cooperation (Feiock 2007).   
As the ability to measure a good or service produced (measurability) becomes 
more difficult, organizations are less likely to cooperate (Feiock 2007; Brown and 
Potoski 2003). 
Free Riding and Cost 
Minimizing 
Organizations are less likely to cooperate if they suspect potential partners to 
free ride or cost minimize (Olson 1965; Bardach 1998). 
Organizations are more likely to overcome fears of free riding and cost 
minimizing and cooperate when potential partners adhere to standards of 
professional performance (Romzek and Dubnick 1987). 
Organizations are more likely to overcome fears of free riding and cost 
minimizing and cooperate when potential partners demonstrate the need to 
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Table 3: Propositions from the Factors that Promote or Inhibit 
Concept Proposition 
Incentives 
Cooperation is more likely when federal and/or state grants promote cooperative 
activities (Post 2004).   
Cooperation is less likely when laws fail to reduce liability for cooperative 
activities. 
Cooperation is more likely when decision makers recognize opportunities to 
“improve the effectiveness or productivity of a program or agency in regard to its 
espoused mission…” through cooperative activities (Bardach 1998, p. 32).   
Cooperation is more likely when decision makers recognize opportunities to 
create personal “ease, security, income, prestige, and power in the work setting” 
through cooperative activities (Bardach 1998, p. 32).   
Cooperation is more likely when decision makers recognize opportunities for 
career advancement in facilitating cooperative activities (Feiock, Steinaker, and 
Park 2009).   
Cooperation is more likely when decision makers recognize opportunities to 
“protect or enhance the [organization’s] resources” through cooperative 
activities (Bardach 1998, p. 32).   
Cognition 
The ability to recognize shared risk and formulate strategies for joint-action 
depends on experience and training (Klein 1993; 2004). 
Decision makers with positive experiences and/or training with respect to 
cooperation will be more likely to pursue cooperative activities. 
Organizations that value information sharing and demonstrate open 
communication channels will be more likely to recognize opportunities to 




Organizations with technical capacity to communicate with other agencies as well 
as seek out and retain critical information are more likely to cooperate (Comfort 
1999). 
Organizations with polices that promote information search and exchange are 
more likely to recognize shared risk and therefore cooperate. 
Organizations with open channels of communication are more likely to recognize 
cooperative opportunities either through formal or informal means. 
Organizations that promote innovation and possess smart/best practices are 
more likely to pursue cooperative arrangements, if it is advantageous to their 
operations (Bardach 1998). 
Positive past experience and training facilitate interaction and cooperation. 
Organizational culture that values the public good, information sharing, and is 
committed to improvement and learning increases the likelihood of cooperation. 
Leadership that recognizes the value of cooperative activities and will challenge 
established, organizational barriers to cooperation increases the likelihood for 
cooperation. 
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Turf protection and suspicious organizational cultures reduce the likelihood for 
cooperation (Bardach 1998). 
Social Capital 
The presence of boundary spanners, i.e. bridging social capital, increases the 
likelihood of cooperation (Agranoff 2007). 
The presence of multiplexity strengthens trust and increases the durability of 
cooperative relationships, i.e. bonding social capital, thus increasing the 
likelihood for future interactions. 
 






External actors influence whether organizations cooperate (Ostrom 2005). 
Scale-Free Networks 
Management networks may be scale-free networks, i.e. they display a power-law 
distribution with respect to degree centrality (Barabási and Albert 1999). 
Small-World Model Management networks may fit the small-world model (Watts and Strogatz 1998). 
3.4 UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
The unit of analysis is the organization.  A major goal of the present study is to characterize the 
opportunities and constraints faced by organizations in deciding whether to work together, 
including community and biophysical variables as well as varying levels of control that 
participants exert on one another.  Several methods and data types are used to explore the 
multiple levels of attributes, interactions, and contexts that create the environments in which 
organizations cooperate.    
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3.5 METHODS 
Four types of methods will be used to explore the research questions.  They include documentary 
analysis, statistical analysis, network analysis, and the Strauss/Corbin approach to analyzing 
semi-structured interviews.  Table 5 outlines the present study’s research questions and links 
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Table 5: Linking Research Questions with Data, Sources, and Methods 
Sub-Questions Data Source Method Ch. 
What variation exits within 
the system in terms of 
vulnerability, the 
participants, their roles, 
and their organizational 






interview data  
Organizational 
websites; U.S. 
Census; PA DCED; 
Allegheny County 9-
1-1 emergency call 
response records;  
Expert interviews; 
Mon Valley survey, 







What other types of 














To what extent do 
emergency management 
organizations cooperate or 










What are the existing 
patterns of interactions 
among agencies during 



























interview data  
Organizational 
websites; U.S. 
Census; PA DCED; 
Allegheny County 9-
1-1 emergency call 




















Census; PA DCED; 
Allegheny County 9-
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What are the key threshold 
points that influence 
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3.5.1 Documentary Analysis 
The present study analyzes open source documents available on publicly-accessible websites 
such as mission statements, organizational charts, operational plans, equipment levels, and maps.  
Documentary analysis was used to identify elements of the field study’s espoused and in-use 
administrative structures and processes such as the system’s participants, their goals, the roles 
they fill, their leaders, their patterns of communication, and the laws and procedures that 
influence cooperation.   
3.5.2 Statistical Analysis 
Data from multiple sources were analyzed using descriptive statistics to identify the extent to 
which agencies interact and to evaluate the field study area’s social and economic conditions in 
terms of variation.  The present study employs analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine 
variation in organizations’ cooperative activities by geography and organizational discipline, i.e. 
fire, police, and EMS.   
3.5.3 Social Network Analysis 
Social network analysis aids the present study in conceptualizing and measuring the existing 
patterns of interactions among agencies.  Network data—coded from the Allegheny County 9-1-
1 emergency call records—were analyzed using the social network analysis software UCINET 
(Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 2002) to identify several features including: 1.) The key network 
measures such as centrality, density, distance, and betweenness; 2.) The extent to which 
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organizations interact with one another on the basis of discipline and geographic location; and 3.) 
The unique system features such as whether the network is scale free and small world. 
3.5.4 Semi-structured Interviews 
I conducted and transcribed 63 interviews with emergency managers and relevant policy makers 
and analyzed the resulting data using Strauss and Corbin’s (1990; 1998) coding process, which 
generated results via a three step process of open, axial, and selective coding.  The method 
facilitated descriptions of several factors that influence cooperation and helped to validate the 
present study’s network findings.  The results identified key threshold points that prompt the 
decision to cooperate. 
3.6 DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENT 
The present study employs several sources of data to characterize how and why organizations 
decide to cooperate in systems characterized by multiple levels of government.   
3.6.1 Open-Source Documents 
Open source documents, found on publicly-accessible websites or obtained upon request, include 
mission statements, organizational charts, operational plans, equipment levels, laws and 
procedures, and maps.  These sources enable the researcher to answer components of each 
research sub-question.  I used documentary analysis to define categories and aggregate data 
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based on the identification of the system’s participants, their goals, the roles they fill, their 
leaders, their patterns of communication, and the rules that influence cooperation. 
The websites of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Pennsylvania 
Emergency Management Agency (PEMA), Allegheny County’s Emergency Management, the 
City of Pittsburgh, and other municipalities provided relevant sources.  Several relevant state 
laws governing public safety, public health, and emergency management were analyzed to 
identify the formal incentives and constraints affecting collective action.  Several studies—
produced either by or for state agencies—offer relevant analysis on issues related to emergency 
management and public safety governance. 
3.6.2 Social, Institutional, and Economic Data 
Several sources of data were identified, acquired, and cleaned to facilitate statistical analyses, 
including information from the U.S. Census, the Pennsylvania Department of Community and 
Economic Development (DCED), results from documentary analysis, and the county’s 9-1-1 
emergency call records.  The data will be particularly useful in outlining the initial conditions in 
which agencies operate, i.e. the context that constrains what actions are possible—in terms of 
socio-economic status, municipal-level fiscal conditions, and the existing vulnerabilities to 
various threats.   
Individual data, compiled by the U.S. Census and aggregated to the community-level, 
will be used to identify socio-economic conditions and issues of vulnerability such as social, 
built, and biophysical.  “Social vulnerability is partially the product of social inequalities—those 
social factors that influence or shape the susceptibility of various groups to harm and that also 
govern their ability to respond” (Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 2003, p. 243).  Social vulnerability 
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and the vulnerability of the biophysical and built environments are interrelated.  “It also includes 
place inequalities—those characteristics of communities and the built environment, such as the 
level of urbanization, growth rates, and economic vitality, that contribute to the social 
vulnerability of places” (Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 2003, p. 243).   
Specific geographic locations and biosystems may be more vulnerable to certain threats 
than others (Mileti 1999).  Geographic location in terms of proximity to bodies of water, seismic 
activity, or volcanic activities indicates a certain level of vulnerability to potential extreme 
events.  In Allegheny County, Pennsylvania an area known for Pittsburgh’s three rivers, flooding 
is a particular threat.  A preliminary analysis of municipal maps allowed the researcher to create 
statistical data, including the number of municipalities that borders rivers or other large bodies of 
water.4   
DCED provides data on institutional-level variables for municipal police and fire 
departments that characterize some of the institutional components of the organizations involved.  
With respect to the fire discipline, data indicate whether departments are paid, volunteer, or a 
combination.  It provides the number of fire companies per municipally and indicates whether 
there is a paid fire marshal.  With respect to the police discipline, data indicate whether a 
municipality’s police service is provided in-house, contracted out, or is part of a regional 
                                                 
4 Populations depend on built infrastructure, which includes transportation components, utilities, and 
buildings in general (Johnson 2006).  Road and rail networks and transmission networks span federal, state, and 
municipal borders and create an interconnected system upon which communities depend (Watts 2004).  
Understanding their vulnerability to various threats represents a shared problem that could initiate action to mitigate 
potential disasters.  The role of built vulnerabilities in promoting cooperation will be explored in the semi-structured 
interviews. 
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department and offers relational data linking those who contract out.  It also offers the total 
number of full-time and part-time personnel.    
In addition to the fire and police information, DCED offers community-level data that 
reflect the economic status of municipalities.  Federal and state revenue per capita offer a 
measure of dependence on external sources (Krueger and McGuire, 2005; LeRoux and Carr, 
2007).  Excess/deficit revenues over expenditures, municipal revenue/expenditure per capita, 
revenue per capita, and real estate tax revenues provide a characterization of municipal-level 
fiscal strength.  Expenditures on police and fire provide information on the public levels of 
funding for municipal public safety activities.   
Allegheny County 9-1-1 and survey data provide data regarding the number of recorded 
incidents related to fire, police, and EMS functions across the county.  Documentary analysis of 
maps also provide municipalities’ number of contiguous municipal neighbors, agencies’ assigned 
9-1-1 geographic call zone, and their council of governments.5  This data may indicate levels of 
need for cooperation as well as the supply of potential partners available in close proximity to 
agencies.   
3.6.3 Semi-structured Interview with Domain Experts Data 
Semi-structured interviews (63) were conducted using a stratified random sample of emergency 
managers and relevant policy makers from throughout the system.  Questions were open-ended 
and designed to elicit the type of “thick descriptions” that describe not just the phenomenon in 
                                                 
5 Maps analyzed included municipal-level, council of government, and 9-1-1 call center zone maps for 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.   
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focus, but the context in which it occurs.  The interview data identifies the elements of 
administrative structure and process that affect cooperation and also the key threshold points that 
influence the decision to cooperate. 
The interviews were tape recorded, transcribed, and analyzed using the Strauss/Corbin 
approach with the qualitative software MAXQDA.  Emergency management personnel and 
policy makers who work in municipal fire, police, EMS and emergency management and related 
county, state, and federal agencies were contacted via email and phone calls to solicit interviews.  
A draft of the interview protocol is located in the appendix.     
 
 
Table 6: Interviews by Level of Jurisdiction and Discipline 
Level of 
Jurisdiction Fire Police EMS 
Emergency 
Mgmt Other Total 
Federal N/A N/A N/A 2 N/A 2 
State 1 2 1 4 3 11 
Regional 1 1 1 N/A 2 5 
County 2 1 1 2 N/A 6 
Municipal 14 10 10 5 N/A 39 
Total  18 14 13 13 5 63 
 
 
The researcher conducted interviews confidentially to promote the free exchange of 
ideas.  Criteria for selection included affiliation with an identified organization as well as senior-
level management status.  Municipal-level individuals, for example, were generally service 
chiefs, i.e. chief operating officers and chief executive officers.  These individuals demonstrated 
day-to-day knowledge in both discipline-related operations and administrative activities.  
Personnel at the county, regional, state, and federal levels expressed various perspectives borne 
from their level of government and responsibilities within the system. 
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Obtaining an accurate sample of the system’s participants was a critical task in pursuing 
the present study’s validity and reliability discussed below.  The present study’s interview 
sample included two federal-level agencies, the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency.  Several state agencies include the State Police, the 
Fire Commissioner’s Office, the Bureau of Emergency Medical Services (Department of 
Health), the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, and the Department of Community 
and Economic Development. 
Regionally, the Emergency Medical Services Institute (EMSI) offers an important link 
between state, county, and municipal resources.  Councils of governments (COGs) were 
identified as relevant actors.  At the county-level, the Emergency Services division served as an 
area of focus in the interview sample.  The county police also provided a key agency.  At the 
municipal-level, fire and police departments, EMS units, and emergency management 
coordinators provided vital frontline experience to the present study. 
On the municipal level, both paid and volunteer fire departments6 were represented in the 
interview sample as well as multi-municipal and single-municipal police departments.7  EMS 
units include paid, public agencies; combination (paid and volunteer) public agencies; nonprofit 
organizations; and for-profit enterprises.  Only for-profit EMS entities are unrepresented in the 
present study as none consented to an interview.   
                                                 
6 Of the 207 fire departments participating in the network, 190 are all volunteer, 14 are a combination of 
paid and volunteer, and 3 are fully paid. 
7 Of the 91 police departments, 80 are municipal-based departments that primarily administer to their 
municipality only, 10 are municipal-based departments that cover their municipality as well as contract out to other 
municipalities, and 1 (Northern Regional) is a regional department. 
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3.6.4 Survey Data 
Data is analyzed from a survey administered for the present study entitled the “Emergency 
Management Cooperation Index” (EMC Index).  Based on the National Fire Protection 
Association’s “NFPA 1600,” which identifies criteria for evaluating emergency management 
agencies, the survey was administered to 37 managers, based on the stratified sample strategy 
also used to sample domain experts.8  The results determine the extent to which agencies 
cooperate during a number of activities.  The researcher administered the survey to agencies that 
engaged in an array of both operational and administrative activities.  These criteria excluded 
several county, state, and federal agencies whose duties focused primarily on administrative 
work.   
The NFPA 1600 lists a number of activities intended to increase the effectiveness of 
emergency management agencies.  These activities are often collaborative in nature and can be 
both formal and informal.9  The addition of mutual aid—both received and rendered—to the list 
of outlined NFPA 1600 activities offers the index another indicator of actual agency practice as 
does the addition of the extent to which financial aid is given and financial aid is requested.  The 
EMC Index measures the frequency and extent to which agencies cooperate during these 
                                                 
8 The NFPA 1600 represents the standard throughout the emergency management community as an 
evaluative tool (Waugh and Streib 2006; Lindell and Perry 2007; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States 2004).   
9 Activities include risk assessment, incident prevention, mitigation activities, mutual aid planning/resource 
management, incident management procedures, communication interoperability testing, operations and procedures, 
training, evaluation and corrective actions, finance and administration, and the actual practice of mutual aid both 
received and rendered (National Fire Protection Association 2007; Lindell and Perry 2007). 
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activities and uses an additive scale to measure the extent to which agencies interact with others 
both inside and outside of their level of jurisdictions and disciplines.   
3.6.5 Network Data 
A collection of Allegheny County 9-1-1 emergency dispatch records represent empirical data 
that document patterns of interaction among emergency management agencies, i.e. fire, police, 
and EMS during the response to emergency calls.  No publication identified by the present study 
has analyzed this type of data.10  Entered into a tracking system by call center dispatchers, the 
data include incident type, time, date, location, the type of apparatus dispatched, and all 
emergency management agencies that agree to dispatch to the incident.11  Call data over seven 
months (July, August, November, and December of 2007, and March, April and May of 2008) 
were analyzed using the social network analysis software UCINET (Borgatti, Everett and 
Freeman, 2002). 
                                                 
10 Andrew (2006) studies formal cooperative agreements signed between Florida municipalities with 
respect to public safety and emergency management activities, but no one identified by the present study analyzes 
the actual network of interactions during response to 9-1-1 emergency incidents. 
11 In Allegheny County, a 9-1-1 call center receives the vast majority of emergency phone calls.  Upon 
receipt of a call, a dispatcher asks for incident type and location, which allows the dispatcher to determine the 
appropriate emergency management agency to assign as the primary responder.  Based on incident severity and 
operational need, the dispatcher may also reach out to other agencies listed on “run cards” that outline potential 
mutual and automatic aid partners based on proximity, past interaction, and special equipment and skills.  Agencies 
fill out “run cards” ahead of time, listing the agencies they are willing to support.  In addition to “run cards” as a 
determinant of selection, emergency management personnel on the scene may also request specific agency 
assistance.  Agencies that are requested decide whether to respond or to stand down. 
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The data required formatting and cleaning to conduct analysis.  First, the recording 
system uses several organizational identifiers, based on agency equipment and their location, to 
represent each agency.12  Second, in the original EXCEL spreadsheet format, responding 
agencies were listed by date, time, and address, but not in a format conducive to network 
analysis.  We used the network analysis software ORA to create relational data by linking 
agencies that responded to the same address, at the same time, on the same date.  Under the 
Incident Command System (ICS), emergency management agencies operate under a unified 
chain of command.  Cooperation, of varying intensity, is assumed if agencies respond to the 
same incident as they each are folded under a formal chain of command once they arrive on a 
scene.  The resulting network matrices included the interactions between all responding agencies 
(the meta-network) and the sub-networks based on discipline, i.e. individual fire, police, and 
EMS networks. 
3.7 THREATS TO VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
In a mixed-methods design, threats to validity and reliability exist at various levels.  The present 
study does not employ statistical methods to test causal hypotheses with the exception of the 
limited use of analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests.  Instead, it focuses on gaining an improved 
understanding of interorganizational cooperation and identifying propositions for future research.   
                                                 
12 My colleague, Steve Scheinert, designed a “find and replace” program using the statistical software 
program STATA in which we aggregated the thousands of acronyms into the appropriate agency identifiers.  I am 
grateful for his contribution. 
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With the exception of the ANOVA models employed to measure the variance in 
cooperation by geography and discipline, internal validity and statistical conclusion validity are 
generally immaterial to the present study.13  Threats to construct validity, external validity, and 
reliability are relevant and addressed below in detail.   
3.7.1 Construct Validity 
Appropriately defining key constructs and operationalizing them through suitable measurements 
are critical tasks in ensuring the validity of this dissertation (Shaddish, Cook, and Campbell 
2002).  Construct validity is the extent to which a study’s measures reflect the intended concepts.  
Several threats to ensuring the “correspondence of measure and meaning” (Innes 1990, p. 4) 
were considered and addressed in order to mitigate threats to validity.   
3.7.1.1 Construct Validity—Survey Data 
Achieving construct validity necessitates that measures adequately capture the types of 
cooperative activity that the present study attempts to characterize.  The construct validity of the 
EMC Index rests in both the recognition of the NFPA 1600 as a comprehensive evaluation tool 
(Waugh and Streib 2006), the addition of other governance related activities, and the assumption 
that higher frequencies of interaction builds interorganizational cooperative capacity through 
                                                 
13 The use of ANOVA to assess variance in the degree centrality statistic violates the technique’s 
assumption of independence of observations.  In this case, statistical conclusion validity also depends on the 
reliability of the degree centrality statistic as a proxy for cooperation.    
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information exchange and organizational learning as a means to facilitate continued collective 
action (Comfort 1999).   
Beyond achieving an adequate description and measure of cooperation (Cronbach and 
Meehl 1955), the researcher is mindful of other threats to construct validity.  By including 
indicators to gauge interaction across an array of mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery, 
and governance activities, the researcher hopes to avoid mono-operation bias.  By employing 
multiple methods of measurement, i.e. the survey and the county 9-1-1 data, the present study 
also attempts to avoid a mono-method bias or the reliance on one method (Shadish, Cook, and 
Campbell 2002).  The researcher was also cognizant of experimenter expectancy bias and sought 
to avoid any indication of “pro-cooperation” expectations while administering the EMC Index 
survey.14   
3.7.1.2 Construct Validity—Semi-structured Interviews 
In the Strauss/Corbin approach, constructs are generated by the subjects themselves and 
identified through the coding process.  The goal of validating the resulting constructs was 
                                                 
14 To test construct validity in future explanatory research, the researcher would use the concept of 
convergent validity, i.e. the assumption that the variable in question and a variable representing a similar concept 
will correlate if they are accurate measures of the concept (Campbell and Fiske 1959).  The researcher would 
compare the results of the EMC Index with the network centrality statistics using a t-test.  If the two measures 
correlate statistically, the researcher would assume that there is a certain degree of convergent validity, thus, to some 
extent, a degree of construct validity.  Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) multitrait-multimethod matrix approach to 
testing construct validity also includes the concept of divergent validity where the researcher compares a test 
variable and its theoretical opposite with the assumption that a valid measure would not correlate with its opposite.  
Whereas data were limited, the present study did not acquire an appropriate measure to test divergent validity. 
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pursued in two ways.  The researcher compared the initial propositions offered in Chapter 2 and 
the phenomenon described in the data.  A disconnection between the initial propositions and the 
data draw attention to potentially invalid constructs and conclusions.  The present study 
identifies the conflict between certain propositions and the interview responses, generally, as 
holes in the literature to be explored further.  The researcher also explored the results of previous 
interviews with other respondents during the data collection process to elicit reaction and further 
evaluation, as advised by Corbin and Strauss (2008).   
3.7.1.3 Construct Validity—Network Data 
The present study pursued construct validity by using official 9-1-1 dispatch records, 
which offer a consistent reporting of interaction during response to emergency calls.  The 
network degree centrality statistic (the total number of agencies with which an agency interacts), 
for example, is a measure of cooperation.  The researcher assumes that the higher the centrality 
statistic, the more active an agency participates in cooperative activities.  Whether the construct 
is valid depends on the degree to which agencies actually interact during response operations to 
9-1-1 dispatch calls.15   
                                                 
15 Again, the present study could test construct validity by conducting convergent validity testing, as 
described above. 
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3.7.2 External Validity 
The extent to which the present study’s conclusions will hold across different field study areas 
represents its external validity.  External validity is limited due to the small sample size of the 
test area, one county.  The limited size of the EMC Index, 37 respondents, also constrains 
generalizability, but offers a baseline assessment to compare against future research.  
Furthermore, the ability to replicate our design, made possible by detailed notes, helps to 
promote further testing and exploration (Kvale 1996; King, Kehane, and Verba 1994), which will 
test external validity.   
The field study area’s limited vulnerability to several threats that other areas experience, 
such as hurricanes and earthquakes, as well as the general lack of variance with respect to state 
laws and regulations limit external validity.  The recognition of shared risk inherent in northern 
California or southern Florida, for example, may not exist in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania or 
other areas not vulnerable to major threats.  Variability in this concept and other key constructs is 
needed to ensure external validity.  Conversely, though, with over 300 organizations analyzed, 
several attributes such as fiscal status, social vulnerability, and organizational flexibility are 
explored with some confidence. 
3.7.3 Reliability 
Reliability—in general—refers to the “consistency and stability” of the measuring instruments, 
i.e. whether they are dependable and replicable across field studies.  “A highly reliable 
measure… tells us that it is measuring something precisely or consistently” (Kerlinger and Lee 
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2000, p. 643).  To ensure the dependability of results, the present study focuses on the points 
outlined below.   
3.7.3.1 Reliability—Survey Data 
The present study’s stratified sampling design strengthens the reliability of the data by 
working to maximize systematic variance.  Face-to-face interviews were the only method of 
survey data collection.  This type of interview is considered to be the most reliable method of 
data gathering with respect to survey research (Kirlinger and Lee 2000).  Advantages include a 
high percentage of returns, a high degree of validity with respect to the information gathered, and 
the potential to collect additional information through semi-structured interviews (Miller and 
Salkind 2002).16  The researcher repeated standard, uniform instructions while administering the 
survey to reduce measurement errors and minimize error variance (Kerlinger and Lee 2000). 
3.7.3.2 Reliability—Semi-structured Interviews 
The grounded theory method as outlined in Strauss and Corbin (1998) offers a replicable 
process that is recorded throughout the research process. The categorization of concepts is tied to 
a clear and accurate transcription of the interview, which the researcher achieved by transcribing 
each interview verbatim.  The reliability of the responses is aided by carefully worded, open-
ended questions intended to derive a valid, straightforward account from the participants.  Again, 
                                                 
16 To ensure a high response rate, the researcher explained to potential participants how the survey was 
relevant to emergency managers through introductory emails and telephone calls (Miller and Salkind 2002, p. 305).   
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the stratified sampling design strengthens the reliability of the data, which will help to maximize 
the variance of experience and opinion represented.   
3.7.3.3 Reliability—Social Network Analysis 
With respect to reliability, the 9-1-1 dispatch records represent empirical data that capture 
the real-world patterns of interaction between agencies recorded as regular procedure during 
official public business.  Reliability refers to the “consistency and stability” of the measuring 
instruments.  The researcher argues that the reliability of the 9-1-1 data is strong as trained 
professional dispatchers, as a part of administrative procedure, record the agencies dispatched on 
each emergency call.  Many social network analysis studies rely on participant recollection of 
past interactions (Hanneman and Riddle 2005; Wasserman and Faust 1994).  Whereas the 9-1-1 
data is compiled in real-time through established procedures by trained professionals, the 
researcher is confident in the reliability of the data. 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
Recognizing factors on multiple levels (the individual, the subgroup, and the system) provides 
key insights on interorganizational cooperation.  Exploring the complexity of a system requires a 
mixed-methods approach that accounts for the policy arena’s scalability.  In order to establish a 
new, nonlinear model to address the research problem, I must use particular methods that 
facilitate a nonlinear understanding of the phenomena.  Analysis of semi-structured interviews 
and survey work identifies variables that influence individual decision making.  Those decisions 
aggregate to form patterns of interaction as measured by methods of network analysis.  Those 
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patterns of interaction create the structure of the system, which itself shapes and constrains future 
policy decisions regarding collective action.  The present study depends on this mixed 
assortment of methods to move beyond the linear, stages model that scholars have emphasized 
for some time and create a more dynamic model to explore interorganizational cooperation. 
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4.0  EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA AS 
AN APPROPRIATE FIELD STUDY AREA 
Emergency management, as a discipline, and Allegheny County, Pennsylvania provides an 
appropriate field study topic and geographic area to explore collective action without hierarchy.  
First, emergency management agencies participate in a wide-range of activities that vary in terms 
of required manpower, resources, and intensity.  Second, variability in terms of emergency 
management agencies’ roles, responsibilities, and internal capacities as well as the differing 
levels of urgency and stress experienced during operations offers the researcher an opportunity to 
study interorganizational cooperation in a number of settings.  Third, the prevalence of 
asymmetry of information (where certain actors possess more information than others) and the 
variability in management skills demonstrated in various situations reveal additional points of 
interest relevant to the research problem.  Fourth, with respect to the field study area, Allegheny 
County’s large nested set of actors and the region’s diverse socio-economic, built, and 
geophysical systems offer variability that increases the research design’s ability to identify 
factors that influence cooperation.  In all, the variability of organizational missions, the capacity 
to act, and the demands of the external environment necessitate varying strategies for action 
across the system. 
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4.1 MISSION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Emergency management is a collection of disciplines that seek to protect life and property from 
various threats, both natural and man-made.  These disciplines operate within a nested set of 
actors layered throughout the federal system in which interorganizational cooperation is a valued 
and, at times, necessary action.  To varying degrees, agencies involved with emergency 
management recognize and adopt cooperative strategies not just in the face of dynamic events 
(Comfort 1999; Waugh 2000), but also in regular administrative environments (Carr and LeRoux 
2005; Andrew 2006). 
The emergency management system is comprised of multiple and diverse disciplines 
whose missions, tasks, and day-to-day routines vary.  Emergency management includes 
nonprofit, private, and public sector actors that represent jurisdictions at all levels of the federal 
system.  Federal and state emergency management personnel represent only a relatively small 
subcomponent of the larger system.  Primary responsibility for operations falls on local first 
responders—fire, police, emergency medical services (EMS), and other local actors such as 
emergency management coordinators, public works, and code enforcement personnel (Waugh 
and Tierney 2007).  Operations during a response expand and scale up depending on the level of 
need, urgency, and stress.  Organizations plan for, mitigate against, respond to, and recover from 
extreme events (with the exception of emergency management coordinators) while also being 
responsible for their other day-to-day missions and tasks, police departments (law enforcement), 
fire departments (fire prevention and suppression), and EMS agencies (medical care and patient 
transport).     
The diversity of tasks and the scalability in terms of expanding the number of agencies 
and moving up and down (and horizontally) through a federal system of governance add 
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variability to the study.  Also, the levels of urgency and stress involved with an incident make 
emergency management an appropriate field study to explore the factors that promote or inhibit 
cooperation.   
4.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
The inability of communities to coordinate effectively has grown in importance as a problem, 
both theoretically and practically, after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Haitian earthquake in 
2010, the floods in Pakistan in 2010, and other recent catastrophic events.  The potential effect of 
climate change, continued population growth in vulnerable areas, and the threat of man-made 
disasters represent ongoing threats (Waugh 2007).  The failure to coordinate effective response 
to extreme events is a seemingly perpetual problem (Quarantelli 1978; Drabek 1985; Wenger 
and Quarantelli 1989; Schneider 1995; Comfort 1999; Waugh 2006).  The recent public focus on 
reforms to FEMA, state, and local emergency management agencies and the continued inability 
to manage disasters effectively make the present study timely and relevant.  Not only does the 
present study address the efficacy of organizational performance, but it also explores efficiency.     
Emergency management begins with local first responders.  Municipal governments 
allocate a significant portion of their budgets to fire, police, and (sometimes) EMS services (Carr 
and LeRoux 2005).  Local public safety organizations are numerous, highly visible, and 
important to the lives of local citizens.  Figuring out where points for possible cooperation exist 
affects not just performance, but potentially the agencies’ fiscal bottom line.  Understanding how 
emergency management agencies interact enables an improved understanding of an important 
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model of governance and identifies opportunities to increase effectiveness, efficiency, and cost 
savings.      
4.3 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Emergency management is a multi-organizational system characterized by a nested set of actors.  
“It is carried out within a framework established by the federal government but must be 
responsive to local needs” (Edwards and Goodrich 2007, p. 53).  Moreover, while command-
and-control arrangements are used during response efforts, the system, generally, lacks a central 
authority to dictate cooperative strategies.   
 Within single municipalities even, public officials confront obstacles in achieving 
appropriate levels of coordination before, during, and after an extreme event.  Coordinating a 
range of organizations across sectors and throughout the federal system is no simple task.  
Within any policy arena, there is the potential for overlapping (and at times conflicting) 
programs, priorities, and goals.  The diversity itself represented by the system’s various actors 
frustrates effective cooperation.  Obstacles to cooperation still exist in the forms of personality 
conflicts and turf protection issues.  Understanding the interdependence between these actors as 
well as their conflicts is critical to understanding how cooperation can be more effectively 
facilitated. 
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4.3.1 “Managing” Emergency Management: The Tension between Chain-of-Command 
Strategies and the Flexibility Needed for Adaptation 
A critical challenge to emergency management agencies is creating and maintaining the ability to 
manage both the daily activities of public safety operations and the demands generated by 
extreme events.  The skills required to deal with both the hierarchical and network governance 
responsibilities of the job vary.  Adaptation to dynamic conditions represents a key factor for 
success.  Public officials have struggled to design administrative arrangements and develop 
management practices that facilitate adaptation and flexibility, while retaining useful elements of 
command-and-control.   
 Emergencies disrupt regular managerial routines.  Tension exists between the concepts of 
emergency and management (Sommers and Svara 2009).  Traditional management functions are 
intended to make activities routine.  In stable conditions, managers achieve certain levels of 
normalcy.  Emergencies, conversely, create uncertainty and require sensemaking (Weick 1995) 
and improvisation (Mendonça 2007) to deal with the demands of unplanned events.   
 The emergency management system—in general—has yet to balance the desire to 
regularize management routines with the constant challenge of adjusting to dynamic conditions 
(Comfort 1999; 2007).  In practice, efforts to regularize action through command-and-control 
strategies (United States Department of Homeland Security 2008) have failed to create the kind 
of robust flexible systems that adapt to emerging threats as hierarchical systems tend to promote 
asymmetries of information, which is discussed in the sections below (Comfort 2005; Comfort 
2007).   
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4.3.2 Established Management Routines and Practices 
The ability to expand operations, whether through internal or external surge capacities, and the 
ability to manage both vertically and horizontally across levels of government and jurisdictions 
represent key management goals.  The development of the Incident Command System (ICS) and 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS) as well as the maintenance of local mutual 
aid agreements have been designed to facilitate coordination during extreme events.        
4.3.2.1 ICS and NIMS 
ICS and NIMS promote command-and-control, hierarchical administrative structures to 
coordinate agencies during response activities.  They provide a common framework by which 
operational control is assumed by an onsite manager who establishes a chain of command that is 
supported by other offsite entities if necessary.  This design proves relatively strong when tested 
by small-scale incidents, but in the face of large-scale extreme events the design is left wanting 
(Buck, Trainor, and Aquirre 2006; Neal and Phillips 1995).  The critical challenge is balancing 
the utility of command-and-control with the benefits of flexibility and adaptation to rapidly 
changing conditions.                
4.3.2.2 Mutual Aid Agreements 
Robust, effective emergency management depends on cooperation in the face of 
complex, uncertain events that overwhelm the capacity of the initial first responders (Waugh and 
Streib 2006).  Both formal and informal mutual aid agreements, “the sharing of supplies, 
equipment, personnel, and information across political boundaries,” create a surge capacity, 
largely horizontal in nature (Stier and Goodman 2007, p. 62).  These networks of local police, 
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fire, and EMS agencies change and evolve, creating dynamic forms of emergency response 
management and metropolitan governance (Andrew 2006, 2009; Caruson, MacManus, Kohen, 
and Watson 2008).  Professional norms have evolved that encourage flexibility and cooperation 
(Waugh 2007).  These professional standards do not, however, always manifest.  Understanding 
what encourages mutual aid agreements represents a critical task of the present study.   
4.3.3 Asymmetry of Information 
Incident command management strategies breakdown when timely, relevant information fails to 
reach key decision makers.  Information asymmetry occurs in situations where certain actors 
possess more pertinent information than others, information that enables them to make more 
timely and appropriate decisions.  Information asymmetry in emergency management creates 
collective action problems where actors display varying abilities to recognize shared risk and 
formulate strategies for action (Comfort 2005).  The uneven distribution of information 
diminishes the ability to create a “common operating picture” so vital to emergency 
management.  For example, Comfort and Haase (2006) find “a striking pattern of asymmetry in 
the communication processes among the organizations participating in response operations” in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (p. 339). 
Shared information across jurisdictions and sectors facilitates collective action based on a 
flexible recognition of need.  In normal situations in which individual organizations possess the 
capacity to plan, train, exercise, and achieve desired levels of efficiency, siloed patterns of 
communication are likely to exist.  Siloed agencies that maintain their normal routines in the face 
of changing conditions leave their operations more vulnerable to disruption and failure during 
rapidly, evolving, dynamic events (Comfort 1999).  The reality is that shared risk (Comfort 
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1999) and the financial constraints of governments on all levels (Carr and LeRoux 2005) make 
information exchange a priority.  In short, threats exist and governments are unable to provide 
the organizational capacity needed to respond to all scenarios.  
Both robust and weak patterns of information exchange exist between organizations in 
Allegheny County.  Variability creates a useful laboratory to study how available information 
affects cooperation.  County and regional agencies increasingly serve as a hub for the 
dissemination of information, including threat levels, equipment availability, etc.  County 9-1-1, 
for example, aided by preplans plays, a significant role during response operations in dispatching 
manpower and other resources to an event.   
While county and regional personnel work diligently to communicate to municipal-level 
agencies, several factors continue to promote information asymmetry.  First, municipal agencies 
accept and process county and regional communications with varying levels of interest and 
attentiveness.  Key pieces of information recognized by one agency are missed by others.  Also, 
the county’s central information technology system, Knowledge Center, has heretofore not been 
regularly accessed by municipal agencies with the exception of during infrequent large-scale 
exercises.  It is possible, then, for organizations to possess information, post it for system 
consumption, but fail to communicate it systematically.  Furthermore, the Pennsylvania 
Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) uses another system, WebEOC, which is not 
interoperable with Knowledge Center, thus perpetuating information asymmetry.       
4.3.3.1 Interoperability and the Sharing of Radio Frequencies 
Other technical problems include the lack of radio interoperability and the fragmentation 
of the radio frequencies used by municipal agencies.  With respect to interoperability, some 
agencies operate on high-band radios, others on low-band.  Furthermore, when agencies operate 
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on the same band, they generally use different channels.  Operating on the same channel 
promotes situational awareness as neighboring agencies monitor each other’s operations.  In 
Allegheny County, local first responders are assigned frequencies by the county Department of 
Emergency Services.  Some agencies are assigned different channels than their neighbors.  
Pockets of municipal self-dispatchers (or “ring down centers”) also operate on separate channels.  
While most agencies switch channels to communicate, the lack of constant monitoring 
diminishes their overall situational awareness and promotes asymmetry of information as some 
agencies possess more information than others.      
4.3.3.2 Lack of Horizontal Patterns of Information Exchange 
Barriers to horizontal information exchange frustrate information exchange.  The present 
study demonstrates that local agencies engage in tightly-clustered networks based, in part, on 
geographic proximity.  However, outside of these “neighborhood-centered” patterns, horizontal 
information flows are less likely to occur.  The factors frustrating information exchange between 
municipal agencies are explored in the present study.  Horizontal asymmetry of information is 
significant because if agencies do not receive key information from a higher level of 
government, horizontal channels are not necessarily in place to disseminate information 
effectively throughout the system, particularly in the fire discipline.   
4.4 VARIABILITY IN ALLEGHENY COUNTY 
Feiock (2007) contends that “economic, social, and political characteristics of community 
populations shape preferences for public goods and help to determine the potential gains and 
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transaction costs of cooperation… We expect homogeneity across jurisdictions to signal 
potential common interests and service preferences” (p. 54).  Pockets of similar communities 
promote cooperation.  To explore this proposition a field study area should have variability in the 
populations explored both in terms of socio-economic characteristics and the physical 
environments in which they live.  The same can be said for the variability of organizations, their 
jurisdictions, and their capacity to operate.  Variability offers the appropriate dynamic to identify 
pockets of similar communities.     
4.4.1 Population 
The total population of Allegheny County is 1,218,494, a 4.9 percent reduction from the 2000 
census estimate of 1,281,665.17  The City of Pittsburgh, by far the largest municipality, has a 
population of 312,819.  Trafford Borough is the smallest with 31.  According to the 2000 U.S. 
Census, 83.1 percent of the population is white and 12.9 percent is African American; 16.8 
percent of the population is 65 years old or older which is above both the national and state 
averages.  With respect to education, 86.3 percent of the population has earned a high school 
diploma, while 28.3 percent holds a bachelor’s degree of higher.  These statistics indicate some 
variability in the population.  
Population distribution varies across municipality and geographic area.  Some areas 
possess larger municipalities than others.  Eight councils of government, which organize 
municipal joint-purchasing programs, operate in Allegheny County largely along geographic 
                                                 
17 http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42/42003.html  
U.S. Census Bureau State and County QuickFacts Allegheny County, Pennsylvania 
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lines.  Table 7 demonstrates the variability in population rates with larger communities in the 
North Hills and South Hills and smaller communities along the region’s river valleys (Allegheny 
Valley North, Quaker Valley, and Steel Valley).  Figure 1 maps the location of the COGs.18     
 
Table 7: Average Municipal Population by Councils of Government 
  N Mean SD Min Max 
Allegheny Valley North 15 4100.1 3263.0 1286 11563 
Char-West 21 6291.0 5218.1 464 22290 
North Hills 18 10619.2 9856.5 1149 32551 
Quaker Valley 14 2216.8 2364.1 78 8770 
South Hills Area 15 13768.4 9795.7 1225 33556 
Steel Valley 9 4418.8 4004.0 565 12264 
Turtle Creek Valley 20 9660.1 12000.9 727 46809 
Twin Rivers 12 7445.3 8264.8 351 24040 
No COG 6 56172.3 136383.4 31 334563 
Total 130 9859.0 29910.5 31 334563 
 
                                                 
18 I want to especially thank my friend and colleague An Lewis for creating this map.  Since the map’s 
creation, Moon Twp in the western end of the county switched to the South Hills Area Council of Government.   
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Figure 1: Map of Allegheny County Councils of Government (COGs) 
4.4.2 Fragmentation 
With 130 municipalities and hundreds more agencies and authorities, Rusk (2003) characterizes 
Allegheny County (and Southwestern Pennsylvania) as one of the most fragmented regions in 
the United States.  The large number of municipalities offers the present study a large N, with 
over 520 first responder agencies either located in the county or listed as mutual aid agencies by 
the county 9-1-1 administration.  Table 8 demonstrates the distribution of municipalities by 
COG.  While fragmentation provides the present study with a large N, the density of 
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municipalities (1 for every 5.62 square miles) may not reflect the geospatial separation that exists 
between agencies elsewhere in the country.  Regardless, fragmentation offers a laboratory in 
which to study collective action without central authority.  Future studies can explore the role of 
distance in other field study areas. 
Table 8: Number of Municipalities by Council of Government 
  N % 
Allegheny Valley North 15 11.5 
Char-West 21 16.2 
North Hills 18 13.8 
Quaker Valley 14 10.8 
South Hills Area 15 11.5 
Steel Valley 9 6.9 
Turtle Creek Valley 20 15.4 
Twin Rivers 12 9.2 
No COG 6 4.6 
Total 130 100 
 
4.4.3 Municipal Fiscal Capacity 
Municipal revenue and expenditures, particularly the revenue appropriated for public safety, 
represent proxies for operational ability.  Municipalities in Allegheny County demonstrate a 
range of financial capacities.  Four measures of fiscal capacity include annual municipal revenue, 
per capita revenue, surplus (or deficit) of revenues over expenditures, and the total police budget 
allocated by municipality.  The heterogeneity of fiscal capacity in Allegheny County indicates 
that some agencies have more resources than others.  With resources comes the ability to initiate 
and sustain action.  The disparity of revenue indicates that agencies with fewer resources may 
call on neighbors or other levels of government when in need.    
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Tables 9 and 10 demonstrate that Allegheny County’s COG areas vary in terms of total 
municipal revenue and per capita municipal revenue.  The 2006 data, from the Department of 
Community and Economic Development, indicate the suburban South Hills, North Hills, and 
Quaker Valley possess greater resources than the aging mill towns in the Steel Valley and Twin 
Rivers area.  This indicates an increased likelihood for adequate equipment levels and staffing. 
 
Table 9: Total Municipal Revenue by Council of Government 
 
N Mean SD Min Max 
Allegheny Valley North 14 2856709.2 1910355.7 679628 6907854 
Char-West 21 6145828.4 5664516.7 545022 24187208 
North Hills 18 9128109.7 7364498.3 525584 23640820 
Quaker Valley 14 2745077.4 2785552.5 28822 9071337 
South Hills Area 15 13147280.5 10910144.6 1242753 42776016 
Steel Valley 9 3170141.0 2678166.8 175775 8181230 
Turtle Creek Valley 19 7262571.0 10061468.1 491311 41066338 
Twin Rivers 10 6351629.2 9171106.9 195814 28971635 
No COG 3 852051.0 866356.4 306739 1851033 
Total 123 6517033.8 7786209.1 28822 42776016 
 
Table 10: Municipal Revenue Per Capita by Council of Government 
 
N Mean SD Min Max 
Allegheny Valley North 14 811.62 425.061 271 1815 
Char-West 21 1077.4 526.115 488 2416 
North Hills 18 949.33 518.748 457 2763 
Quaker Valley 14 1488.04 1776.051 370 7363 
South Hills Area 15 969.05 249.279 628 1386 
Steel Valley 9 713.16 329.625 311 1342 
Turtle Creek Valley 19 699.94 236.9 404 1253 
Twin Rivers 10 589.46 233.416 405 1205 
No COG 3 1093.47 692.45 611 1887 
Total 123 937.7 731.985 271 7363 
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Table 11 reports the fiscal strength of municipalities in terms of surplus (or deficit) of 
revenues over expenditures.  A significant portion of the county’s municipalities, 53 (40.8 
percent), operate in the red.  Fiscal problems exist in urban, suburban, and exurban areas.  
Municipalities in Allegheny Valley North, Quaker Valley, and Turtle Creek Valley average 
budget deficits.  The City of Pittsburgh and several other municipalities receive state support to 
prevent bankruptcy under Pennsylvania’s Act 47 program.   
Table 11: Annual Municipal Budget Surplus (or Deficit) by Council of Government 
 
N Mean SD Min Max 
Allegheny Valley North 14 -716.6 371236.2 -886390 609555 
Char-West 21 189695.1 850701.1 -1005399 3435428 
North Hills 18 635808.1 2777873.6 -3358314 10745352 
Quaker Valley 14 -10718.3 399787.8 -785449 955678 
South Hills Area 15 392368.3 1554827.7 -2649518 4453971 
Steel Valley 9 17280.1 363451.0 -394981 845798 
Turtle Creek Valley 19 -513380.2 1920032.4 -7956251 517235 
Twin Rivers 10 94403.0 801584.2 -1763416 1504088 
No COG 3 -27958.0 50243.3 -71484 27024 
Total 123 100935.2 1489757.0 -7956251 10745352 
 
Table 12 presents the distribution of municipal police expenditures by COG.  Two 
municipalities, Glenfield and Haysville, use the state police as their primary police protection 
and pay little to nothing for the service.  Several municipalities invest considerable amounts on 
their police services.  With resources comes increased operational capacity.  The suburban areas 
along the northern river valleys, less populated areas, show relatively low expenditures.  The 
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Table 12: Municipal Expenditures on Police by Council of Government 
 
N Mean SD Min Max 
Allegheny Valley North 14 499086 329957 165549 1189066 
Char-West 21 1100031 1012011 51188 4189639 
North Hills 18 1363907 1152905 131687 4712246 
Quaker Valley 13 426391 372183 31672 1181238 
South Hills Area 15 2302640 1715258 210037 6414744 
Steel Valley 9 737512 629722 46668 1959158 
Turtle Creek Valley 19 1592167 2237436 42015 8554272 
Twin Rivers 10 1197195 1535799 13560 3970841 
No COG 3 256495 340898 49796 649961 
Total 122 1183206 1417605 13560 8554272 
 
4.4.4 Vulnerability and Threats 
Vulnerability to various threats, both man-made and natural, creates common cause for action.  
Agencies face (and recognize) different threats and vulnerabilities at varying degrees based on 
the context of their situations.  Variability of threats and vulnerability pose barriers to collective 
action as agencies recognize different goals and priorities at different times.  Within its 730.17 
square miles, Allegheny County demonstrates variability in terms of vulnerabilities and threats, 
but it also maintains pockets that share common characteristics.  Allegheny County, therefore, 
represents an appropriate case study area to explore collective action without central authority.  
The section below identifies the variability of three types of vulnerability: social, built, and 
geophysical (and the types of threats involved).   
4.4.4.1 Social Vulnerability 
 Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley (2003) provide a set of metrics to quantify social vulnerability 
and a population’s capacity to return to normal living conditions following an extreme event.  
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Lack of access to resources and the percentage of at-risk populations (based on age and socio-
economic standing) serve as appropriate measures.  The recognition of social vulnerability 
motivate planning and preparation for action in the face of hazards (Gazley, Brudney, and 
Schneck 2009).  Conversely, the lack of recognition creates barriers to collective action (Comfort 
1999).   
The 2009 U.S. Census estimates that 12.4 percent of county residents live below the 
poverty line.  An inspection of the same poverty statistic (for 2000) by municipality identifies 
pockets of vulnerable communities, notably in the City of Pittsburgh, the Mon Valley (a set of 
municipalities along the Monongahela River), and other aging-river towns suffering still from 
the collapse of the steel industry.  Table 13 presents the geographic distribution of poverty rates 
by council of government, which reaffirms the differences between urban, suburban, and 
exurban areas.     
Table 13: Average Poverty Rate by Council of Government 
 
N Mean % SD 
Allegheny Valley North 15 8.1% 0.033 
Char-West 21 7.1% 0.051 
North Hills 18 8.1% 0.038 
Quaker Valley 14 7.5% 0.046 
South Hills Area 15 6.5% 0.041 
Steel Valley 9 17.9% 0.078 
Turtle Creek Valley 20 14.1% 0.107 
Twin Rivers 12 10.8% 0.048 
No COG 6 23.0% 0.386 
Total 130 12.4 - 
 
Table 14 reports per capita income averaged across geographic areas, which reaffirms the 
variance in social vulnerability as demonstrated in Table 13.  Suburban areas appear to be more 
affluent, while the river valley communities earn considerably less on average.    
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Table 14: Per Capita Income by Council of Government 
 
N Mean SD Min Max 
Allegheny Valley North 14 811.62 425.061 271 1815 
Char-West 21 1077.4 526.115 488 2416 
North Hills 18 949.33 518.748 457 2763 
Quaker Valley 14 1488.04 1776.051 370 7363 
South Hills Area 15 969.05 249.279 628 1386 
Steel Valley 9 713.16 329.625 311 1342 
Turtle Creek Valley 19 699.94 236.9 404 1253 
Twin Rivers 10 589.46 233.416 405 1205 
No COG 3 1093.47 692.45 611 1887 
Total 123 937.7 731.985 271 7363 
4.4.4.2 Built Vulnerability 
The built environment consists of “the infrastructure on which the population relies for 
normal day to day life” (Johnson 2006, p. 68).  It represents the “human-made environment and 
technology—public utilities, transportation systems, communications, critical facilities, 
engineered structures, and housing” (Mileti 1999, p. 128).  The built environment represents 
society’s critical infrastructure necessary to maintain basic services.  Code enforcement efforts 
mitigate the vulnerability of new construction in some hazardous areas.  Many constructed 
systems, however, remain susceptible to extreme events or decay due to subpar building 
materials, inadequate maintenance, and poor code enforcement (Caruson and MacManus 2008).  
One fire chief, Respondent 13, confirms the vulnerability of older neighborhoods where 
“building construction and materials are old.”  He indicated that “there are a lot of abandoned 
structures in that area that are subject to fires and criminal arson fires.” 
“The ability of this built environment to withstand the impacts of extreme natural forces 
plays a direct role in determining the number of lives lost, the number and severity of injuries, 
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and the financial impact of disasters” (Mileti 1999, p. 128).  Vulnerability to specific elements of 
critical infrastructure spans municipal borders (Leavitt and Kiefer 2006).  The recognition of 
specific built vulnerability motivates mitigation and planning activities to reduce the risk of life 
and property lost.   
Allegheny County possesses an assortment of roads, railways, tunnels, and bridges.  
Utilities, such as electric transmission lines, communication towers, and gas lines, dot the county 
as do residential, public, and commercial buildings (Johnson 2006).  Mixed land use across the 
county ranges from residential to commercial to industrial.  Each type of development creates 
vulnerabilities to extreme events, including the risk of terrorism. 
Allegheny County’s role as a nexus for regional and national transportation routes 
exposes it to traffic accidents and large-scale mass casualty events.  As a pass through point for 
hazardous materials, Allegheny County faces a high degree of manmade risk, which increases 
the need for cooperation across municipal and county boundaries.  Figure 2 demonstrates the 
overlapping transportation network.  Several interstates and principal arterial roads intersect rail 
lines, busways, and the area’s water routes.     
There is some variability in the degree of transportation infrastructure across 
municipalities.  However, all municipalities are exposed to some level of risk.  For example, 
state-maintained roads run through 116 of the 130 municipalities (89.2 percent).  Active rail lines 
crisscross through 98 municipalities (75.4 percent).  Major interstates run through less, only 34 
(26.2 percent).     
 
  91 
 
Figure 2: Allegheny County Transportation System 
Source: Allegheny County Economic Development - Planning Division 
http://www.alleghenyplaces.com/maps/ec/TransportationSystem.pdf 
  
Housing stock represents potential vulnerabilities to the system.  Allegheny County 
possesses 583,646 housing units, an average of 4489.58 per municipality (median 1980.00, SD 
14,499.11).  Vacant housing units (46,496, mean 357.66, median 132.00, SD 1721.17) present 
risks in the form of potential fire and illegal squatting.  Density of housing units per square mile 
differs across geographic areas.  High density indicates a concentration of people susceptible to 
various risks.  Low density creates problems with respect to evacuation and other response 
related activities.  Table 15 shows that in Allegheny County, however, low density housing areas 
are located in certain suburban areas.  It also shows high density housing areas distributed 
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throughout the county.  Some pockets of high density housing are located in low-income, flood 
prone areas such as the Turtle Creek Valley.   
Table 15: Housing Units per Square Mile by Council of Government 
 
N Mean SD Min Max 
Allegheny Valley North 15 1569.2 1439.0 61 4767 
Char-West 21 1601.5 1991.6 65 8614 
North Hills 18 1079.6 1250.1 129 3932 
Quaker Valley 14 1314.7 1605.8 104 4770 
South Hills Area 15 2205.3 1614.6 239 5790 
Steel Valley 9 1838.2 845.6 1004 3646 
Turtle Creek Valley 20 2245.3 1250.6 371 4646 
Twin Rivers 12 1016.1 829.5 85 2225 
No COG 6 812.5 1114.2 48 2940 
Total 130 1589.3 1479.2 48 8614 
4.4.4.3 Geophysical Vulnerability 
“Various parts of the country are more susceptible to specific natural disasters—the West 
to earthquakes, the Midwest to tornados, the South to hurricanes, and the North to blizzards” 
(Caruson and MacManus 2008, p. 288).  Communities bear varying levels of risk based on their 
geophysical surroundings, i.e. the geographic features of their environment, weather patterns, 
etc. (Mileti 1999).  Common geophysical vulnerabilities create common cause for action.  
Allegheny County is vulnerable to snowstorms, landslides, windstorms, and occasionally 
tornadoes.  The county is particularly vulnerable to flooding. 
Allegheny County, where the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers form the Ohio, 
represents a focal point for several regional watershed systems.  Municipalities are exposed to 
various levels of flooding risk.  Each municipality in the county is part of a watershed and each 
municipality has some type of hydrology system passing through its borders.  Major rivers, not 
small creeks or streams, pass through 83 of the 130 municipalities (63.8 percent).  Flood risk 
varies across the county with 54 of the 130 municipalities (41.5 percent) located on a recognized 
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floodplain.  Strong flooding due to Hurricane Ivan in 2004 reminded communities of their 
susceptibility to floods and catastrophe.   
Some areas recognize and act on their mutual vulnerability to flooding whereas others do 
not.  Figure 3 depicts Allegheny County watershed areas in which communities have in the past 
collaboratively planned to mitigate risk and respond to disasters.19  Only one area, in the North 
Hills, was in the process of updating their plans in 2006.  Despite the increasing risk of flooding 
as suburban development expands, a sizable portion of the county fails to engage in joint action, 
which indicates that communities either do not recognize their risk or that barriers exist, 
inhibiting cooperation.   
 
                                                 
19 The Pennsylvania Stormwater Management Act, or Act 167 of 1978, mandates that counties organize 
stormwater management plans with communities located in areas of risk. 
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Figure 3: Allegheny County Designated Watersheds and Plan Status 
Source: Allegheny County Economic Development - Planning Division 
http://www.alleghenyplaces.com/maps/ec/PA_Stormwater_Act_167.pdf 
4.5 VARIABILITY WITHIN ALLEGHENY COUNTY’S EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
In emergency management, roles and responsibilities are determined by the internal capacity of 
the agency, i.e. their mission, resources, and the ability of their personnel, as well as the demands 
of the external environment (including the prevalence of extreme events).  Tasks range from day-
to-day routines to response to high-risk, low-probability events where levels of urgency and 
stress as well as the demand on resources and personnel increase significantly.   
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National Incident Management System (NIMS) organizes agencies into a common 
framework to coordinate emergency support functions during extreme events.  Activities include 
the coordination of transportation support, communications, mass care, search and rescue, and 
public safety and security.  In total, fifteen support functions are outlined.  Compared with day-
to-day routines, these activities require a greater degree of cooperation and coordination with 
outside agencies. 
Several disciplines make up the emergency management system.  The present study 
focuses on three disciplines—fire, police, and EMS—as they bear the primary local 
responsibility for emergency response.  These three disciplines are introduced below with a 
general description of their organizational structures and both their routine public safety tasks 
and their disaster response activities.  Allegheny County represents a proxy for federal system.  
Other levels of government and other types of agencies are also reviewed below. 
First responders exhibit varying operational capacities in terms of their exposure to risk, 
their experience, training, resources, technical infrastructure, and their ability to recognize risk.  
Comfort and Wukich (2009) demonstrate the variability of operational capacities in a set of first 
response agencies in the Mon Valley region of Allegheny County.  One key finding is the 
considerable variability in the activities dedicated to reducing vulnerability to outside risk.  
Variability across a range of organizational indicators makes Allegheny County an appropriate 
field study.         
 Table 16 lists local, regional, and county agencies by discipline participating in the 
Allegheny County system as listed in the 9-1-1 records.  Several agencies that border the county 
are included as they are listed as mutual aid agencies.  Table 16 does not, however, account for 
the county police and the Department of Community Service’s assets, public works departments, 
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or the 130 municipal emergency management coordinators who participate in varying degrees.  
Furthermore, Table 16 does not account for agencies operating at the regional (i.e. trans-county), 
state, or federal levels.  The sections below briefly introduce these actors and demonstrate their 
variability in terms of missions, activities, and organizational capacity. 
Table 16: First Responder Agencies by County 
  
EMS Fire Police Total 
N % N % N % N % 
Allegheny 82 94.3 240 78.2 124 98.4 446 85.8 
Armstrong 0 0 1 0.3 0 0 1 0.2 
Beaver 0 0 2 0.7 0 0 2 0.4 
Butler 0 0 11 3.6 0 0 11 2.1 
State 0 0 0 0 2 1.6 2 0.4 
Washington 2 2.3 16 5.2 0 0 18 3.5 
Westmoreland 3 3.4 37 12.1 0 0 40 7.7 
Total 87 16.7 307 59 126 24.2 520 100 
 
4.5.1 Municipal Agencies 
During disasters, local responders represent response system’s frontline and bear the primary 
responsibility to manage events (Kamolvej 2006; Waugh and Tierney 2007; Caruson, 
MacManus, Kohen, and Watson 2008).  “Emergency management capacity is built from the 
ground up.  Neighborhood and community programs have to stand on their own because 
assistance may not arrive for hours or days” (Waugh and Streib 2006, p. 133).  In many 
communities, agencies are relatively small and are overwhelmed as incidents evolve from 
routine to extreme.  First response surge capacity is bolstered during the initial response, not 
generally by higher levels of government, but by mutual aid agreements with neighboring local 
agencies.    
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Local first responders, because of their knowledge and proximity to their communities’ 
physical and social vulnerabilities, are well-situated to engage in mitigation and planning 
activities.  The ability of local first responders to learn and adapt represents a critical component 
to developing resilient disaster response systems (Comfort 1999; Comfort and Wukich 2009).  
Understanding how local agencies interact within their jurisdictions, outside of their 
jurisdictions, and with other levels of government is critical in recognizing how information 
exchange and other factors facilitate cooperation and improve performance.  Studying the 
abilities of local responders to cooperate with each other and other actors within the system, 
therefore, is useful.  The extant literature, however, generally focuses on federal and state level 
actors.  The present study is designed to focus on local responders, their interaction with each 
other, and their interaction with other organizations within the system. 
4.5.1.1 Fire 
“A volunteer fire company is a nonprofit chartered corporation, association, or 
organization that provides fire protection or rescue services and may offer other voluntary 
emergency services...” (Pennsylvania General Assembly 2005, p. 6).  The majority of fire 
departments are volunteer.  Some are paid.  Fire departments, both paid and volunteer, focus 
their daily operations on fire prevention, suppression, and search and rescue activities.  Several 
fire departments offer emergency medical services of some kind, generally quick response or 
basic response services (although some maintain advanced life support units).  Volunteer 
departments generally depend on internal fundraising activities to maintain their operations 
(Compton and Granito 2002), although some are supported by varying levels of municipal 
government support in the form of direct financial contributions, insurance payments, and fuel.   
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During an extreme event, fire departments provide fire suppression, mutual aid support, 
search and rescue, traffic control, and warning and evacuation support (Wenger and Quarantelli 
1989).  “Firefighting is a service that also has the properties of labor-intensity, although much 
less so than police patrol” (Carr and LeRoux 2005, p. 14).  The “downtime” experienced by 
personnel allows for fire personnel to plan, train, and pursue other educational initiatives.     
There is variability in fire department governance structures.  Fire departments are 
funded by a number of sources including public and nonprofit entities.  The administrative 
structure is often similar across municipalities in that fire chiefs oversee both operations and 
some administrative functions.  However, in volunteer departments, executive boards 
(particularly the president) maintain many administrative duties.  Structure and personnel used 
vary across municipalities.  Types include volunteer, paid, and combination (paid/volunteer) 
departments.  Predominantly, throughout the country, departments depend on volunteer labor 
(Wenger and Quarantelli 1989; Perkins 1990; Compton and Granito 2002).   
Department size, access to resources, experience, and overall capacity vary.  Of the 207 
fire departments based in Allegheny County, for example, 190 (91.7 percent) are staffed only by 
volunteers, 14 (6.8 percent) use a combination of paid and volunteer staff, and only 3 (1.4 
percent) departments are fully paid.  Table 17 shows the staffing arrangements by municipality; 
111 municipalities (85.4 percent) are served by all volunteer departments, 8 (6.2 percent) are 
protected by combination departments, 3 (2.3 percent) are served by paid departments, and 8 (6.2 
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Paid/Vol Fully Paid None Total 
N % N % N % N % N % 
Allegheny Valley North 15 13.5 0 0.0% 0 0 0 0 15 11.5 
Char-West 19 17.1 0 0 0 0 2 25 21 16.2 
North Hills 17 15.3 1 12.5 0 0 0 0 18 13.8 
Quaker Valley 10 9 1 12.5 0 0 3 37.5 14 10.8 
South Hills Area 12 10.8 3 37.5 0 0 0 0 15 11.5 
Steel Valley 8 7.2 1 12.5 0 0 0 0 9 6.9 
Turtle Creek Valley 17 15.3 2 25 1 33.3 0 0 20 15.4 
Twin Rivers 11 9.9 0 0 1 33.3 0 0 12 9.2 
No COG 2 1.8 0 0 1 33.3 3 37.5 6 4.6 
Total 111 85.4 8 6.2 3 2.3 8 6.2 130 100 
 
4.5.1.2 Police 
Police departments maintain labor-intensive operations aimed at protecting life and 
property through a number of activities including patrols, response to incidents, investigations, 
and coordination with other agencies within the criminal justice system.  Officer training and 
educational programs represent additional activities conducted in support of the operations listed 
above.      
Police also engage in disaster response duties such as planning, training, mutual-aid 
response, traffic control, warning and evacuation, and some search and rescue activities (Wenger 
and Quarantelli 1989; Andrew 2009).  Their routine activities include the potential for interaction 
with a number of organizations including fire departments and EMS agencies, hospital 
emergency rooms, mental health programs, drug treatment, facilities, homeless shelters, and of 
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course other actors within the criminal justice system such as prosecutors, the courts, correction 
facilities, etc. (Geller 1991). 
With respect to administration, police departments are funded and operate as public 
entities.  The structure of police departments is comparatively similar across municipalities, 
although sizes and capacity change often based on size and capacity of their local populations 
and tax bases (Wenger and Quarantelli 1989).  For example, the largest department, the City of 
Pittsburgh, employs 900 full-time personnel and no part-time officers.  Removing Pittsburgh 
from the analysis, most departments are relatively small, ranging from no full-time employees 
(where even the chief is a part-time employee in five departments) to 52 employees.  The 
average size of full-time staff is 11.76 (median 9.50, SD 11.32).  Five departments depend 
entirely on part-time staff.  Part-time officers are used by the majority of departments to augment 
their numbers and reduce salary expenditures.  The average department employs 4.44 part-time 
officers (median 3.00, SD 5.26).  Several departments do not employ part-times while Bethel 
Park employs 27 (just one less than their full-time total).   
Of the 91 police departments, 80 are municipal-based departments that administer to their 
municipality only, 10 are municipal-based departments that service their municipality as well as 
contract out to other municipalities, and 1 (Northern Regional) is a regional department.  While 
the one example of a regionalized department is limited to the suburban North Hills, Table 18 
demonstrates the distribution of municipalities that contract out for their police service ranges 
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N % N % N % N % N % 
Allegheny Valley North 15 13.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 11.5 
Char-West 18 16.7 3 18.8 0 0 0 0 21 16.2 
North Hills 14 13 0 0 4 100 0 0 18 13.8 
Quaker Valley 7 6.5 5 31.3 0 0 2 100 14 10.8 
South Hills Area 15 13.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 11.5 
Steel Valley 7 6.5 2 12.5 0 0 0 0 9 6.9 
Turtle Creek Valley 17 15.7 3 18.8 0 0 0 0 20 15.4 
Twin Rivers 11 10.2 1 6.3 0 0 0 0 12 9.2 
No COG 4 3.7 2 12.5 0 0 0 0 6 4.6 
Total 108 83.1 16 12.3 4 3.1 2 1.5 130 100 
4.5.1.3 EMS 
Emergency medical services (EMS) agencies provide ambulance services and paramedics 
for emergency situations (Tierney 1985).  Daily, routine activities include response to incidents, 
patient transport, and other administrative duties.  During disasters, activities may include 
planning, training, mutual-aid response, the provision of paramedic services, and patient 
transport.  EMS agencies coordinate operations and information sharing with other organizations 
within the public health system, particularly during extreme events. 
EMS agencies take the form of public, nonprofit, and private organizations.  Many 
municipalities, across the country, pay for and contract out for ambulance services (Holian 
2007).  Others provide in-house, publicly-financed agencies.  In Allegheny County, EMS 
agencies include municipal authorities, municipal departments, and nonprofit organizations that 
derive their revenue from a combination of municipal government support, community 
subscriptions, private contributions, and insurance reimbursements for patient transports. 
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With respect to Emergency Medical Services (EMS), varying levels of operational 
capacity exist as well as mission imperatives.  For example, there are 54 Advanced Life Support 
(ALS) units, 24 Quick Response Service (QLS) units, and 5 Basic Life Support (BLS) units.  
Some ALS agencies and all QRS do not transport patients.  Some of these ALS agencies are 
counted multiple times if they have sub-units located in separate municipalities.  
4.5.1.4 Role of Other Municipal Actors 
In addition to fire, police, and EMS, many other municipal-level actors participate in 
emergency management.  The sections below briefly introduce other municipal actors and also 
county, regional, state, and federal agencies involved in Allegheny County.  These sections 
describe the range in missions, activities, and organizational capacities and resources.     
Local Emergency Management Coordinators (LEMC)  
In Pennsylvania, each municipality is required by state law to appoint a local emergency 
management coordinator (LEMC) who annually submits written emergency operational plans to 
the county who in turn submits them to the state.  The extent to which emergency management 
coordinators participate in planning, training, and response in Allegheny County varies.  
According to the present study’s qualitative findings, some contribute considerably in terms of 
coordinating activities, while others have not even met key first responders in their 
municipalities.  The range of experience and ability varies also.  Local emergency management 
coordinators, in the county, are predominantly volunteers.  Elected officials who make the 
appointments are limited to appointing individuals who are willing to accept the responsibilities.  
Other than appointing a service chief (which many municipalities do), there are few incentives 
available to municipalities to recruit coordinators.      
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Public Works Departments 
Public works departments contribute a significant amount to emergency management in 
terms of prevention, response, and recovery activities.  In Allegheny County, public works 
departments are involved in debris removal, road clearing, and other support functions.  The 
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), the county, and almost every 
municipality have public works personnel.  These departments vary in terms of their resources.  
The February blizzard of 2010 provides an example of the extent to which emergency services 
(and the community at large) depend on public works to clear vital transportation routes. 
Building Inspection/Code Enforcement 
Each municipality offers building inspection and code enforcement services that 
implement various zoning regulations and building standards.  The provision of these services 
derives from either in-house personnel or contracting out (from other municipalities or for-profit 
entities).  These actors play a vital role in implementing prevention and mitigation initiatives, 
including fire and flood prevention programs.  However, the extent to which municipalities adopt 
and implement prevention and mitigation initiatives varies.  The extent to which these personnel 
interact with emergency service agencies also varies, according to the analysis of semi-structured 
interviews. 
Municipal Managers and Elected Officials 
Municipal managers and elected officials establish and implement policies related to 
emergency management and prioritize activities through the budgeting process.  They play an 
important role as connectors with state agencies such as the Department of Community and 
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Economic Affairs.  The extent to which municipal managers and elected officials are involved 
with their public safety agencies vary.   
4.5.2 County Agencies 
Two main departments influence the emergency management system at the county level: The 
Department of Emergency Services and the county police.  These county agencies disseminate 
information regarding threats and provide support to municipal agencies.  Both operations are 
diverse in terms of the number of activities in which they engage.  Both possess considerable 
resources.  Both are described below. 
4.5.2.1 The Department of Emergency Services 
Waugh (1994) argues that county governments possess the potential to serve as regional 
emergency management agencies, supporting local municipal agencies.  County governments’ 
geographic proximity to local agencies, their large-resource base, and their ties to state agencies 
facilitate the coordination of various activities (Waugh 1994).  Allegheny County supports 
Waugh’s (1994) argument, particularly the work of the Department of Emergency Services, 
which is divided into five operational divisions: 9-1-1 operations, the county fire academy, fire 
investigation, the EMS division, and emergency management support and HAZMAT operations.  
9-1-1 Center 
Within the past decade, Allegheny County consolidated tens of municipal-based 
emergency dispatch centers into one, central call center.  The 9-1-1 call center dispatches 
emergency services based on the nature of calls and the need of the situation.  They also dispatch 
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mutual aid and additional support as requested by first responders on the scene of an incident.  
Currently, the county is divided into four call zones: North, East, South, and Central.  Four 
municipalities, which border neighboring counties, are dispatched by those counties’ 9-1-1 
systems.  These county 9-1-1 systems work together (and with their emergency management 
coordinators) to coordinate dispatching in the event of an incident that requires a multiple-county 
response.  While county 9-1-1 consolidated several ring down centers over the past decade, a 
handful of communities continue to self dispatch.  A few border municipalities are dispatched by 
Beaver and Washington Counties. 
Fire Academy 
The fire academy facilitates training at the county level.  The academy provides baseline 
certification training for firefighters.  They also offer advanced level courses in both operations 
and leadership skills.  The fire academy coordinates their curriculum with the State Fire 
Commissioner’s office and works with the Community College of Allegheny County to 
administer their courses.20 
Fire Marshal’s Office 
The fire marshal’s office investigates the cause of structural fires throughout the county.  
Determining the origins of a fire has ramification on law enforcement activities and insurance 
payments.  The fire marshal’s office spans municipal borders to provide a necessary service.    
 
                                                 
20 The Community College of Allegheny County and the University of Pittsburgh’s Center for Emergency 
Medicine provide training for EMS agencies in the county. 
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The Division of Emergency Medical Services 
The Division of Emergency Medical Services coordinates resources for EMS agencies 
and facilitates meetings and operations of the Allegheny County EMS Council, “a not-for-profit 
corporation that represents the prehospital care community with issues of recruitment, retention, 
reimbursement, recognition and response” (Allegheny County Emergency Services 2010a).  
Personnel in this section are boundary spanners.  They coordinate training exercises and 
planning.  They serve as the direct link between the EMS community and the county personnel.  
They also promote quality control between EMS agencies and the 9-1-1 center.   
Emergency Management and HAZMAT Teams 
The Department of Emergency Services contributes directly to municipal response 
operations.  Pennsylvania Code Title 35 mandates that local municipalities retain operational 
control during an incident.  While the county will not take control of an incident scene, personnel 
will help to coordinate the acquisition of resources and personnel.  The county owns equipment 
and facilitates interagency sharing.  Equipment owned by the county is used during emergency 
incidents and includes rescue, technical rescue, fire suppression, and HAZMAT response 
equipment.  Five county-coordinated HAZMAT teams respond to hazardous material incidents 
(four suburban teams and one team for Pittsburgh).  They provide a specialized service to 
municipalities overwhelmed by a HAZMAT incident.       
4.5.2.2 County Police 
County police perform basic law enforcement activities on county property (airports, 
parks, etc.).  More germane for the present study, many of their 240 officers and 50 civilian 
employees provide support to local municipalities and other criminal justice agencies in the form 
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of detective work regarding homicide, narcotics, and general investigations (Allegheny County 
Police 2010).  County police offer local police departments significant support in terms of 
experienced personnel and specialized services.   
4.5.3 Regional Agencies 
Two types of regional entities exist in the Allegheny County system.  The first type of regional 
agency spans county borders.  The second type is geographically smaller, spanning across 
municipalities, but seldom counties.  These regional entities, county and municipal boundary 
spanners, serve several purposes, but the common theme here is that regional entities cross 
jurisdictions to disseminate information or coordinate some type of multi-agency task. 
County Boundary Spanners   
The PA Region 13 Task Force is comprised of 13 counties and the City of Pittsburgh.  
Figure 4 identifies Pennsylvania’s counterterrorism task forces.  The primary focus of Region 13 
is to coordinate planning, training, and response operations across jurisdictional borders.  Shared 
resources and expertise facilitate operational activities on a regular basis.  Analysis of semi-
structured interviews indicate that agencies recognize Region 13 as a unifying, coordinating 
entity with specific respect to resource management and to a lesser extent the provision of large-
scale training exercises.  Region 13 is one of nine anti-terrorism task forces in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Respondent 58 differentiated Region 13 from similar entities: 
There are two models of task forces. Some are more administrative task forces. They get 
together.  They purchase equipment.  They have mutual agreements.  They share their 
things that way.  They do planning regional in.  Other task forces are becoming more 
operational.  They actually respond to regional incidents and may have more of an 
operational element to them.  Region 13 is very operational. 
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Figure 4: Pennsylvania's Regional Task Forces and PEMA Areas (Source: PA SEOP, BP-24) 
 
The Emergency Medical Services Institute (EMSI) encompasses much of the same area 
as Region 13 and serves as an administrative and operational entity for the Pennsylvania 
Department of Health’s Bureau of EMS.  EMSI inspects ambulance services for licensure, is 
responsible for personnel accreditation, and reviews quality assurance procedures in the region.  
The agency also coordinates large-scale training exercises as well as a regional strike team to be 
deployed during extreme events.  “We rely on EMSI to put on those exercises because we just 
don’t have the resources to do it” (Respondent 32).   
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Municipal Boundary Spanners    
Smaller regional entities cross municipal borders, but seldom county borders.  Councils 
of governments (COGs), chief associations, and the Allegheny County EMS Council are primary 
examples.  COGs, particularly the South Hills Area Council of Government (SHACOG) with 
respect to public safety agencies, serve as a coordinating entity for joint purchasing.  The North 
Hills Council of Governments (NHCOG) provides a forum to create and maintain region-wide 
mutual aid agreements.  Chief associations and professional organizations like the county police 
chief association and the county EMS council provide forums for networking, discussing best 
practices, and coordinating training exercises.      
4.5.4 Federal and State Agencies 
State and federal agencies play a role in the local emergency management system.  The federal 
government through the Department of Homeland Security (and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency) distributes grants for anti-terrorism and hazard prevention initiatives.  The 
FEMA Fire Grant program bolsters the operational capacity for fire departments and some EMS 
agencies. 
State legislators (through their discretionary grants), the Pennsylvania Emergency 
Management Association (PEMA), and the Bureau of EMS also enhance agency operational 
capacity through their grants programs.  The State Fire Commissioner oversees the State Fire 
Academy whose curriculum and instructors are available across the Commonwealth.  And the 
Bureau of EMS exhibits certain regulatory control of EMS agencies as they license agencies and 
certify personnel.  
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The Department of Community and Economic Development devote personnel and 
resources to improve the efficiency of administrative operations within first response agencies.  
They develop regional police and fire studies and share the information with municipalities.  
They will attempt to mediate relevant merger negotiations with interested agencies through a 
detailed strategy of community involvement.   
4.6 CONCLUSION 
In terms of exploring collective action in the absence of hierarchy, emergency management as a 
discipline and Allegheny County, Pennsylvania as a location provide an excellent laboratory for 
study.  Standard organizational designs based on hierarchy often fail to meet the urgent need of a 
diverse system of actors pursuing a heterogeneous set of goals within a common action arena.  
The policy arena and physical location provide such diversity and stimulate such complex 
patterns of interaction that a hierarchical structure would be an insufficient management strategy.  
With hundreds of smaller organizations interacting, the system integrates and achieves larger 
policy objectives because managers make policy decisions to reach across boundaries and 
coordinate activities. 
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5.0  COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES: THE BUILDING BLOCKS FOR POLYCENTRIC 
SYSTEMS OF GOVERNANCE 
The previous chapter outlines the variability in emergency management agencies as well as the 
social, built, and geophysical conditions in which they operate.  These conditions require various 
types of activities and strategies for action in order to address a range of needs.  The previous 
chapter also identifies the various scales on which agencies operate such as levels of 
government, sector, and discipline.  
Threats and vulnerabilities within the field study area create opportunities for 
cooperation.  Interaction and communication then facilitates the creation, exchange, and adoption 
of shared strategies for action.  This chapter studies cooperative activities as the building blocks 
for polycentric systems of governance.  It reveals who works with whom and on what activities, 
while also identifying the scales on which cooperation occurs and the levels of integration 
achieved.  I present a model of an integrated, interdependent system of emergency management, 
as opposed to the established sequential cycle of disaster response.   
Analysis of semi-structured interviews demonstrates that joint activities integrate 
agencies into subsystems based on various goals.  These subsystems aggregate to create a larger, 
overall emergency management system.  I demonstrate this phenomenon by identifying several 
types of joint activities and modeling how they link agencies together.  These types of interaction 
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build systems of polycentric governance that scale up and out to include agencies across levels of 
government, sectors, and disciplines.     
5.1 COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES AS BUILDING BLOCKS 
Analysis of semi-structured interviews confirms Ostrom’s (2005) model of polycentric systems 
in which organizations operate as components of a larger system.  Some cooperative activities in 
emergency management require the involvement of different types of organizations, which vary 
in terms of level of government (jurisdiction), sector, and discipline, in addition to the 
experience, training, and knowledge exhibited by personnel.  The diversity of organizational 
capacities provides the flexibility to meet both routine requirements and also rapidly evolving, 
dynamic demands.   
The field study area is able to scale up to include other levels of government, but also 
scale out to incorporate additional jurisdictions, disciplines, and organizations from other sectors.  
The present study pays particular attention to the local level (municipal and county) as it 
shoulders the primary responsibility for emergency management.  The role of regional, state, and 
national actors in working with local agencies and creating the rules in which local agencies 
operate is also explored.   
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5.2 EMERGENCY AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT AS AN INTERDEPENDENT 
SYSTEM, NOT A CYCLE 
What the analysis of semi-structured interviews makes apparent is that, in practice, emergency 
managers do not strictly follow a list of sequential steps to achieve intended goals.  The 
prevailing model of disaster response characterizes a cycle of tasks starting with mitigation 
leading to preparedness, which fosters response that is then followed by recovery activities (as 
modeled in Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Conventional Cycle of Emergency Management 
 
The sequential model, or life cycle model, (Figure 5) shows emergency managers moving 
in order from mitigation to recovery, but neglects the nonsequential manner in which risk is 
recognized, strategies are prioritized, and action is taken during related activities.  It essentially 
fails to capture emergency management’s complexity.  Efforts to formulate a model have been 
recommended (Neal 1997).   
Overall, the field should now recognize the following related characteristics of how 
disaster phases are currently used. First, different phases may occur simultaneously.  
Second, what happens (or does not happen) during one period (e.g., amount of mitigation 
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or preparation) directly effects what happens (or does not happen) during another period 
(e.g., response, recovery).  Theoretically and conceptually, disaster researchers and 
practitioners should change their thinking about disaster phases and recognize their 
interconnectiveness (Neal 1997, p. 154).  
 
This study presents an interconnected model of emergency management.  I argue that 
lessons learned from a number of experiences influence how decision makers devise strategies 
for future action in nonsequential patterns.  Lessons learned from a past incident, for example, 
may motivate a new training program.  A conversation during a joint administrative project may 
lead to the recognition of risk and prompt a new mitigation initiative.  Activity during a recovery 
effort may generate information useful to responders during a future incident.  The relationships 
that create the system often can be characterized by multiplexity or the existence of “multiple 
ties between two nodes” (Isett and Provan 2005, p. 158).  Agencies often cooperate on a number 
of projects and activities.  One interaction may lead to another and interaction on multiple 
projects may create stronger, more robust relationships.    
Figure 6 models how experience and information gained from a number of activities 
prompts (or influences) any number of other activities.  Following interactions between agencies, 
interpretations of the results feed back into the organizations’ knowledge systems.  Analysis of 
semi-structured interviews reveals that past positive experiences promotes the likelihood of 
future interaction.  This reaffirms Ostrom’s (2005) research on decision making.  “When the 
interactions yielding outcomes are productive for those involved, the participants may increase 
their commitment to maintaining the structure of the situation” (Ostrom 2005, p. 14).  
Conversely, if a situation yields unfavorable results, participants may decide to change their 
strategies.  Strategies that emerge in one action situation, therefore, influence patterns of 
interaction on other levels.     
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Figure 6: An Interdependent Model of Cooperative Activities 
5.3 COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES AND SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
Participation in cooperative activities influences the degree to which systems integrate.  The 
existing patterns of interaction in an array of activities represent an indication of resilience or 
“the capacity for collective action in the face of unexpected extreme events that shatter 
infrastructure and disrupt normal operating conditions” (Comfort, Oh, Ertan, and Scheinert 2010, 
p. 33).  The level of system integration and the extent to which the system’s collective cognition 
recognizes need affects the ability of actors to self-organize to achieve shared goals. 
Participation in cooperative activities links organizations into the larger system of 
emergency management.  These linkages create the structure of interaction, which facilitates 
information exchange, resource sharing, skill development, and organizational learning.  The 
time, resources, and number of personnel required to establish and maintain these linkages vary 
per cooperative activity.  The sections below identify the different types of cooperation and the 
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extent to which they occur.  They also demonstrate how cooperative activities integrate 
participants together into a larger set of interdependent agencies.  They identify key activities 
critical to integration, useful sources of information, and the degree to which activities link 
agencies both within and between disciplines, levels of government, and sectors.   
Disaster management literature focuses on the four phases of response: mitigation, 
preparation, response, and recovery (Mileti 1999; Donahoe and Joyce 2001; Waugh and Tierney 
2007).  To explore the emergency management system prior to, during, and after dynamic 
events, the present study expands the typology to include additional administrative tasks, 
emphasizing tasks previously classified as disaster management subcomponents.  Analysis of the 
semi-structured interviews supports the present study’s focus on risk assessment, mitigation, 
preparedness, response, recovery, evaluation and corrective action, and administrative activities 
as core systemic functions.  Some agencies achieve what they label as “operational 
consolidation” with other agencies where they plan, train, and respond to threats as one group, 
but maintain separate administrative structures and organizational identities.   
Each cooperative activity varies in terms of required time, resources, manpower, and 
information sharing.  Analysis of semi-structured interviews confirms that information exchange 
(through multiple channels) facilitate these activities.  All of these activities are pursued by both 
formal and informal strategies for action.     
The goals of agencies and the activities they pursue create the opportunities to cross 
organizational boundaries.  The overarching goal of emergency management is to protect life and 
property.  First responders, as outlined in Chapter 4, pursue a diverse set of functions including 
fire suppression, law enforcement, and emergency medical services.  Agencies from higher 
levels of government also engage in diverse sets of activities.  There are many cross over points, 
  117 
however, where agencies engage in both intra-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary cooperation to 
pursue shared or complementary goals as the extant literature suggests (Kearns 2000; Cigler 
1999).  Several activities, as outlined below, provide the opportunity for agencies to interact. 
5.3.1 Mapping the Relationships between Cooperative Activities and Types of 
Organizations 
The present study models interagency relationships created through cooperative activities.  
Content analysis of the semi-structured interviews provides data on interactions.  Using the 
social network analysis software UCINET (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 2002), network 
analysis was conducted to create bimodal maps to conceptually demonstrate the degree to which 
the system integrates due to cooperative activities.  The present study introduces several bimodal 
network maps below which include actors and actions.  These conceptual maps show how 
activities connect agencies at different levels together and how these activities might generate, 
change, and reinforce the existing systemic structure.  The maps serve as visual models to 
demonstrate levels of integration and interdependence.  By identifying central actors, cut points, 
and siloed (or disconnected) agencies, I demonstrate how systems integrate or fail to do so. 
5.3.2 Risk (and Vulnerability) Assessment 
Risk assessment, an activity in which actors survey their environments through both formal and 
informal methods to identify risks and vulnerabilities, represents a continuous process of 
information search and (occasional) exchange during all phases of emergency management.  
Identifying hazards and assessing the extent to which a community is vulnerable offers two 
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examples of risk assessment activities.  The assessment of risk can, and often is, conducted as an 
intra-agency activity.  As risks transcend political and organizational boundaries, information is 
sometimes either produced jointly or produced independently, but then shared among relevant 
agencies.  These activities create a network of agencies focused on risk (and vulnerability) 
assessment. 
5.3.2.1 Integration of Subsystem—Risk (and Vulnerability) Assessment 
Figure 7 demonstrates how various activities link agencies together into a risk 
assessment-based subsystem.  As demonstrated by Figure 7, evaluating infrastructure receives 
considerable attention during the risk assessment process and integrates the activities of multiple 
disciplines.  According to the semi-structured interview data, facility evaluations play an 
important role in connecting fire, police, and EMS as well actors from other sectors.  Figure 7 
shows that the cooperative activities of evaluating school facilities and apartment buildings serve 
as network “cut points.”  That is without these activities, the system would be disconnected.   
Joint risk assessment activities bridge levels of government, sectors, and disciplines.  
These activities represent cases in which the goals and operations of various agencies overlap to 
promote cooperation.  Council of government groups based on discipline, for example, provide a 
forum for emergency managers to span their jurisdictional boundaries and work together on risk 
assessment.  Another example is the mandate requiring local businesses to report hazardous 
material to municipal officials.  This reporting process encourages interaction between business 
and emergency managers.  The information obtained encourages communication between these 
municipal officials, building inspectors, and emergency managers.      
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Figure 7: Diagram of Agencies and Risk Assessment Activities 
Circle (red) = Activity; Square (blue) = Organization 
 
Table 19: Types of Risk Assessment Activities 
Acronym Activity Acronym Activity 
Chiefsmtg Meeting - municipal chiefs Eval-flooding Identifying vulnerability to flooding 
COG(fire) Meeting - COG fire Eval-Schools Facility evals - Schools 
COG(police) Meeting - COG police HAZMAT Reporting hazardous materials 
EMScouncil Meeting - county ems council Itshare Info sharing through IT 
Eval-Apartments Facility evals - Apartment bldg Riskrating Insurance Service Office rating 
Eval-Assistedliving Facility evals - Nursing homes     
   
5.3.2.2 Lack of Integration—Risk (and Vulnerability) Assessment 
The field study’s risk assessment subsystem lacks significant involvement from state and 
federal agencies.  Analysis of semi-structured interviews reveals the predominance of local 
agencies in the risk assessment system.  “Risk assessment information is pushed up from the 
local level.  The folks at the local level know their communities and what their vulnerabilities 
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are… and what they need to deal with,” Respondent 39 indicated.  However, opportunities exist 
for state and federal agencies to promote that activity.  Figure 10 does not include the efforts of 
the Department of Homeland Security to identify vulnerable infrastructure, which indicates a 
lack of integration with local agencies.    
For agencies that engage in joint risk assessment, they do so infrequently.  Survey results 
demonstrate that, for the majority of agencies (56.7 percent), cooperative risk assessment 
occurred less frequently, ranging from three times a year to every other year.  A sizable portion 
(18.9 percent) fails altogether to assess risk jointly (including 4 out of the 10 EMS agencies 
surveyed).   
5.3.2.3 Integration of Activities into the Larger System—Risk (and Vulnerability) 
Assessment 
Analysis of semi-structured interviews indicates that risk assessment generates the 
impetus for mitigation and incident prevention.  The information gained in these activities helps 
decision makers to prioritize preparedness activities.  It can also inform responders during the 
response and recovery phases.  Risk assessment provides a necessary function for mitigation and 
incident prevention efforts.  If a manager does not recognize the nature or severity of a risk, he or 
she is less likely to invest in mitigation and planning.   
5.3.3 Mitigation and Incident Prevention 
Mitigation functions are “activities taken to reduce the severity or consequences of an 
emergency” (National Fire Protection Association 2007, p. 1600-5).  Incident prevention 
activities are intended to prevent an incident from occurring.  Most first responders interviewed 
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focus on education initiatives or deterrence to prevent various hazards and crimes.  One joint 
mitigation activity pursued by local municipalities is the dredging of creeks and other waterways 
to reduce the likelihood of catastrophic flooding.  Specific prevention functions differ by 
discipline.  Fire departments conduct fire prevention courses and offer free home inspections.  
EMS agencies increasingly engage in public health functions such as administrating vaccinations 
to prevent the spread of communicable diseases.  Police departments dedicate manpower for 
violence prevention in schools, DUI checkpoints, and heavy machinery inspection, in addition to 
their violent crime prevention programs. 
5.3.3.1 Integration of Subsystem—Mitigation and Incident Prevention 
Most agencies that pursue joint mitigation and incident prevention do so independently.  
The incident prevention and mitigation network in Allegheny County, therefore, is sparse (so 
sparse and disconnected that the present study does not report the fragmented system diagram).  
First response agencies by in large do not participate in traditional types of mitigation work 
facilitated through zoning and code enforcement, analysis indicates. 
Analysis of semi-structured interviews reveals little joint mitigation/incident prevention 
activities among agencies of the same discipline.  Interactions generally occur between agencies 
operating in the same municipality or between local municipalities and agencies from higher 
levels of government.  Respondent 45 recounted the intergovernmental coordination during a 
mitigation program to prevent flooding in his municipality.  “Every spring and every summer, 
the street department foreman, myself, and one councilman will walk around to observe the 
stream levels.”  The group then assesses their community’s risk of flooding.  “We want to see if 
the streams are clear.  We work with the Army Corps of Engineers…  They dredge the streams 
to remove debris.  Last June, they removed, from one stream, 65 tons of debris.” 
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As a discipline, police participate in joint incident prevention projects more frequently 
(63.6 percent) than the other two disciplines; fire (31.8 percent) and EMS (10.0 percent).  Law 
enforcement activities such as DUI checkpoints; joint trailer and heavy equipment inspection; 
and other crime prevention programs account for the difference in cooperation.  While semi-
structured interviews indicate that some fire and EMS agencies dedicate considerable time and 
resources to prevention programs, they less regularly do so in conjunction with other agencies.  
5.3.3.2 Lack of Integration—Mitigation and Incident Prevention 
Respondent 35 characterized the lack of joint activities in terms of mitigation and 
incident prevention.  “I don't think we really get into the mitigation side.”  First responder 
agencies generally lack a coordinated mitigation program.  It makes sense for the responders 
who know their communities to collaborate with building inspection personnel to mitigate 
against potential hazards, but for most part first responders consider this work to be either 
outside of their responsibilities (with a few exceptions) or not supported by the municipality with 
resources.  Municipalities waiting for higher level support do not recognize state and federal 
mitigation grant programs.    
5.3.3.3 Integration of Activities—Mitigation and Incident Prevention 
Mitigation and incident prevention programs do not always achieve their intended goals.  
However, participation in these activities provides agencies with updated information on the 
nature and probability of possible events.  The coordination of external grants or organizing 
work with the Army Corps of Engineers strengthens administrative relationships and networking 
in general.  These relationships may translate to expand later response and recovery operations as 
operators become more familiar with the environments and potential threats.  
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5.3.4 Preparedness 
Preparedness is a phase of emergency management and disaster response management 
comprised of a number of activities, including planning, training, and the coordination of large-
scale exercises.  Preparedness “refers to the readiness of a jurisdiction to react constructively to 
threats from the environment in a way that minimizes the negative consequences of impact …” 
(Perry and Lindell 2003, p. 338).  Planning to develop strategies to deal with response and 
recovery efforts is not uncommon in Allegheny County.  In fact, they are required by state law.  
However, the extent to which agencies plan individually and plan collaboratively across agencies 
and jurisdictions varies.   
Agencies’ readiness to respond depends in part on their recognition of those threats and 
how they fit into a common operating picture that adequately encompasses the reality of the 
situation.  This situational awareness is facilitated by information search and exchange at times 
focused on risk and vulnerability assessment.  The intensity of planning and training increases 
with the agency’s anticipation of an extreme event.  Similarly, major preplanned events spur 
joint preparedness activities.    
5.3.5 Planning 
In the field study area, multiagency planning activities range from filling out and submitting 
“boiler plate” templates to the County Emergency Services (as Respondent 20 describes it) to 
conducting more deliberate, coordinated planning exercises and discussions related to both 
municipal emergency operations plans (MEOP) and regional planning.  Some first responders 
preplan for both routine, day-to-day response as well as large-scale disasters.  They plan in a 
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range of administrative environments from informal meetings to formal processes facilitated by 
other levels of government.  At the county and state levels of government, considerable 
investment in terms of hours are dedicated to planning initiatives, but analysis of semi-structured 
interviews indicate that local municipal agencies are often not engaged with these actors.   
5.3.5.1 Integration of Subsystem—Planning 
Figure 11 reveals how joint planning activities link agencies across disciplines, levels of 
government, and sectors.   
 
Figure 8: Diagram of Agencies and Planning Activities 
Circle (red) = Activity; Square (blue) = Organization 
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Table 20: Types of Planning Activities 
Acronym Activity Acronym Activity 
AL Assisted living facility plan MEOP(c) Municipal emergency ops plan (c) 
CEOP County emergency ops plan Nuclear Nuclear facility plan 
EOPtemp Emergency ops plan template Ops Operations planning 
Evac Evacuation PC(COG) Planning committee (COG) 
HAZMAT Hazmat PC(EMC) Planning committee (EMC) 
Industry Industrial facility plan PC(EMS) Planning committee (EMS) 
ITshare Info sharing through info technology PC(R13) Planning committee (Region 13) 
Informal Informal planning meeting PPE Preplanned events 
LEPC Local emergency planning committee RM Resource management 
Mall Mall plan Runcards Run cards 
Mit Mitigation School School plan 
MEOP(a) Municipal emergency ops plan (a) Threat Specific threat 
MEOP(b) Municipal emergency ops plan (b) Univ University plan 
 
For example, County 9-1-1 plays a central role in facilitating planning.  Figure 8 
graphically depicts the centrality of run card planning in integrating the system.  First responders 
submit “run cards” to county dispatchers rank ordering agency preference for mutual aid 
partners.  During an incident, a commander relays his or her run card request, i.e. first, second, 
third, fourth, or fifth preference for mutual aid and dispatch will contact that pre-assigned 
agency.  Some emergency managers update their run card order regularly.  Others do not.  The 
run cards, regardless, encourage chiefs to think through their needs and rank order neighboring 
assets. 
At the center of Figure 8 are planning committees (PCs) that are organized based on 
discipline and/or location (municipality, council of government, etc.)  Some regular municipal 
planning meetings consist of municipal managers, public works, police, fire, and EMS directors.  
The planning process in this activity, according to Respondent 22, “is not highly formal. We’re 
sitting down and saying, hey, we’ve got this coming up or we’ve got that coming up.”  These 
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types of meeting are not the norm across the field study area, but they do occur sporadically 
depending on the volition of a municipality’s leaders.   
In addition to municipal-based meetings, planning committees are also organized by 
discipline and region.  Figure 8 displays several planning committee activities based on 
discipline (EMS and local emergency management coordinators) as well as meetings of 
organizations grouped by council of government.  These regional activities field separate police 
and fire committees. 
The state emergency management agency plays a significant role in the system despite 
not interacting directly with municipalities on a regular basis.  “We provide the municipality 
with a model plan so that everybody is on the same sheet of music about contingency plans 
based off of federal guidance,” Respondent 55 offered.  Title 35 of the Commonwealth Code 
mandates that PEMA provides municipalities with planning templates.  PEMA creates the 
planning templates and county emergency services distributes them.  Municipalities annually 
submit the planning document to their county emergency management agency that then submits 
them to the state.  Municipal actors, particularly LEMCs, rely on county personnel for input and 
guidance, but not state personnel.   
Analysis of semi-structured interviews indicates that the integration of public and private 
sector agencies are the strongest during planning activities.  County Emergency Services, for 
example, organizes a diverse group of 60 public, private, and nonprofit agencies for planning 
purposes focused on hazardous materials.  The Allegheny County Local Emergency Planning 
Committee (LEPC) includes representatives from public safety, medical services, and private 
industry among others.  The maintenance of the group is mandated by SARA Title III, the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986.  The LEPC, created for 
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HAZMAT purposes also doubles as the Citizens Corps Council (CCC), which assists County 
Emergency Services in creating a broader, all-hazard plan to mitigate, respond, and recover from 
an array of potential hazards.  (Allegheny County Emergency Services 2010b). 
5.3.5.2 Lack of Integration—Planning 
Some agencies do not plan with other agencies.  According to the survey data, a sizable 
portion (21.6 percent) fail to participate in any joint planning whatsoever, either completely 
disengaged or reliant upon their local emergency management coordinator to communicate 
relevant information.  Another sizable portion (24.3 percent) participate in planning sessions 
only once a year, usually as part of the state-mandated update of municipal operations plans.   
In Pennsylvania, Title 35 requires municipalities to create an emergency operations plan. 
While PEMA provides the template for response plans, they (not the county emergency 
management offices) review or provide feedback on the final products.  Several respondents 
viewed the planning process as a checklist.  “Most of these plans are boilerplate.  You just plug 
your information in them.  When the shit hits the fan, maybe they help” (Respondent 20).    
Analysis of the semi-structured interviews identifies the prevalence of a lack of 
integration between some local emergency management coordinators (LEMCs) and their 
municipal agencies, especially nonprofit EMS agencies.  Active LEMCs play a pivotal role, as 
boundary spanners, connecting state, county, and other municipal resources with their local 
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Integration of Activities—Planning 
Joint planning leads to additional activities.  Analysis of the semi-structured interviews 
indicates that the decision whether to plan with other agencies influences related decisions 
regarding training, resource management, and information search.   
5.3.6 Training 
A considerable percentage of survey respondents (89.1 percent) engaged in interagency training 
at least once a year.  Several types of training are used in the field study area, as demonstrated by 
Table 21, including classroom lectures, table-top exercises, discipline-related skill training, 
discipline-related incident simulations, and large-scale incident response exercises.  Effective 
training requires relevant information on potential threats and specific best practices on how to 
effectively respond to those hazards.  Local first responders initiate training for a number of 
relatively routine (or at least anticipated) events, as described below.  Agencies at the county, 
regional, state, and federal levels facilitate larger-scale exercises that either anticipate a low 
probability, high risk incident occurring or prepare personnel for preplanned events, such as the 
G20 summit, Super Bowl celebrations, or March Madness (student celebration and riots) in the 
case of the field study area. 
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5.3.6.1 Integration of Subsystem 
 
Figure 9: Diagram of Agencies and Training Activities 
Circle (red) = Activity; Square (blue) = Organization 
Table 21: Types of Training Activities 
Acronym Activity  Acronym Activity  
AED Automated external defibrillator MC Mass casualty 
AP Airport emergency exercise MC(trans) Mass casualty (transportation) 
AP(fire) Airport (fire) Mdecon Mass decontamination 
Assistedliving Assisted living Nuclear Nuclear 
BT Bio terrorism Ops(EMS) Operations (EMS) 
ConEd(EMS) Continuing education (EMS) Ops(fire) Operations (fire) 
CR(fire) Classroom (fire) PPE Preplanned event 
CR(health) Classroom (health) PPE(local) Preplanned event (local) 
CR(police) Classroom (police) QRS Quick response service 
CRinf(fire) Classroom - informal (fire) Rescue Rescue 
CSM Crime scene management RIT Rapid intervention team 
DoE Dept. of Energy School School 
Ffrehab Firefighter rehab SWAT SWAT 
Highrise High rise Theater Theater 
K-9 K-9 Trescue Technical rescue 
Mall Mall     
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Training, in preparation for discipline-specific emergencies, links levels of government, 
sectors, and disciplines.  As visually depicted in Figure 9, assisted living facilities, high rise 
apartments, and unique facilities such as shopping centers, schools, and factors, provide areas of 
concern that fire and police departments focus on with the occasional participation from EMS 
agencies.  Other facilities, especially those considered to be potential targets for terrorism, serve 
as training grounds for multiple response agencies.  Funded by federal and state agencies, large-
scale exercises focused on the international airport, nuclear facilities, and the US Department of 
Energy’s local research facility integrate agencies from across levels of government, sectors, and 
disciplines (as demonstrated in Figure 9).   
Inter-disciplinary training occurs in preparation for potential large-scale events.  Mass 
causality training, for example, connects EMSI, the county EMS bureau, the Port Authority, and 
local EMS agencies.  SWAT and critical incident response team (CIRT) training links local 
municipal police departments with county police, state police, and some federal resources as well 
as with SWAT teams from other regions of Pennsylvania and EMS agencies.   
Preplanned events, such as the G-20 summit, Super Bowl celebrations, and March 
Madness, pose potential crowd control problems as well as targets for terrorist activity.  The G-
20 summit spurred the City of Pittsburgh and County Emergency Services to plan and exercise 
closely with agencies across the scale of government, i.e. outside county and municipal assets 
and up the scale, i.e. the FBI, the Secret Service, the Department of Homeland Security, and 
foreign security and law enforcement agencies.   
5.3.6.2 Lack of Integration—Training 
On the municipal-level, regular training between fire, police, and EMS appears to be the 
exception rather than the rule according to the analysis of semi-structured interviews.  
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Respondent 6, a fire chief, commented that his department does not train with the police and 
seldom exercises with EMS agencies.  Instead, his agency takes an ad hoc approach to incident 
coordination.  “Normally when an accident occurs, it’s up to us with regard to what we want 
[police and EMS] to do and how we want them to handle it” (Respondent 6).  Some LEMCs, 
particularly those who are paid, help to organize inter-municipal training, but many 
municipalities lack a LEMC who actively coordinates training.  One EMS director who 
administers several municipalities confirms this, “as far as joint training coordinated by 
municipal emergency management coordinators, we see very little” (Respondent 35).    
5.3.6.3 Integration of Activities—Training 
As described in the planning section above, planning and training prepare agencies for an 
array of contingencies.  Lessons learned during preparedness activities facilitate effective 
response operations.  One emergency manager characterized the integrating role preparedness 
activities as a way to improve response operations.  “Good interagency coordination and 
cooperation doesn’t happen accidentally.  It is helped by the kind of exercises and training 
opportunities that we can do before an event” (Respondent 53).  While training is recognized as a 
direct contribution to response effectiveness, activities also identify opportunities for additional 
preparedness and risk assessment functions.  
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5.3.7 Response 
“When the whistle…  In the emergency service, there something to be said when the whistle 
blows even the police realize ‘the more the merrier’ send people out…” (Respondent 28, police). 
 
Response is a highly visible type of cooperative activity.  NFPA 1600 defines response as 
“immediate and ongoing activities, tasks, programs, and systems to manage the effects of an 
incident that threatens life, property, operations, or the environment” (p. 1600-5).  Response 
activities create opportunities for agencies to interact on regular basis, depending on the 
frequency and location of the incident type.  All first responders surveyed (100 percent) 
indicated that they respond jointly at least once a month.  The two sections below map the 
patterns of interaction and types of activities occurring during response both to routine events 
and also to large-scale, rapidly evolving dynamic events.     
5.3.8 Response (Routine)   
Agencies coordinate both intra-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary joint functions related to 
response.  Analysis of semi-structured interviews identifies several types of intra-disciplinary 
cooperation: fire departments implementing fire suppression tactics; police working together 
during law enforcement activities; and EMS agencies coordinating patient care and 
transportation.  These activities are displayed in Figure 10.     
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5.3.8.1 Integration of Subsystem—Response (Routine) 
County 9-1-1 serves as a central hub for information.  Figure 10 visually demonstrates 
the centrality of dispatching first responders during emergency calls.  County 9-1-1 and to a 
lesser extent the few self-dispatching municipalities remaining play a critical role in linking 
disciplines and levels of government during a response to both routine and large-scale events.   
 
 
Figure 10: Diagram of Agencies and Routine Response Activities 
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Table 22: Types of Routine Response Activities 
Acronym Activity Acronym Activity 
Assessincident Assessment of incident Majorinvestigations Major investigations 
Bankrobbery Bank robbery investigation Protectff Provide security for firefighters 
Bodysearch Body search Protectparamedics Provide security for paramedics 
Carrying patient Carrying patient QRS Quick response service 
CC Crowd control RIT Rapid intervention team 
CSM Crime scene management Roadclear Road clearing 
Dispatch Dispatch Structure fire Structure fire 
DUI DUI check points Suspectapprehension Suspect apprehension 
Ffrehab Firefighter rehab TA Traffic accident 
Fireinvestigation Fire investigation Tahighway Traffic accident (highway) 
Foam trucks Foam trucks TrafficStop Traffic stops (hw) 
From From Uncover Undercover intelligence 
HAZMAT HAZMAT VI Vehicle inspections 
Homicide Homicide investigations Vice Vice 
 
Police cooperation during law enforcement activities is a regular occurrence in the field 
study area.  For example, county police provide special investigations for homicides, sexual 
assaults, and kidnapping.  The FBI participates in bank robbery investigations.  Municipal law 
enforcement coordinates with state police on speed-limit enforcement.   
Some disciplines’ core, daily functions overlap.  Several fire departments, for example, 
maintain QRS units to respond to medical emergencies.  Fire department-based QRS, are often 
located closer to an incident than an ambulance service.  EMS agencies and fire departments 
work together, therefore, as need arises.  Also, police increasingly operate automated external 
defibrillators (AED) and serve as emergency medical first responders until EMS agencies arrive 
to take over certain incidents.  These overlaps in functions facilitate collective action as one 
agency augments another.  Volunteer fire services, occasionally, include police and paramedics 
in their ranks.  These double-hatters provide a valuable link between agencies.  Respondent 16, a 
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fire chief, commented that “there is no break now with police.  Three or four policemen are 
members of the fire department.  Some of them carry fire gear in their police car.”  
Even when their primary functions do not overlap, first responders coordinate with other 
disciplines.  EMS agencies commonly respond to structure fires to provide emergency scene 
rehabilitation to the firefighters.  “Any one of our incidents that has an immediate danger to life 
and health has an ambulance automatically dispatched,” Respondent 13, a fire chief, commented.  
With respect to inter-disciplinary activities, police provide operational security for EMS and fire 
personnel as demonstrated in Figure 10. 
5.3.8.2 Lack of Integration—Response (Routine) 
Lack of integration during routine response activities occurs sporadically.  Equipment 
such as a fire department’s foam truck might not be deployed because first responders on scene 
did not know it existed.  Fire departments in close proximity may refuse to mutual aid together 
for a number of reasons, including turf battles and more frequently one department’s lower 
standards of professional performance.   
Analysis of the semi-structured interviews indicates that some large departments refuse to 
work with neighboring municipalities during response operations.  Some paid fire departments, 
the City of Pittsburgh in particular, appear to make deliberate policy decisions not cooperate.  
One neighboring fire chief recounts a single response experience with a large, paid department.  
“My only experience with [them] was when there was a house right on the border and they 
showed up first and realized that it was in [our municipality], they saw us pull up and they 
packed up their things and they left.  They could have stayed” (Respondent 10).  In addition to 
paid fire departments, for-profit EMS agencies appear not to be integrated into the larger system.  
This is explored in Chapter 7.  
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5.3.9 Response (Large-Scale) 
During routine incidents, agencies generally focus on specific, core competencies of public 
safety.  Large-scale events create less ordinary and more complex demands on agencies’ time, 
resources, and personnel.  During large-scale incidents, local first responders are often unable to 
independently resolve the demands of their external environments.  Other municipal agencies, 
such as public works and other personnel, participate as do other levels of government such as 
county, state, and sometimes federal assets.   
During large-scale incidents, emergency support functions (ESFs) group agencies by 
functions in order to coordinate key response duties.  For example, agencies participate in public 
works (ESF #3), firefighting (ESF #4), mass care and public health and medical services (ESF #6 
and #8), oil and hazardous materials response (ESF #10), and public safety and security (ESF 
#13) based on their core competencies.  During these activities, they may coordinate with other 
agencies in their disciplines or with outside agencies. 
5.3.9.1 Integration of Subsystem—Response (Large-Scale) 
During large-scale incidents, agencies expand their normal repertoire of actions to meet 
the needs of their communities.  One EMS director, Respondent 35, described how his agency 
shifted from an emergency care provider to a public health center during response and recovery 
efforts during the flooding his community.  “On an ongoing basis we had a trailer set up there to 
provide more like a clinic environment where folks could come.  If a person cut their finger they 
could get it evaluated and cleaned up” (Respondent 35).  Essentially, the agency created a clinic 
to support the cleanup operations.  County-level assets supported their efforts.  “We provided 
immunizations.  The county public health department provided us with the vaccines…  I think 
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our roles are defined by the incident.  In that particular case, we spent almost two weeks down 
there just providing community health.”  The EMS agency adapted (with the support of other 
levels of government and disciplines) to provide needed services outside of the agency’s day-to-
day functions. 
 
Figure 11: Diagram of Agencies and Large-Scale Response Activities 
Circle (red) = Activity; Square (blue) = Organization 
 
Table 23: Types of Large-Scale Response Activities 
Acronym Activity Acronym Activity 
Bomb Bomb threat Policeshooting Police shooting 
CEOC County EOC Publichealth Public health 
CSM Crime scene management RA Resource acquisition 
Evacuation Evacuation Security Security 
Hostage Hostage situation Shelter Shelter 
LAEOC Law enforcement EOC Supplyescort Supply escort 
Logistics Logistics Winterstorm Winter storm 
MEOC Municipal emergency operations center     
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Large-scale incidents generate an array of demands in terms of time, resources, and 
personnel.  Depending on the incident, specialized equipment may be required to respond 
effectively.  Logistics represent an activity that integrates the system.  For example, private-
sector contractors are sometimes needed to procure equipment.  Respondent 42, a local 
emergency management coordinator, indicated that “In the past, there have been several 
situations that Allegheny County hasn’t been able to help…”  The respondent cited one example 
in which “the County didn’t have the right back-hoe to get into the stream and clear the channel.  
We had some names on our resource list of construction companies that had the necessary 
equipment.”  The LEMC contracted out for the equipment and services.  Generally, however, 
County Emergency Services plays a major role as a boundary spanner, connecting local agencies 
with needed resources and personnel during a large-scale event.  
On the state-level, interorganizational communication and coordination, during large-
scale incidents, are facilitated at the state EOC through emergency preparedness liaison officers 
(EPLOs).  “All state agencies should have an EPLO who interact with all other agencies.  And 
when we need resources I go to them” (Respondent 19).  However, state involvement in local 
incidents varies based on an incident’s level of intensity and the need of local responders.  
Routine events, such as the one described above, receive little attention.  As events increase in 
intensity, PEMA’s regular emergency operation center’s staff may be contacted whereas they 
collect information and try to develop situational awareness.  As local resources are exhausted, 
PEMA will mobilize state resources per state procedures (Pennsylvania State Emergency 
Operations Plan).    
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5.3.9.2 Lack of Integration—Response (Large-Scale) 
Volunteer organizations (VOADs) participate in large-scale response activities.  The 
American Red Cross is responsible for coordinating sheltering programs that may integrate local 
grocery stores, churches, restaurants, and the Salvation Army.  They often work with public 
assets, like LEMCs, to coordinate response.  Respondent 6 explained “We do have an evacuation 
team here in town that has been trained through the Red Cross.  We’ve called them out probably 
four times in the last year for temporary sheltering.”  However, the vast majority of respondents 
do not coordinate response with VOAs.  They also do not engage in joint risk assessment or 
preparedness. 
5.3.9.3 Integration of Activities—Response (Large-Scale) 
Joint response (to both routine and large-scale incidents) is by far the most frequent 
cooperative activity in the field study area.  This frequency of interaction facilitates reasoned risk 
assessments and provides the justification for preparedness activities (based on past experiences).  
Semi-structured interviews confirm the evaluation of past experience provides the foundation for 
an agency’s formal and informal knowledge base.  These knowledge bases justify either action 
or inaction in terms of other participation in other activities. 
5.3.10 Recovery  
First responders, emergency management personnel, other government agencies such as local 
public works, and private-sector organizations pursue recovery activities after a response phase 
of an incident to “return conditions to a level that is acceptable to the entity” (National Fire 
Protection Association 2007, p. 1600-5).  That is they restore services, facilities, and other 
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critical infrastructure to working order. Opportunities to participate in joint recovery efforts 
occur only after situations in which extreme events (flooding, windstorms, and other large-scale 
accidents) disrupt normal conditions.  The frequency at which agencies interact is, therefore, less 
than during response to routine events.  Of those surveyed, 86.4 percent of agencies participate in 
some kind of recovery effort at least once a year.    
 Common joint activities are debris removal, road clearing, and restoration of electricity 
(and other critical services like public health functions).  These types of activities require the 
identification of projects.  Police conduct “windshield surveys” to gather information and rely it 
back to relevant agencies for action.  Other activities, especially in the aftermath of large-scale 
disasters, include the restoration of physical infrastructure and facilities (Donahoe and Joyce 












  141 
5.3.10.1 Integration of Subsystem—Recovery 
 
 
Figure 12: Diagram of Agencies and Recovery Activities 
Circle (red) = Activity; Square (blue) = Organization 
 
Table 24: Types of Recovery Activities 
Acronym Activity Acronym Activity 
Debris Debris removal Publichealth Public health 
Electricrepair Electric line repair Reimburse Reimbursement 
EOC EOC coordination RM Resource management 
HNG House National Guard Windshield Windshield survey 
 
Several recovery activities integrate levels of government, sectors, and disciplines.  
Analysis of the semi-structured interviews indicates that police serve a major role in identifying 
response and recovery points and communicating this intelligence to decision makers to prompt 
action.  Respondent 28 explained that “the police’s role is to get the road back open and make 
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sure that there are no safety hazards… We are the first line of communication to [the electric 
company] and to emergency management.”  Again, some police call this intelligence gathering 
function “windshield surveys” where they “tabulate problems and communicate them back to 
other parties” (Respondent 28).  
Figure 12 visually depicts the central role that police play in several activities.  As police 
and other agencies acquire actionable information, they often communicate that information back 
to the EOC and county dispatch.  The act of establishing the EOC and coordinating activities 
ranging from resource management to debris removal helps to integrate the system. 
Recovery efforts require funding; therefore, higher-level government agencies and 
insurance companies are active following a disaster, processing claims, and distributing 
reimbursement checks.  Figure 12 demonstrates how this reimbursement activity links federal 
and state resources with local-level agencies. 
5.3.10.2 Lack of Integration—Recovery 
Lack of communication with electric companies was a common concern expressed by 
respondents from all levels of government.  Respondent 3 acknowledged the lack of 
communication between first responders and the power companies.  “When there’s a power 
outage… communication is a problem with the power company.  We will call them and they will 
tell us that we are on the list for later and that’s it.”  The lack of coordination with utility 
companies is not uncommon throughout the set of emergency activities. 
5.3.10.3 Integration of Activities—Recovery 
As mentioned above, intelligence gathering during response facilitates at least the initial 
recovery phase.  Like response, the efficacy of recovery efforts is bolstered by preparedness 
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activities.  Evaluation of recovery operations may foster increased commitments to mitigation 
and preparedness programs in the future. 
5.3.11 Evaluation and Corrective Action 
Evaluation and corrective action is a process that occurs during each type of cooperative activity.  
Any joint recognition of deficiency or shortcoming and the steps taken to rectify or improve the 
situation constitutes evaluation and corrective action.  These activities occur in a number of 
situations and can be either formal or informal.  The goal of agencies engaged in this activity is 
to learn and improve operations.  Respondent 10 commented that “it helps us to reaffirm our 
plans and procedures.  If somebody screwed up a plan or procedure, they will learn from it.”  In 
some cases, evaluation leads to organizational learning where agencies take corrective actions to 
improve the efficacy of their operations.   
5.3.11.1 Lack of Integration—Evaluation and Corrective Action 
“As needed” was a phrase repeated again and again during the interview process to 
explain the lack of cooperation on this activity.  According to the survey data, only 10.8 percent 
of respondents reported that they engage in joint critiques on a monthly basis.  The “need” to 
evaluate and correct mistakes is recognized generally after large-scale incidents or the loss of life 
during operations.   
5.3.11.2 Integration of Subsystem—Evaluation and Corrective Action 
Evaluation and corrective action occurs infrequently.  Respondents indicated that 
informal conversations between chiefs and line officers about joint response or training activities 
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occur more regularly than formal critiques.  Joint hot washes, “critiques… done immediately 
after the event” (Respondent 17), are less common.   
5.3.12 Administration 
The goal of agencies engaging in administrative cooperation is generally to either save money 
through joint purchases or to receive grants that require some form of cooperation.  In terms of 
administrative tasks, first response agencies and other emergency management agencies enter 
into joint purchasing agreements.  Another form of cooperation is the submission of joint grant 
applications, often to FEMA Regional Grants Programs in the fire discipline.   
Rarely, agencies will merge their administrations, either structurally or operationally 
where two or more departments maintain separate administrative identities, but operate under 
joint operational command.  The Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic 
Development created a typology of regionalization activities to demonstrate possible types of 
administrative cooperation.21  These activities range from consolidations and mergers (where 
agencies structural come together) to associations (where certain activities are administrated 
jointly through umbrella organizations) to regionalization (joint projects in which agencies retain 
their identity).    
                                                 
21 Legislative Budget and Finance Committee (2005) “The Feasibility of Regionalizing Pennsylvania's 
Volunteer Fire Companies” Pennsylvania General Assembly: Harrisburg, PA. 
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5.3.12.1 Integration of Subsystem—Administration 
“We formally established working groups and committees to work through issues.  A lot of our 
day-to-day business functions are where our strongest collaborations are” (Respondent 55) 
 
With respect to joint and coordinated purchasing, a small but growing group of agencies 
coordinate their efforts.  Figure 13, a single-mode network, reveals the patterns of interactions 
agencies exhibit in coordinating joint purchasing.  One council of government, in particular, 
plays a central role in the network.  The COG lessens the costs of acquiring information and 
provides continual administrative support, which elevates costs related to negotiating joint 
purchasing, both between agencies and between the purchaser and vendor.  COGs represent what 
Weible (2010) refers to as a “collaborative institution” that brokers collaborative relationships.  
Respondent 10 praised the results of coordinating with his COG.  “We get outstanding prices.  A 
lot of our smaller vehicles, SUVs, and pickup trucks are bought through [the COG’s] law-
enforcement group.” 
 
5.3.12.2 Lack of Integration—Administration 
An area where integrating joint purchasing is weak is the fire discipline.  SHACOG and 
the Northern Fire Chiefs Association have conducted joint purchase projects, but coordinating 
regular joint purchasing is difficult because of the wide range of equipment and preferences 
within the discipline.  Respondent 10 explained that “the purchasing thing itself hasn’t gone very 
well because everybody’s using different equipment.”  Coordinating major purchases require 
interagency agreement on apparatus or equipment type, brand, vendor, etc.  Respondents 
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generally host testing, ladder testing, and pump testing as areas where joint purchasing requires 
little coordination beforehand and can be effectively management.   
 
Figure 13: Diagram of Agencies Interactions Related to Joint (or Coordinated) Purchasing 
 
With respect to joint grants, patterns of interaction generally appear to be limited to intra-
disciplinary relationships.  Neighboring departments are more likely to coordinate grant 
applications, but some exceptions include agencies that specialize in specific functions, such as 
technical rescue.  State and federal agencies incentivize joint grants to varying degrees.  This will 
be explored in Chapter 7. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter reveals that integration on certain activities influences cooperation and integration 
on others.  In a system with a large number of agencies operating at various levels of 
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government, in different professional disciplines, and in dissimilar contexts, many strategies 
emerge and are adopted to address the diverse set of functions characterized by risk assessment, 
mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery, and administrative goals.  Chapter 5 employs 
Ostrom’s (2005) IAD framework to assess cooperation at the levels of individual activities 
(action situations), the subsystems, and the system that these activities create, i.e. the 
interdependent model of emergency management.  The interconnectivity facilitated by 
cooperation generates and reinforces the structure of the larger system.  This cooperation enables 
agencies to administer a complex environment characterized by variability in terms of goals and 
demands.  To understand these systems, the present study analyzes the field area on multiple 
scales.  Chapter 6 explores the architecture of one subsystem in detail, the response system. 
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6.0  THE STRUCTURE OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE NETWORKS 
Chapter 5 demonstrates the general patterns of interaction created by several cooperative 
activities in an emergency management field study area.  Chapter 6 investigates more closely the 
composition of the network and the structure created by interaction during response operations.  I 
employ social network analysis to study data of day-to-day emergency incidents recorded by 
Allegheny County (Pennsylvania) 9-1-1 over a seven-month period.   
I demonstrate that the network structure displays both small-world and scale-free model 
effects.  This indicates a dense clustering between regional subgroups (a small world model) 
connected by a core group of disproportionately highly connected agencies (a scale-free 
network).  These findings reveal what I label as a “neighborhood-centered network” model for 
emergency management and public safety.   
This chapter identifies several highly connected, prominent agencies that span 
jurisdictional and disciplinary boundaries.  These boundary spanners (county agencies, regional 
EMS agencies, and large municipal police departments) weave the regionally-based, 
neighborhood-centered clusters of interactions into the larger emergency management system.  
In all, findings depict a dense network with a robust capacity for information exchange necessary 
for the detection and response to risk.  
Although a relatively dense network, there are noticeably absent players.  This chapter 
identifies the system’s metropolitan center, the City of Pittsburgh, as a relatively disengaged 
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player with respect to response activities.  While the semi-structured interviews identify points in 
which the city engages with others, i.e. planning and operations during major preplanned events, 
Pittsburgh agencies (the fire department in particular) demonstrate a much lower commitment to 
cooperation during response than do other municipalities.  This withdrawal leaves a  significant 
hole in the network to which other agencies must adapt.      
Chapter 6 demonstrates a polycentric system of governance in practice that is 
characterized by relationships varying in terms of their level of commitment and intensity.  
Chapter 5 identifies how agencies may work together once (briefly) or how they may choose to 
operate within groups that have operationally consolidated.  That is they plan, train, and respond 
as one unit, consistently over time, but maintain separate administrative structures and 
organizational identities.  Most relationships fall, however, somewhere in the middle of these 
two types of interactions. 
6.1 INTERLOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT NETWORKS AS SMALL-
WORLD, NEIGHBORHOOD-CENTERED MODELS 
Using network analysis, this chapter models the patterns of interaction that occur during response 
operations to 9-1-1 calls over a seven-month period.  The complete emergency management 
network demonstrates the small-world effect in that most agencies are connected by short 
distances in dense clusters of relationships (Watts and Strogatz 1998).  In these densely-clustered 
groups, agencies exhibit social influence over one another, creating an environment in which 
strategies emerge and spread without a central authority (Watts 2003).  Small-world models 
facilitate contagion, a process in which information search and exchange spreads specific 
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strategies for action.   The field study’s emergency management network fits what the present 
study labels a neighborhood-centered network for emergency management and public safety, as 
the dense clusters of relationships correspond generally with the geographic locations of the 
participating agencies.   
The fit of the small-world model was determined using the following proximity measure 





Analysis indicates that the complete network’s proximity measure (𝜇 6.906) far exceeds Walsh’s 
(1999) minimum threshold for small-world classification (𝜇 1.0).22  It indicates that the network 
consists of high clustering coefficients and short mean distances.  To calculate the proximity 
measure, the present study divided the complete network’s clustering coefficient (𝐶 0.593) by the 
average clustering coefficient of 50 Erdős and Rényi random graphs produced via UCINET (𝐶𝑟𝑔 
0.078).  The quotient of these clustering coefficients was then divided by the quotient of the 
mean distance of the complete network (ℓ 2.157) divided by the mean distance of 50 Erdős and 
Rényi random graphs produced via UCINET (ℓ𝑟𝑔 1.989).  The resulting proximity measure (𝜇 
6.906) mathematically demonstrates that the interlocal emergency management network fits the 
small-world model.  The final equation reads as follows: 
6.906 = . 593. 0782.1571.989  
                                                 
22 Walsh, T. 1999. Search in a small world.  In T. Dean (ed.), Proceddings of the 16th International Joint Conference 
on Artificial Intelligence.  Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco, CA. 
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6.2 SCALE FREE NETWORK AND BOUNDARY SPANNERS 
Analysis of the network data indicates that the field study area represents a scale-free network 
(Barabási and Albert 1999; Barabási 2009).  In other words, the system contains a group of 
highly connected, central agencies.  The scale-free nature of the field study area indicates that 
there are several highly connected, prominent agencies that serve as boundary spanners.  These 
boundary spanners (county agencies, regional EMS agencies, and some large municipal police 
departments) link the regional-based neighborhood-centered clusters of interactions into the 
larger system.  Because of their centrality, the hubs in a scale-free network are able to act as 
information gatekeepers that possibly exert high levels of control over other agencies.  As 
boundary spanners, these prominent agencies may also generate bridging social capital useful in 
connecting disparate groups.   
The present study determines that the field study represents a scale-free network by 
assessing the distribution of centrality statistics.  The degree centrality statistics, as revealed in 
Figure 14, follow a power law (or flat tail) distribution due to the existence of a few central 
nodes that connect with a disproportionate number of lesser-connected agencies.  These hubs 
represent critical nodes on which the system depends and are explored below.   
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Figure 14: Distribution of Degree Centrality (Complete Network) 
6.3 DENSITY AND DISTANCE 
In addition to the small-world and scale-free qualities exhibited in the field study’s network, 
other system-wide measures characterize the network as a densely-clustered system.  First, the 
complete network and its subcomponent networks (fire, police, and EMS) reveal significant 
systemic density.  Second, the network’s distance statistics (the average shortest path between 
any two agencies) indicate that agencies have the ability to reach others in a limited number of 
steps within the network, which reaffirms the system’s high level of interconnectivity. 
6.3.1 Density 
There are 444 active agencies listed in the 9-1-1 call data.  A total of 15,286 relationships exist in 
the complete network between these agencies, which represents 7.74 percent of all possible 
relationships that could occur in a 444-member system.  The overall network, therefore, has a 
density measure of 0.074.  Analysis of discipline-based networks (police-only, fire-only, and 
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EMS-only) show that police (0.169), fire (0.076), and EMS (0.172) exhibit higher density scores 
than the overall network (0.074).  This indicates that groups interact in denser patterns within 
their own discipline than they do with others.  The police and EMS scores help to explain the 
particularly dense patterns of interactions modeled below in Figures 16 and 18.     
6.3.2 Distance and Reachability   
As presented in the small-world findings, the average node-to-node distance, i.e. the average 
shortest path between any two agencies, is 2.229.  Therefore, for any random agency to reach 
another agency in the network they must pass through an average 2.229 other agencies (on the 
network graph).  For a large network (444 agencies), this low distance score reaffirms the dense, 
tightly-clustered structure identified above.  The police network (2.058) and the EMS network 
(2.157) exhibit shorter mean distances than the overall network, while the fire network (3.044) is 
considerably longer.  The fire network’s average distance is reflected in Figures 20 and 21, 
which shows a less tightly-coupled system than the police and fire networks.  In all, the complete 
network demonstrates a relatively tightly-coupled system in which the average agency is able to 
reach 70.87 percent of all other agencies in the complete network in two steps or less.  This 
reaffirms interconnectivity and the capacity of the network in terms of information exchange.   
6.4 SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE RESPONSE NETWORK 
The complete response network consists of agencies from several disciplines and jurisdictions.  
Table 25 reveals the size [453 active agencies (444 recorded in the 9-1-1 data)] and composition 
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of the system.  Predominantly, municipal agencies (82.34 percent) populate the network.  
Regional organizations (9.49 percent), particularly nonprofit-based EMS agencies, who 
administer to more than one municipality, are well-positioned to interact with several agencies.  
Key agencies also operate from county (7.06 percent) and state (0.66 percent) jurisdictions.  
Most prominent federal and state agencies are excluded from the response network because 
incidents during the seven-month period of observation failed to require their assistance.  
 
Table 25: Frequency Distribution of Active Agencies by Discipline and Jurisdiction 
  
EM EMS Fire HAZMAT Police Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
State 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2.38 3 0.66 
County 2 100 1 1.16 1 0.43 5 100 23 18.25 32 7.06 
Regional 0 0 34 39.53 5 2.14 0 0 4 3.17 43 9.49 
School District 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.79 1 0.22 
Municipal 0 0 51 59.3 228 97.44 0 0 94 74.6 373 82.34 
University 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.79 1 0.22 
Total 2 0.44 86 18.98 234 51.66 5 1.1 126 27.81 453 100 
534 agencies are listed in the county 9-1-1 records.   
       *453 agencies are active.  445 are recorded in the 9-1-1 data. 
      **8 agencies listed above are active in the network but not recorded in the data 9-1-1 network (4 police, 4 
EMS). 
 
Fire (51.66 percent of the network) ranks as the most prominent discipline in terms of 
number of participants (234).  Police (27.81 percent) and EMS (18.98 percent) also represent 
sizable portions of the network.  Only County Emergency Services and County 9-1-1 are listed 
on the 9-1-1 data base as emergency management agencies.  As responders request additional 
mutual aid, other agencies such as neighboring counties, Region 13, PEMA, and FEMA would 
enter the network.  These agencies represent a surge capacity as incidents transition from routine 
to large-scale. 
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Figure 15 reveals the composition of the complete network.  It confirms, visually, the 
dense, tightly-coupled patterns of interactions found in the analysis above.  Analyses of 
individual networks by discipline are included in the sections below.  
 
Figure 15: Diagram of Interacting Agencies, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (Complete Network) 
6.5 KEY AGENCIES 
What agencies are central in the network?  Which actors are critical in linking the network’s 
subcomponents?  Analysis of network data indicates that a number of county-level agencies, the 
County Police and Fire Marshal, in particular, play prominent roles in connecting the network as 
do several regional EMS agencies and a few large, municipal police departments. 
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6.5.1 Complete Network 
The present study employs degree centrality as an indicator of activity with the assumption that 
activity indicates prominence in a network.  An actor’s degree centrality is measured by the total 
number of other actors to which it is connected (Freeman 1979).  Police, fire, and EMS agencies, 
on average, worked with 34.35 agencies (median 30.00) at some point during the seven months 
that data was collected in the 9-1-1 dispatch records, a considerable number, albeit with 
variability (SD 28.73).  Table 26 presents the descriptive statistics for the complete network’s 
degree centrality scores.  The wide range between the maximum number of partners (282) and 
the minimum (1) indicate considerable variance in terms of agencies’ activity.  The network 
centralization measure (56 percent) depicts a tightly-coupled network.      
 
Table 26: Degree Centrality (Complete Network) 
  Degree NrmDegree Share 
Mean 34.35 7.74 0.00 
Std Dev 28.73 6.47 0.00 
Sum 15286.00 3442.79 1.00 
Variance 825.32 41.87 0.00 
SSQ 892352.00 45265.81 0.00 
Minimum 1 0.23 0.00 
Maximum 282 63.51 0.02 
    Network Centralization = 56.03% 
   Heterogeneity = 0.38% 
   Normalized = 0.16% 
   Median = 30.00       
 
An analysis of the individual degree centrality scores identifies several prominent 
agencies.  Table 26 lists the top 10 most central actors in the complete network.  Several units 
within the Allegheny County Police, including the detective unit (Degree 282, Nrm Degree 63.5) 
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and the photo lab (Degree 165, Nrm Degree 37.2), play active roles.  County detectives working 
on scene with 282 other agencies (police, fire, and EMS) represent a major actor upon which 
other agencies rely.   
The county fire marshal and the deputy (Degree 249, Nrm Degree 56.1) work on scene 
with a considerable number of departments as they investigate structure fires to determine cause.  
Shaler Township Police (Degree 125, Nrm Degree 28.2) and Northern Regional Police (Degree 
120, Nrm Degree 27.0), two departments from the North Hills region of the county, rank high on 
the degree centrality list as do several regional (as opposed to municipal) EMS agencies: UPMC 
St. Margaret Paramedic Response Team (Degree 103, Nrm Degree 23.2), Ross-West View EMS 
(Degree 99, Nrm Degree 22.3), Lower Valley Ambulance (Degree 95, Nrm Degree 21.4), and 
Seneca Area EMS (Degree 94, Nrm Degree 21.2).  Respondent 39 explained the regularity of 
EMS agencies crossing boundaries and responding with other agencies.  “EMS, on a day to day 
basis, responds throughout a variety of communities to assist.  [EMS] does not worry about 
geopolitical boundaries…” 
Many of these prominent agencies are located in the North Hills region of the county.  
What makes this area more conducive to cooperation than others?  The North Hills’ 
municipalities possess more first response agencies than other areas.  The high volume of 
agencies within a compact geographic area decreases the distance and response times, which 
increases the opportunity to interact.  The Shaler Police Department, for example, is located at 
the center of the area within easy access to many neighboring municipalities.  Perhaps as a 
function of geography, the area exhibits a culture that values interorganizational cooperation.  
One of the only consolidated, regional police departments in the Commonwealth, Northern 
Regional, operates within the area.  In addition, the Ohio Township Police contracts out its 
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services to several municipalities in the North Hills.  With respect to EMS, most agencies 
operate under a client reciprocity agreement (introduced in Chapter 5).   
Outside of the North Hills, another prominent agency, the Pennsylvania State Police 
(Degree 94, Nrm Degree 21.2), provides primary law enforcement services to three 
municipalities in Allegheny County, in addition to patrolling all limited access highways in 
Pennsylvania, conducting traffic investigations, and performing a number of other functions.  
The state police is, therefore, in a position to regularly interact with other agencies.       
The absence of municipal fire departments among the top agencies is noticeable.  
Municipal fire departments, mostly volunteer, do not field the personnel to respond constantly to 
incidents.  Fire-related incidents, also, occur less frequently than emergency medical or law 
enforcement activities.  Not mentioned in the Table 27 is the County 9-1-1 which dispatches the 
vast majority of emergency calls and serves as the hub for information exchange in the network.     
 
Table 27: Prominent Actors by Degree Centrality (Complete Network) 
Agency Name Discipline Sector Jurisdiction Degree NrmDegree Share 
County Allegheny - Detectives Police Public County 282 63.5 0.0184 
Allegheny County Deputy Fire Marshal Fire Public County 249 56.1 0.0163 
Allegheny County Fire Marshal Fire Public County 249 56.1 0.0163 
Allegheny County Photo Lab Police Public County 165 37.2 0.0108 
Shaler Twp Police Public Municipal 125 28.2 0.0082 
Northern Regional PD Police Public Regional 120 27.0 0.0079 
UPMC St. Margaret Paramedic Team EMS Nonprofit Regional 103 23.2 0.0067 
Ross-West View EMS  EMS Public Regional 99 22.3 0.0065 
Lower Valley Ambulance  EMS Nonprofit Regional 95 21.4 0.0062 
Seneca Area EMS  EMS Nonprofit Regional 94 21.2 0.0061 
 
The prominent agencies mentioned above are well situated to disseminate information 
throughout the network.  Also well situated are agencies that sit in between others, particularly 
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prominent actors.  This type of position, or high betweenness in a network, provides 
opportunities for information access and control (Krackhardt 1992; Comfort and Haase 2006).  
These agencies can serve as brokers of information resources.   
This type of position can be measured by the betweenness centrality statistic, “a measure 
of the number of times a[n] [actor] occurs on a geodesic” (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002).  
Freeman (1979) developed this measure “based upon the frequency with which a point falls 
between pairs of other points on the shortest or geodesic paths connecting them” (p. 221).  In 
short, an agency with high betweenness sits in between many other agencies on the network 
graph.  Table 28 presents the descriptive statistics for the complete network’s betweenness 
centrality.  The average agency sits on 272.74 direct paths of communication (SD 1207.96).  The 
agency with the highest betweenness measure, the County Police detective unit (17238.63), is a 
prominent actor.    
 
Table 28: Betweenness Centrality (Complete Network) 
  Betweenness nBetweenness 
Mean 272.74 0.28 
Std Dev 1207.96 1.23 
Sum 121367.00 123.41 
Variance 1459171.00 1.51 
SSQ 682432128.00 705.58 
Minimum 0 0 
Maximum 17238.63 17.53 
   Network Centralization Index = 17.29%     
   
 
Degree centrality correlates, generally, with betweenness centrality; therefore, many of 
the same agencies appear in Table 29 that appear in Table 27.  Table 29 presents prominent 
actors by betweenness.  One agency that moved up in prominence from the degree centrality list, 
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the Pennsylvania State Police (1747.18), appears to be situated in a key role connecting various 
agencies on the local level. 
 
Table 29: Prominent Actors by Betweenness Centrality (Complete Network) 
Agency Name Discipline Sector Jurisdiction Betweenness nBetweenness 
County Allegheny - Detectives Police Public County 17238.63 17.529 
Allegheny County Fire Marshal Fire Public County 12519.54 12.730 
Allegheny County Deputy Fire Marshal Fire Public County 12344.97 12.553 
Allegheny County Photo Lab Police Public County 4150.40 4.220 
Northern Regional PD Police Public Regional 3037.04 3.088 
Shaler Twp Police Public Municipal 2888.73 2.937 
Pennsylvania State Police Police Public State 1747.18 1.777 
Jefferson EMS  EMS Nonprofit Regional 1538.07 1.564 
UPMC St. Margaret Paramedic Team  EMS Nonprofit Regional 1415.71 1.440 
Eastern Area Pre-Hospital Services  EMS Nonprofit Regional 1348.77 1.372 
 
Another measure to identify prominent network actors is closeness centrality.  Closeness 
centrality indicates the proximity (or closeness) of an agency to all other agencies in the network.  
Closeness indicates the reach an agency has within a system.  Agencies seeking to coordinate 
activities may be well served in positions of high closeness as they have shorter paths to reach 
other organizations.23   
An analysis of closeness centrality statistics confirms the prominence of county agencies, 
regional EMS agencies, and large municipal police departments.  Table 30 displays the agencies 
with high normalized closeness and low farness.  It reaffirms the prominent standing of the 
County Police, the Fire Marshal, Shaler Police, North Regional Police, and large regional EMS 
agencies.     
                                                 
23 “The farness of a vertex is the sum of the lengths of the geodesics to every other vertex.  The reciprocal 
of farness is closeness centrality.  The normalized closeness centrality of a vertex is the reciprocal of farness divided 
by the minimum possible farness expressed as a percentage” (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002).  
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Table 30: Prominent Actors by Closeness Centrality (Complete Network) 
Agency Name Discipline Jurisdiction Sector Farness nCloseness 
County Allegheny - Detectives Police County Public 608 73.0263 
Allegheny County Deputy Fire Marshal Fire County Public 644 68.9441 
Allegheny County Fire Marshal Fire County Public 645 68.8372 
Allegheny County Photo Lab Police County Public 729 60.9053 
Shaler Twp Police Municipal Public 783 56.705 
Northern Regional PD Police Regional Public 789 56.2738 
UPMC St. Margaret Paramedic Team  EMS Regional Nonprofit 810 54.8148 
Ross-West View EMS  EMS Regional Public 819 54.2125 
Lower Valley Ambulance  EMS Regional Nonprofit 823 53.949 
Allegheny County Investigator Police County Public 825 53.8182 
 
The degree, betweenness, closeness centrality measures indicate a relatively centralized, 
interconnected network.  One method to identify possible weaknesses in a network is to spot 
cutpoints.  “A cutpoint of a graph is a vertex whose removal increases the number of 
components” (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002).  That is a cutpoint links a network’s 
subcomponents.  Its removal will disconnect groups and reduce interconnectivity of a network.  
Analysis identifies only seven cutpoints.  Geographically, the agencies are located toward the 
boundaries of the field study area and only connect relatively small subcomponents to the larger 
network.  Table 31 identifies a relatively even mix of agencies as represented by discipline: fire, 
police, and EMS.  The lack of a cutpoint linking large subcomponents underlies the density of 
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Table 31: List of Cutpoints by Discipline (Complete Network) 
Agency Name Discipline Sector Jurisdiction 
Northern Regional PD Police Public Regional 
Jefferson EMS EMS Nonprofit Regional 
Indiana Twp Police Public Municipal 
White Oak EMS EMS Nonprofit Municipal 
White Oak Police Public Municipal 
Neville Fire Nonprofit Municipal 
Aleppo Fire Nonprofit Municipal 
Logans Ferry #3 (Plum) Fire Nonprofit Municipal 
 
Another measure to identify agencies are agency-level structural holes statistics (effective 
size, efficiency, and constraint) that identify particularly sparse sets of relationships (Burt 1992). 
Structural holes are gaps in a network; more specifically they are the extent to which an agency’s 
alters (or partners) are not connected.  From an emergency management perspective, limited 
interconnectivity makes a network vulnerable to failure if central hubs fail.  Agencies with 
sparsely-connect ego-networks are valuable in promoting information exchange as redundancy is 
limited. 
Table 32 presents particularly sparse ego networks within the complete network, meaning 
the agencies with which an agency interacts are not particularly connected with each other.  An 
agency with high structural hole values, therefore, serves a major role in connecting the system. 
Specifically, an evaluation of three measures—effective size, efficiency, and constraint—
indicates that the same prominent agencies identified above (in the centrality analyses) play 
prominent roles in connecting otherwise disconnected agencies.  County Police, the fire marshal, 
and Shaler Police, in particular, exhibit high effect sizes (see Table 32).  
Constraint indicates the extent to which an ego’s alters are connected to each other; the 
greater degree of interconnectivity, the greater the “constraint” on the ego (Burt 1992; Borgatti, 
Everett and Freeman 2002).  Lower constraint scores indicate less interconnectivity.  The 
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measure correlates inversely with effective size and efficiency.  Structural holes occur noticeably 
in the large ego networks identified in the degree and betweenness centrality analyses.  This 
finding bolsters the importance of these central hubs in connecting disparate agencies and 
subcomponents.         
 
Table 32: Structural Holes (Complete Network) 
Agency Name Discipline Sector Jurisdiction EffSize Efficiency Constraint 
County Allegheny - Detectives Police Public County 248.12 0.88 0.02 
Allegheny County Deputy Fire Marshal Police Public County 218.65 0.88 0.02 
Allegheny County Fire Marshal Police Public County 218.47 0.88 0.02 
Allegheny County Photo Lab Police Public County 136.27 0.83 0.03 
Shaler Twp Police Public Municipal 97.35 0.78 0.03 
Northern Regional PD Police Public Regional 90.58 0.75 0.03 
Pennsylvania State Police Police Public State 77.04 0.82 0.04 
UPMC St. Margaret Paramedic Team EMS Nonprofit Regional 74.38 0.72 0.04 
Ross-West View EMS EMS Public Regional 65.75 0.66 0.04 
Lower Valley Ambulance EMS Nonprofit Regional 65.57 0.69 0.04 
 
Clique analysis is another method by which to identify prominent, interconnected 
agencies in the complete network.  Scott (2005) defines a clique as “a sub-set of points in which 
every possible pair of points is directly connected by a line and the clique is not contained in any 
other clique” (p. 114).  The minimum size for a clique is three.  UCINET analyzes clique 
overlap.  Depending on the complexity and interconnectivity of a network, several configurations 
of cliques may exist.    
Analysis of cliques within the police, fire, and EMS networks indicates that the field 
study area is particularly interconnected.   There are 690 maximally complete subgraphs in the 
police network, 421 in fire, and 198 in EMS.  The cliques range in membership from the largest 
(14) to the smallest (3).  Of the 444 agencies active in the network, 229 are represented in at least 
  164 
one clique.  The Ross Township Fire Police, which participates in a number of fire, police, EMS-
related activities, is found in the most cliques (96).  Respondent 24, a police chief, indicated his 
department’s reliance on fire police.  “We use them extensively…” for traffic control, event 
management, etc.  They were “originally designed to direct traffic at the scene of a fire… that’s 
been expanded over the years.”    
The fact that 108 agencies participate in at least 10 cliques or more indicates high levels 
of interconnectivity.  The average of 7.42 cliques per agency also demonstrates dense patterns of 
interaction.  However, wide variance (SD 14.156) suggests variability in the degree to which 
agencies are integrated into the complete network.  
The section above identifies several key actors within the network.  In terms of 
geographic centrality, size, and available resources to share, one municipality is noticeably 
disengaged from the system: the City of Pittsburgh.  The existing network data, supported by 
anecdotes from the semi-structured interviews, characterize the city as a relatively absent player 
with respect to response.  Pittsburgh, which sits at the geographic center of the county and 
borders thirty-three municipalities, responds to emergencies in conjunction with only a handful 
of outside agencies.  While the police and EMS are somewhat engaged with others (the police 
interacted with eleven outside municipal police departments according to the county 911 data), 
the fire department only operates within the city and the Borough of Wilkinsburg.24  They do not 
request mutual aid from others nor do they offer it.   
Pittsburgh’s public safety agencies interact with county organizations including the fire 
                                                 
24 The City of Pittsburgh Fire Department provided mutual aid occasionally for the Wilkinsburg Fire 
Department.  In March 2011, the two departments formally merged with Pittsburgh officially taking over operational 
responsibilities.  
  165 
marshal, the county police, and the Port Authority police.  They appear to have created a direct 
link with the county apart from their neighbors.  Pittsburgh’s involvement within the system 
forces other departments to adapt and work around their metropolitan center, relying on county 
resources instead of their resourceful, but reluctant neighbor. 
One explanation of Pittsburgh’s apparent policy decision not to extend mutual aid on a 
regular basis could be their perception of need.  As a set of large, resourceful departments, city 
officials may not recognize the need to work with others on a regular basis.  The city possesses 
the capacity internally to respond effectively to the vast majority of incidents.  In the absence of 
need, there is no pressing imperative for the city to expend their resources to the benefit of their 
neighbors when, in their estimation, future interactions will not benefit the city.    
6.5.2 Police Network 
Network analysis of just the police network data was conducted to explore the structure of the 
system.  Figure 16 models what is a densely-clustered police network.25  Several county agencies 
sit at the center of the network.  Municipal reliance on county assets helps to explain the high 
level of integration apparent between county and municipal-level agencies.  Six of the top ten 
active police entities, as presented in Table 33, are county-based.  The County Police detective 
unit (Degree 87, Nrm Degree 66.41), the photo lab (Degree 63, Nrm Degree 48.09), and three 
district barracks demonstrate considerable activity within the network.26  The state police 
                                                 
25 Lists of active police, fire, and EMS agencies (and their acronyms) are located in the appendices.   
26 The network data demonstrate that county police personnel come into contact with a large number of 
other agencies.  These county personnel provide specific resources and services related to law enforcement.  The 
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(Degree 41, Nrm Degree 31.30) demonstrate comparatively less intra-disciplinary cooperation, 
as the agency interacts with more non-police entities (53) than police (41).  This inter-
disciplinary activity most likely takes place in areas with low concentrations of municipal police 
where the state police interact more with fire and EMS agencies. 
 
 
Figure 16: Diagram of Interacting Police Departments, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania 
Isolates and pendants removed 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
extent which the county police strengthen the system’s resilience or integrate other agencies together with respect to 
emergency management is less clear.  The county police are in a position to use their access to coordinate a more 
robust system, however. 
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Table 33: Prominent Agencies by Degree Centrality (Police Network) 
Agency Name Sector Jurisdiction Degree NrmDegree Share 
County Allegheny - Detectives Public County 87 66.41 0.030 
Shaler Twp Public Municipal 64 48.86 0.022 
Allegheny County Photo Lab Public County 63 48.09 0.022 
County Sheriff Public County 61 46.56 0.021 
County Allegheny District 3 (North Park) Public County 57 43.51 0.020 
Northern Regional PD Public Regional 55 41.98 0.019 
County Allegheny District 2 (South Park) Public County 52 39.69 0.018 
County Allegheny District 1 (Airport) Public County 43 32.82 0.015 
Penn Hills Public Municipal 42 32.06 0.014 
Swissvale Public Municipal 42 32.06 0.014 
 
 Table 34 presents the descriptive degree centrality statistics for the police network.  The 
network centralization score (50.29 percent) indicates a highly-centralized structure, especially in 
comparison with the EMS (24.67 percent) and fire (12.56 percent) networks.  Again, the 
prevalence of county-based agencies connecting departments throughout the field study area 
helps to explain this network centralization.     
Table 34: Degree Centrality (Police Network) 
  Degree NrmDegree Share 
Mean 22.121 16.886 0.008 
Std Dev 15.189 11.595 0.005 
Sum 2920 2229.008 1 
Variance 230.713 134.44 0 
SSQ 95048 55386.051 0.011 
MCSSQ 30454.061 17746.088 0.004 
Euc Norm 308.299 235.342 0.106 
Minimum 1 0.763 0 
Maximum 87 66.412 0.03 
    Network Centralization = 50.29% 
   Heterogeneity = 1.11%   
   Normalized = 0.36%       
  168 
6.5.3 Fire Network 
Fire chiefs focus their operations on local, neighborhood incidents with the exception of those 
departments that field rapid intervention teams and other specialized services and equipment 
such as foam trucks, ladder trucks, etc.  These special operations teams and specialty pieces of 
equipment offer departments opportunities to span regional boundaries.  Figure 21 models the 
clusters of “neighborhood-centered” groups that form as a result of joint response activities.  The 
center node, the County Fire Marshal’s Office (afm401f), demonstrates how a county asset has 
the potential to link otherwise disparate subcomponents.27  Figure 17 models the fire network 
without the fire marshal’s office, which more clearly illustrates the clustering of delineated 
groups.  A visual inspection confirms the underlying logic of the small-world model that 
agencies sharing professional contacts are more likely to work with each other.   
                                                 
27 While the county fire marshal has a legal role and authority limited to identifying the cause of fires, the 
former director who also administered county emergency services was able to use his multiple roles and access to 
multiple agencies to help integrate the system. 
  169 
 
Figure 17: Diagram of Interacting Fire Departments, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania 
Isolates and pendants removed 
 
Figure 18: Diagram of Interacting Fire Departments (County Fire Marshal Removed) 
Isolates and pendants removed 
County fire marshal’s office removed 
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Table 35 lists the most active fire departments in terms of intra-disciplinary degree 
centrality.28  Eight of the 10 agencies are geographically located in the North Hills region of 
Allegheny County.  Chapter 7 demonstrates that geographic location influences degree 
centrality.  The two agencies that make this list outside of the North Hills area (Pleasant Hills 
and Homestead) operate rapid intervention teams (RIT), which increases their opportunities for 
interaction.  RIT teams specialize in firefighter rescue and safety during response operations.  
Noticeably absent from the active agencies in Table 39 are paid departments.  This absence is 
explored in Chapter 8. 
Table 35: Prominent Agencies by Degree Centrality (Fire Network) 
Agency Name Sector Jurisdiction Degree NrmDegree Share 
Undercliff (Shaler Twp) Nonprofit Municipal 47 20.09 0.011 
Homestead Nonprofit Municipal 47 20.09 0.011 
Pleasant Hills Nonprofit Municipal 44 18.80 0.011 
Hampton Nonprofit Municipal 43 18.38 0.010 
Etna Nonprofit Municipal 40 17.09 0.010 
Millvale Nonprofit Municipal 40 17.09 0.010 
Ross Twp Fire Police Nonprofit Municipal 40 17.09 0.010 
Ross Twp Fire Marshal Public Municipal 39 16.67 0.009 
Rural Ridge (Indiana Twp) Nonprofit Municipal 37 15.81 0.009 
Elfinwild (Shaler Twp) Nonprofit Municipal 37 15.81 0.009 
 
Table 36 indicates that fire departments, on average, interact with fewer agencies (Degree 
17.86 Nrm Degree 7.634) than do police (22.12).  Fire, as mentioned above, is not as centralized 
(12.56 percent) as the EMS (24.67 percent) or police (50.29 percent) networks.  The lack of 
centrality is reaffirmed in the regional “neighborhood” groups into which fire departments 
cluster.   
                                                 
28 The County Fire Marshal’s office is excluded from analysis of municipal agencies. 
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Table 36: Degree Centrality (Fire Network) 
  Degree NrmDegree Share 
Mean 17.864 7.634 0.004 
Std Dev 10.126 4.327 0.002 
Sum 4198 1794.017 1 
Variance 102.535 18.726 0 
SSQ 99088 18096.281 0.006 
MCSSQ 24095.643 4400.548 0.001 
Euc Norm 314.782 134.522 0.075 
Minimum 0 0 0 
Maximum 47 20.085 0.011 
    Network Centralization = 12.56% 
   Heterogeneity = 0.56%  
   Normalized = 0.14%       
6.5.4 EMS Network 
Figure 19 models the interaction between EMS agencies demonstrating a relatively tightly-
connected system.  Several agencies clearly operate at the core of this network.  Table 37 shows 
a mix of agencies by sector (nonprofit and public) and by jurisdiction (regional and municipal) 
among the most central EMS agencies.  The most active agency, UPMC St. Margaret Paramedic 
Team (Degree 33, Nrm 41.25), sits in a position as a hospital-based team that crosses 
geographical boundaries in order to assist other agencies.  Private agencies are noticeably absent 
from the list of most active agencies.  Also, all prominent agencies listed in Table 37 are 
Advanced Life Support (ALS), which reaffirms the role of QLS and BLS agencies as local 
responders that augment ALS capacity, not regional agencies that regularly cross jurisdictional 
boundaries. 
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Figure 19: Diagram of Interacting EMS Agencies, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania 
Table 37: Prominent Agencies by Degree Centrality (EMS Network) 
Agency Name Type Sector Jurisdiction Degree NrmDegree Share 
UPMC St. Margaret Paramedic Team  ALS Nonprofit Regional 33 41.25 0.030 
Seneca Area EMS  ALS Nonprofit Regional 33 41.25 0.030 
Lower Valley Ambulance  ALS Nonprofit Regional 32 40.00 0.029 
McCandless-Franklin Park EMS  ALS Public Regional 32 40.00 0.029 
Ross-West View EMS  ALS Public Regional 31 38.75 0.028 
Eastern Area Pre-Hospital Services  ALS Nonprofit Regional 30 37.50 0.027 
Shaler Area EMS  ALS Nonprofit Municipal 29 36.25 0.026 
Hampton Twp EMS  ALS Nonprofit Municipal 28 35.00 0.025 
Southbridge EMS  ALS Nonprofit Regional 28 35.00 0.025 
McKeesport EMS  ALS Public Regional 27 33.75 0.024 
 
 Table 38 presents the average degree centrality statistics for the EMS network.  The 
average number of partners was 13.75 (SD 8.99); considering that the EMS network consists of 
far fewer agencies than fire and police, the lower degree centrality is understandable.  The range 
with a high of 33 and low of 1 illustrates the variability in activity.   
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Table 38: Degree Centrality (EMS Network) 
  Degree NrmDegree Share 
Mean 13.753 17.191 0.012 
Std Dev 8.985 11.231 0.008 
Sum 1114 1392.5 1 
Variance 80.729 126.139 0 
SSQ 21860 34156.25 0.018 
MCSSQ 6539.062 10217.284 0.005 
Euc Norm 147.851 184.814 0.133 
Minimum 1 1.25 0.001 
Maximum 33 41.25 0.03 
    Network Centralization = 24.67% 
   Heterogeneity = 1.76% 
   Normalized = 0.53%       
 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter identifies the composition, structure, and key actors within an emergency 
management network over a seven-month period.  Findings demonstrate that the field study area 
exhibit both small-world and scale-free tendencies, which indicate a tightly-clustered system 
interwoven by several core actors.  I label this architecture as a “neighborhood-centered 
network” for emergency management and public safety.   
Analysis of several network measures (centrality, structural holes, etc.) identifies several 
county, police, and EMS agencies as core actors.  Fire departments appear to be more localized 
in their patterns of interaction.  Discipline and levels of government provide attributes to explore 
the components of administrative structure that influence whether agencies cooperate.    I address 
those issues in the next chapter. 
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7.0  COMPONENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE THAT INFLUENCE 
COOPERATION 
Chapters 5 and 6 map the patterns of interaction that occur in the emergency management 
system.  Interaction creates opportunities to share information and promote organizational 
learning within an interdependent system.  As an organization learns, it may develop new 
strategies for action and communicate those strategies to others.  As these ideas diffuse and are 
adopted, a type of community learning takes place where behavior changes overtime.   
Whether organizations cooperate depends on the decisions of individual personnel.  Their 
decisions are heavily influenced by the available information from across organizational 
boundaries (Comfort 1994).  Communication then becomes the driving force that shapes and 
constrains the decision to cooperate (Luhmann 1989).  As organizations interact with one another 
and accrue experiences, they build a common knowledge base.   
These knowledge systems (and the decision to cooperate) are influenced by various 
components of administrative structure and process of different sizes and importance.  
Components of structure include organizational goals, designs, resources, and the rules that 
shape and constrain action.  Structure also encompasses the technical infrastructure used to store 
and communicate information.  Components of process include organizational culture, 
leadership, and interpersonal relationships.  Decision makers recognize these components at 
different rates and in different ways.  Operating within a heterogeneous nested set of agencies, 
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organizations exhibit varying resources, experiences, and priorities.  What is vital to one agency 
may not be to another at any given point.  What is constant is that decision makers are making 
judgments about the professional confidence of the people with whom they interact.  What 
influences these judgments and to what extent do they influence collective action?     
Chapter 7 identifies the components of administrative structure affecting 
interorganizational cooperation.  Analysis of semi-structured interviews clearly demonstrates that 
similar problems and goals create the opportunity for collective action.  This chapter also 
identifies the existence of organizational competition that inhibits cooperation.   
Once common cause is established, geographic and conceptual proximity increases the 
likelihood for collective action as the likelihood for shared problems, interaction, and feedback 
increases.  Urgent need and proximity heavily influence the decision to cooperate.  When these 
conditions are met, it takes significant disincentives to inhibit collective action.  Chapter 9 
explores these factors, namely low professional competence.  
Influential actors from the federal to the municipal level of government create rules that 
either promote or inhibit collective action.  In particular, state legislation reducing the liability 
concerns of emergency managers is a positive factor.  In addition, findings demonstrate that 
policies at the county and municipal levels place limitations on who has access to the 
information infrastructure and when.  Analysis of semi-structured interviews indicates that the 
field study area’s information infrastructure, while on a positive trajectory in reducing 
information asymmetry, limits the extent to which some agencies receive and exchange data 
critical to decision making regarding collective action.  County 9-1-1 and emergency 
management serve as major hubs for information within the system, but they also restrict 
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situational awareness by assigning different radio frequencies to neighboring agencies (in certain 
cases). 
7.1 PROBLEMS AND GOALS 
Analysis of the semi-structured interviews supports Gray (1989), Bardach (1998) and Cigler 
(1999) who suggest that shared problems create the opportunity for cooperation.  Shared and/or 
interrelated problems provide an impetus for collective action.  Decision makers, in the face of 
common problems, identify complimentary goals that lead to action.  The recognition of shared 
risk, certain focusing events, and fiscal stress represent common problems that prompt 
cooperation.   
7.1.1 Vulnerability 
The present study’s findings reinforce the fundamental assumptions of the extant literature 
(Mileti 1999; Comfort 1999) that the identification of vulnerability to any number of risks 
prompts the formation of strategies for action, including collective action, that are intended to 
mitigate against potential negative consequences.  Chapter 4 identifies the field study area’s 
major vulnerabilities (social, built, and geophysical) and Chapter 5 argues that agencies engage 
in both formal and informal patterns of risk assessment that justify either action or inaction 
depending on their recognition of need.  The recognition of risk and vulnerability increases the 
likelihood that agencies distinguish the utility of cooperation.  As agencies identify potential 
benefits of collective action, they are far more likely to pursue it.   
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7.1.2 Focusing Events   
The present study argues that emergency-response incidents lead to collective action and 
represent focusing events that generate demands on personnel, resources, and time.  Two types 
of focusing events (external and internal), identified through the analysis of semi-structured 
interviews, motivate agencies to work together.  Focusing events serve as defining moments in 
time in which decision makers recognize vulnerabilities and/or opportunities for action.  A 
specific type of focusing event demonstrated in the field study area is the response to emergency 
incidents.  These events direct attention to specific problems (and external demands) and can 
lead to cooperation between organizations (Comfort 1999; Cigler 1999).  Emergency response 
incidents in progress represent focusing events that generate demands on a regular basis.  As the 
capacity of a responding agency is overwhelmed, mutual aid agencies and agencies from other 
levels of government are requested for support.       
An agency does not have to directly participate in a focusing event to take away lessons.  
External focusing events represent incidents in which agencies do not directly engage, but from 
which they draw conclusions that influence their future decisions.  Respondents commonly cite 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks as an external focusing event.  Another commonly cited incident, the 
school shooting in Columbine, Colorado, in 1999, prompts interorganizational cooperation 
between first responders and school districts in the field study area to prevent school violence.  
In addition to these events of national prominence, respondents from the police discipline 
commonly refer to several incidents in which lone-responding officers were shot during traffic 
stops.  These incidents create and reinforce perceptions of the need for interorganizational 
cooperation.  
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Internal focusing events encompass direct experiences that alter organizational 
perspectives and motivate action, including collective action.  For police personnel, a murderous 
shooting spree that crossed municipal borders in the late 1990s drew attention to the need for 
timely, accurate information exchange in the face of a deadly threat.  Respondents from the fire 
discipline cite several structure fires in which their capacity was overwhelmed and they, as a 
result, recognized the indispensability of mutual aid. 
In the field study area, several focusing events, both external and internal, motivated 
departments in a specific geographic area to create a regional police working group.  The 
Columbine incident and the aforementioned trans-municipal shooting spree first led a group of 
police chiefs to recognize the necessity of “inter-municipal police response” (Respondent 51).  
They began meeting to explore possible points of collaboration.  “Then everything was 
crystallized during the events of 9/11,” according to Respondent 51.  “Once the concept [of 
interagency cooperation] took hold, both purpose and organizational inertia were overcome and 
the program basically picked up its own head of steam and is where it is today because of that 
history.”  Presently, the regional group has seventeen members and several pieces of shared 
specialty equipment.    
7.1.3 Fiscal Stress 
Resource dependence theory argues that agencies with limited resources will pursue the assets 
needed for survival (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  In circumstances where organizations 
experience fiscal stress or anticipate stress, cooperation offers a strategy to ensure organizational 
survival and maintenance (Cigler 1999).   Past research indicates that fiscal stress positively 
correlates with intermunicipal cooperation (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991; Sonenblum, Kirlin, and 
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Ries 1977; Joassart-Marcelli, and Musso 2005).  Analysis of semi-structured interviews suggests 
that fiscal stress (at certain levels) prompts cooperation.  The “Needs of the Organization” 
section below identifies the thresholds at which fiscal stress encourages cooperation in the field 
study area. 
In the recognition of shared problems, agencies develop goals attainable through action, 
sometimes collective action.  These goals range from espoused institutional missions such as 
protecting life and property to organizational maintenance and survival.  Chapter 4 and 5 explore 
some of the goals driving operations.  Mission-oriented goals such as improving the 
effectiveness of operations and ensuring service continuity prompt some agencies to interact.   
Organizational maintenance goals, such as cost savings, prompt others to work together.  
Extant literature focuses on the positive role that cost savings plays in promoting cooperation 
(Sonenblum, Kirlin, and Ries 1977; Stein 1990; Hamilton 1999; Hodge 2000; Post 2004).  Cost 
savings, according to several respondents, is a priority to many agencies in the field study area.  
Joint and coordinated purchasing (while limited) is clearly intended to achieve the goal of cost 
reduction.   
While joint response reduces the costs of additional personnel and equipment, few define 
mutual aid as a cost saving activity, but rather a mission-driven imperative to protect life and 
property.  Respondents indicated a desire to improve the efficacy of response through mutual aid, 
which corresponds with the desire to improve the quality of public goods and/or services 
hypothesis (Stein 1990; Thurmaier and Wood 2002; Post 2004).   
Federal and state grants, state mandated programs (such as the Act 35 municipal planning 
directives) and training opportunities made available through state and county assets are intended 
to create minimum standards of performance across jurisdictions.  The objective of service 
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continuity across jurisdictions helps to explain state and county involvement, according to state 
and county-level respondents.  However, on the municipal level, respondents do not indicate that 
service continuity [as Ugboro, Obeng, and Talley (2001) perceive it] motivates municipal 
collective action.  
7.2 THE NEEDS OF THE ORGANIZATION 
“I think the biggest obstacle [to interorganizational cooperation] is to have a need” (Respondent 
39).   
 
The definition of problems and goals shape and constrain strategies for action.  Action places 
demands on organizational resources.  In the field study area, commonly needed resources 
include manpower, equipment, specialized services (and expertise), money, and time.  When 
emergency managers recognize these needs, they are more likely to enter into cooperative 
relationships.  The ability and willingness to recognize need differs across agencies as does the 
actual need itself.  It is the alignment of need and the recognition of need with the opportunity to 
cooperate that facilitates collective action.  “Getting people to understand why we need to do 
these kinds of drills… That’s the challenge we face,” Respondent 42 stated, speaking to the 
inability or unwillingness of agencies to recognize the need for joint preparedness activities.   
  As need differs across agencies, so does the level of urgency that decision makers face.  
An emergency situation, dispatched by county or local 9-1-1 personnel, offers an urgent 
pronouncement of need.  Respondent 38 cited an example that facilitated cooperation.  “The 
shooting in Collier Township where 15 people were shot at the health club…  There were a 
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dozen services who jumped in on that and cooperated very well and worked together extremely 
well.  Services that don’t even work together on a day-to-day basis.”  On the other hand, low 
levels of urgency (or no urgency at all) reduce the probability of collective action.  A FEMA 
flood map, for example, represents a pronouncement of need, but not with the same level of 
urgency and not with the same directness of a communication as from a county 9-1-1 dispatcher.   
7.2.1 Manpower 
“When you have a 10-person police department, you barely have the ability to put people in 
patrol cars and go out and answer calls” (Respondent 21). 
 
“Manpower is becoming scarce.  Volunteerism is becoming a thing of the past.  And the ability 
to sustain yourself… is becoming a thing of the past.  Mutual aid is becoming prevalent in 
communities because of the rising costs of equipment and the lack of manpower” (Respondent 
13).   This comment, from a police chief, speaks to the declining rate of volunteer firefighters 
statewide (Pennsylvania General Assembly 2005).  At the first responder level, chiefs cite 
manpower as a driving force that prompts interorganizational cooperation (nine fire chiefs, nine 
police chiefs, and one EMS director).  In all, 64.29 percent of the police chiefs interviewed and 
50.00 percent of the fire chiefs identify available manpower as a key factor influencing collective 
action.   
The inability to muster adequate levels of staffing, either because of fiscal stress (police 
and EMS), the availability of volunteers (fire), or restricted staffing in general (police and fire) 
limits agencies’ ability to adequately respond to emergency incidents independently.  The lack of 
manpower, therefore, compels emergency managers to request mutual aid.    
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Analysis of semi-structured interviews indicates that many fire departments are 
occasionally unable to muster sufficient crews for fire calls.  Fielding crews for daytime 
incidents, in particular, presents challenges for even large volunteer departments.  “What’s the 
obstacle [to mutual aid]?  Today it is daylight fire calls.  Everybody is very light on manpower 
on daylight. Not only our company but all of the companies in the area” (Respondent 16).  This 
comment echoes sentiments from many service chiefs.  EMS agencies experience the same 
problem.  “You just don’t know whether or not [fire departments] are going to muster up the 
personnel to get there.  The coordination isn’t the problem.  The unknown is whether [the fire 
departments] are going to be able to get there” (Respondent 35). 
Why the inability to field daylight crews?  “What used to help the volunteer fire service 
in Pennsylvania and Allegheny County in particular was the shift work.  A lot of millworkers.  A 
lot of heavy industry.  There were plenty of people around during the day and those people used 
to volunteer…” (Respondent 17).  Respondent 9 also noted the change in available volunteers 
and indicated how his agency adjusted (through interorganizational cooperation) to meet the 
needs of his community.  “Most of the volunteers… work daylight hours.  Now [our neighbor] 
comes automatically [during the day] because we never know what we are going to get…” 
(Respondent 9).  This comment is indicative of a common strategy of requesting automatic aid 
during the day from other departments.  
Some communities have dealt with the shortage in manpower by hiring part-time, paid 
personnel during the day.  Others release their public works employees during fire calls.  Some 
police and EMS agencies employ cross-trained personnel and permit their participation in fire 
suppression while on the clock.  Most chiefs, however, like Respondent 9, still depend on other 
departments for manpower.   
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The lack of manpower is not unique to the fire discipline.  Police, like the municipalities 
they serve, experience fiscal stress, which limits the number of officers on any given shift.  
Respondent 26, a police chief in a smaller municipality, described his limited fiscal resources.  “I 
am down two men and [the municipality] won’t replace them.  They cut my budget by about 15 
percent overall…  It hasn’t been a good year so far.”  Small municipalities, in general, are unable 
to field large numbers of police even in strong economic environments.  In the face of perpetual 
constraints on resources, many municipal police departments routinely rely on mutual aid, at 
least, during certain high risk incidents.  Respondent 22 described one example, “[Our neighbor] 
will [usually] have one police officer out on patrol.  One!  If he or she gets on the radio and 
they’ve got a gunman [or some other incident] and they don’t answer our dispatcher, [our] shift 
sergeant will use command authority to send an officer down there [automatically].” 
In all, respondents indicate that sufficient manpower, sometimes too much, is a necessary 
operational objective.  “Two or three police officers on a shift in a small town almost always can 
handle the issue.  But when something arises when they are overpowered, out manned, or 
outgunned, it is better to have more help available and on scene than not to have enough at all” 
(Respondent 23). 
7.2.2 Specialized Equipment, Services, and Multiagency Operations Teams 
Several specialized services, pieces of equipment, and multi-agency operational teams encourage 
cooperation and integrate several agencies into a larger response system (see Chapter 5’s section 
5.2.3.6 on response).  With these pieces of equipment and service teams comes operational 
expertise.  Agencies request these assets based on their recognition need.  
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Agencies vary in the levels of equipment, training, and services offered.  For example, 
volunteer fire departments, depending on the size of their municipality and level of resources, 
operate with limited resources.  “On the volunteer side, outside of a select few, nobody really 
runs more than two engines out of the same station” (Respondent 2).  This comment indicates 
that most large-scale incidents likely will overwhelm an individual agency’s capacity of most 
fire departments.  In that case, departments request mutual aid or pre-assign automatic aid 
requests for certain incidents, i.e. structure fires, etc.  The reality for agencies is that “the cost of 
equipment has increased... Our fundraising capacity hasn’t kept pace with the increase in 
equipment costs and neither has the contributions…” (Respondent 50).  Adjusting to limited 
resources, agencies increasingly rely on mutual aid (and specialized equipment and services) to 
accomplish their operational tasks. 
Respondents indicated that available equipment influences their decision regarding with 
whom to work.  “I may have replaced a company with another department who just purchased a 
new piece of equipment” (Respondent 12).  Other respondents indicate that they prioritize their 
mutual aid requests (run cards) based on available equipment, services, and operational teams, 
such as rapid intervention capabilities.  
What other types of specialized services, equipment, and multi-agency operational teams 
help to promote collective action?  Table 39 reveals the specialized equipment that facilitates 
interorganizational cooperation as identified during the semi-structured interviews.  Types of 
assets vary by discipline and types of incidents.  Police, according to Table 39, share several 
pieces of equipment.  All-terrain vehicles and aviation assets are more likely to be requested 
during suspect apprehension, for example.  Boats, predictably, are useful in river rescue 
situations.  EMS agencies request mass causality kits during some large-scale accidents.  All fire 
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assets listed in Table 43 are useful depending on the type and severity of fire incident.  Foam 
trucks for fire suppression appear to be increasingly common as “foam is useful for industrial 
types of fires, tanker rollovers, diesel, and gas [incidents]” (Respondent 17).  Respondent 9 
lauded foam and explained how his agency came to request it from an agency in relative close 
proximity: 
We had a situation where the structure collapsed [and] we were in there for hours just 
dumping water on it and [the water] was not getting down where it was burning.  We 
would get it as best as we could and left…  After a couple of hours the neighbors called 
back because it was burning again.  So we finally asked [the agency with the foam] to 
show us what [their] truck did.  And they came and put a blanket of foam over everything 
and that was it.  And it was like wow why didn't we do this sooner. 
 
Table 39: Specialized Pieces of Equipment that Facilitate Interorganizational Cooperation 
Police Fire EMS 
All-terrain vehicles (ATV)  Aerial trucks Automated external defibrillators (AED)* 
Armored vehicles Boats* Bariatric stretchers (heavy weight) 
Auto license plate recognition devices (ALPR) Fire engines Boats* 
Automated external defibrillators (AED)* Foam trucks Ladders* 
Aviation assets Heavy rescue vehicles Mass casualty kits 
Ballistic shields Ladder trucks Stokes baskets  
Bicycles Ladders*   
Boats* Lights   
Gas masks Mobile EOC   
GPS for crime/traffic scene reconstruction Portable air cascade units   
HAZMAT gear Tanker trucks   
Ladders* Thermal imaging cameras   
Motorcycles     
Munitions     
Night vision goggles     
Snake inspection cameras     
Telescopic cameras     
* Multiple disciplines 
   
Table 40 presents several specialized services that facilitate interorganizational 
cooperation.  Chapter 5 describes how County Police contribute to municipal law enforcement 
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efforts by leading homicide and most violent crime investigations.  That type of detective work 
requires specific skill sets, expertise, time, and resources.  The County Police are able to achieve 
an economy of scale in the provision of those services.  “We rely on county homicide because 
they are well-versed, they are very good” (Respondent 25). 
In terms of frequency of interaction, semi-structured interviews indicate that sharing K-9 
units is a common activity.  K-9s are deployed for several types of incidents including bomb 
detection, drug detection, search and rescue activities, and suspect apprehension.  Female 
officers conducting searches is also a common request between police departments.  Respondent 
22 explains why departments stress the need for female officers to conduct searches on female 
suspects: 
Now a male may search a female but the Supreme Court has ruled many times, they’ve 
said all searches must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  And in order to be 
reasonable, it would be better to have a same sex person conduct the search.  So if that 
person is remotely available, you better darn well make an effort to get them.  And if the 
search is absolutely necessary and you can’t wait, you can do it, but it's better to have a 
female do it. We send our female officers here and there and everywhere for search 
inspections.  
 
In terms of the fire discipline, rapid intervention teams provide a commonly requested 
service (as identified in Chapter 5).  Fire police and rescue teams also facilitate 
interorganizational cooperation.  EMS work together and with fire departments during firefighter 
rehabilitation.  Emergency management activities often cross municipal boundaries with respect 
to urban and wilderness search and rescue and HAZMAT response. 
Specialized services and equipment encourage cooperation during other types of 
activities in addition to response.  The desire to familiarize personnel with a neighbor’s 
specialized equipment and services leads to training activities.  “A lot of it has to do with 
specialties and specific pieces of equipment.  We might need to work with another truck 
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company and get to know their procedures” (Respondent 12).  The desire to improve internal 
specialized services promotes training between agencies across spatial distance.  “[Our new 
training partners] are too far way to mutual aid with on response, but they have a lot of the same 
interests like rescue.  We will cross pollinate between these two other municipalities” 
(Respondent 5). 
 
Table 40: Specialized Services that Facilitate Interorganizational Cooperation 
Police Fire EMS Emergency Management 
Computer forensics Technical rescue* Firefighter rehab Urban search and rescue  
Electronic surveillance  Fire police Technical rescue* HAZMAT teams 
Homicide investigations Forcible entry   Wilderness search and rescue  
K-9 Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)     
Searches by female officers Rescue     
SWAT       
Technical rescue*       
Violent crime investigations       
* Multiple disciplines 
    
Semi-structured interviews identified several multiagency operations teams (or task 
forces) organized to facilitate collective action in order to address specific problems.  The South 
Hills Area Council of Governments police advisory group and the North Hills area chiefs’ group 
both field critical incident response teams (CIRT) that serve a similar role as SWAT (Special 
Weapons Assault Team).  EMS agencies also participate in police CIRT.  Police departments 
work together in several DUI task forces, the county district attorney’s narcotics task force, the 
commercial vehicles task force, and the state police’s computer crimes task force.  All three 
disciplines (EMS, fire, and police) play some role in technical rescue teams (TRT).   
Region 13 and County Emergency Services (specifically through County 9-1-1), 
according to respondents, serve as a central hub for information regarding available resources.  
  188 
Many agencies learn of available resources during response to an incident via communication 
with the 9-1-1 dispatcher. 
Many agencies learn of available resources from past incidents and informal relationships 
with other agencies.  Respondent 13 indicated that “if you need a piece of specialty equipment 
on scene to work a problem, it’s better to have cooperation beforehand.”  Agencies that 
recognize what resources are available, understand their functionality, and know who to call (and 
when) improve the speed and efficacy of their operations.  “It’s a fore-knowledge that the 
resource exists even before the incident” that improves response and “communication on the fly” 
(Respondent 56).   
Region 13 and county personnel attend chiefs’ meetings and send out communications 
(letters and emails) with new equipment announcements.  “The EMS County manager keeps us 
up to date about any new county or regional purchases.  That’s how we know that it exists,” 
Respondent 40, an EMS director offered.  “He sends out e-mails.  A lot of e-mail notifications.”  
While resources lists are also posted on the county’s decision support software system, 
Knowledge Center, many municipal respondents either did not know the software was available 
to them or simply do not use it.  Regional chiefs’ associations create resource lists available to 
mutual aid partners.  These lists are distributed in hardcopy, but they are increasingly sent out via 
email and are occasionally posted online.   
7.2.3 Financial Resources 
Resource dependence theory argues that agencies with limited resources will pursue strategies to 
gain assets needed for survival (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  In circumstances where 
organizations experience fiscal stress or anticipate stress, cooperative arrangements offer 
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strategies to ensure organizational survival and maintenance (Cigler 1999).  The role of financial 
resources may not be binary, however.  LeRoux (2006) and Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) find 
that, in terms of inter-municipal cooperation, both very low income and very high income areas 
are more likely to engage in cooperation than organizations operating in the middle ground.  
Analysis in the present study reaffirms LeRoux (2006) and Morgan and Hirlinger’s (1991) 
findings and offers a possible explanation whereas fiscally stressed agencies reach out to well-off 
agencies for possible assistance.   
The present study presents a typology of agencies to explain the role that fiscal stress 
appears to play on cooperation.  While the relationship between fiscal status and cooperation is 
influenced by other factors, analysis of the semi-structured interview transcripts identified 
agencies that appear to be in four categories of fiscal status that influence interorganizational 
cooperation: self-sufficient, resourceful, just getting by, and fiscally-stressed.  Figure 20 
indicates the non-linear effect that fiscal status has on cooperation.  Resourceful and fiscally-
stressed agencies appear to be more willing to cooperate, while agencies that are “just getting 
by” or consider themselves to be “self-sufficient” appear to be less willing.  The sections below 
explain.   
Fiscal Status   
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Figure 20: Relationship between Fiscal Status and Interorganizational Cooperation 
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7.2.3.1 Fiscally-Stressed  
 
“That $3 or $4 fish sandwich, it takes a whole lot more fish sandwiches to buy what it did 20 
years ago” (Respondent 50).   
 
Analysis of the semi-structured interviews indicates that agencies that experience severe 
fiscal stress often depend on neighbors for mutual aid and other resources to supplement low 
levels of staffing and their low operating budgets.  Respondents recognize a threshold point 
where agencies are forced to work together to ensure their survival.  Agencies in severe stress 
either identify opportunities to share or they may find themselves unable to meet basic 
operational minimums.  Cooperative activities include cost saving strategies, mergers, and the 
sharing of resources.  Manpower is a critical indicator of operational capacity and fiscal stress.  If 
an agency does not have the resources to secure manpower, they cannot operate.  
Before an agency becomes fiscally stressed to the point of bankruptcy, the present study 
finds that personnel including “working chiefs” dedicate their time and efforts to maintaining the 
agency, i.e. fighting for organizational survival.  At this point the fiscal stress inhibits agencies 
from working together as limited manpower and time prevent dedicated cooperative efforts.  
Agencies “just getting by” may engage in mutual aid, but other types of collective action—
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7.2.3.2 Just Getting By 
 
“All of our chiefs are working chiefs” (Respondent 49). 
 
Within the threshold points of low and high-levels of resources are agencies that are “just 
getting by.”  While many managers who fall within this category acknowledge the benefits of 
cooperation, they are constrained by their obligations to maintain internal operations.  There is a 
certain point that agencies reach where they are still independent and can operate without relying 
on other agencies for resources.  These organizations usually are run by “working chiefs,” 
managers who are out in the field responding to calls as opposed to in-office administrators.  
Several police chiefs and EMS directors indicated that because of cutbacks they are forced to go 
in the field and respond to emergency calls, which inhibits them from participating in the 
regional planning and governance activities. 
The focus on day-to-day response activities restricts a manager’s ability to develop 
cooperative projects.  So while there is a threshold point where fiscal stress is so severe that 
agencies must develop cooperative arrangements in order to stay viable, there is a more 
populated area where agencies “just get by,” dedicating their resources to operations but not 
significantly pursuing cooperative activities.   
Agencies are constrained by the lack of time and the unavailability of personnel to 
participate in interorganizational cooperation other than mutual aid.  “A big obstacle is just being 
able to get out of the office to get to the COG meeting because it takes time.  If you’re a one man 
show… If we’re busy, none of this gets done.  I’m sure a lot of the other smaller agencies work 
like that” (Respondent 28).  Respondent 35 described the obstacles that EMS directors face in 
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participating in cooperative efforts.  “One thing that has hurt the organization is that most 
agencies are small and many of the directors have had to spend time on the ambulances because 
of staffing issues.  And they can’t leave. [Regional planning] meetings have been poorly attended 
at best” (Respondent 35). 
7.2.3.3 Resourceful 
 
“Affluence breathes the ability to think a little bit differently” (Respondent 51). 
  
Agencies with more resources, i.e. staff, equipment, and money for overtime, not only 
appear more likely to recognize the importance of cooperation; they also simply have more 
manpower to dedicate to cooperation.  “The larger the agency… what’s the phrase outlook for… 
the economy of scale, you are able to spare personnel to work on emergency management plans, 
to attend meetings with fire and EMS” (Respondent 21).  These “resourceful” agencies pay 
competitive salaries and generally hire more experienced emergency managers.  However, these 
municipalities are generally not so large that they can adequately handle large-scale incidents 
without mutual aid.  Mutual aid then becomes an insurance policy to ensure service continuity 
during large-scale events.  These emergency managers extend resources and personnel to less 
resourced agencies in return for future aid as need arises. 
7.2.3.4 “Self-Sufficient” 
Interestingly, municipalities with the most resources indicate less of a willingness to 
cooperate.  Their self-sufficiency breeds a “lone-ranger” attitude.  This category includes large-
municipalities with significant resources that typically boost the personnel to respond to most 
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incidents with no outside assistance.  “Someone from a big town might think they don’t need 
assistance from a small town.  They think they have everything that they need and that they don’t 
need any type of assistance,” Respondent 45 commented.    
Self-sufficient agencies do not fear being taken over by other agencies, but they do fear 
the internal ramifications of regular cooperation.  Within municipal governments, agencies use 
incident data to justify appropriation requests, personnel levels, and equipment purchases.  
Regular mutual aid may indicate less of a need for appropriations and justify elected officials to 
decrease funding.  “If we were to have formal mutual aid agreements with all of the volunteer 
fire departments around the city, the case could be made that we could do away with the… fire 
houses that are close to the border” (Respondent 2). 
7.2.4 Time 
“Time is a volunteer firefighter’s worst enemy” (Respondent 12). 
 
Analysis of semi-structured interviews indicate that lack of time acts as an obstacle, not 
necessarily to mutual aid, but to cooperation on other joint activities like planning, training, and 
prevention.  “For the most part, when the whistle blows those guys all want to go out and put out 
the fire” (Respondent 28).  However, fewer agencies and personnel participate in other activities.  
Agencies face time constraints exacerbated by administrative duties, commitment to family, and 
in the case of paid departments, money for overtime.   
The leaders of these organizations increasingly are saddled with administrative 
responsibilities.  “Most people don’t realize when you move up the ranks and your helmet gets 
lighter, the issue comes that you have more responsibilities that you didn’t realize were there” 
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Respondent 1 indicated.  “Running fire calls is easy.  That’s the easiest part of the job.  Dealing 
with personalities, objects, paperwork and then throw on top of that… fundraising...”   
Volunteer fire chiefs, with their jobs and family lives, have limited amounts of time to 
dedicate to promoting interorganizational cooperation outside of mutual aid.  “I don’t get out to 
the meetings that some of these other chiefs do.  My time is very restricted.  I’m constantly just 
in meetings in the borough.  I have a wife and two kids.  Multiple stations.  So that’s enough” 
(Respondent 3).  Respondent 8 elaborated on the strain that the long hours put on a relationship. 
“It’s been a huge sacrifice over the years. I don’t think people really appreciate what kind of 
sacrifice it is.  I’ve missed out on a lot of family events.  It’s a miracle that I am still married 
because I’ve pissed my wife off so many times” (Respondent 36).   
The time of EMS and police personnel costs money.  And as mentioned above agencies 
operate with a limited amount of resources.  “I don’t have time on the schedule to send a guy 
away.  If I send a guy away I have to pay overtime to back fill the slot; a lot of it is dollars and 
cents” (Respondent 28).  Some EMS agencies focus on revenue generation at the expense of 
emergency management.  “Any EMS now is so business-oriented that we have taken the 
approach that we need to do transports in addition to emergency services” (Respondent 40). 
Police and EMS run on average more calls than fire departments.  The operational 
imperative of constant emergency calls limits the time available to pursue cooperative activities 
outside of mutual aid.  Respondent 21, a police chief, spoke to the idea that fire personnel 
generally have more time to devote to emergency planning: 
I joke with our fire chief, we are in the police discipline. It’s not like we have time to sit 
around and write plans all day. We work 24 hours, 7 days a week answering calls, while 
you are playing around in the garage. We have this good-natured relationship. Having 
said that, I think there is some truth to that. I can’t speak to EMS, but fire does have some 
downtime. They have a much lower number of calls. They have the time to spend on 
emergency management and on the training. On the development of policy, the 
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development of manuals, the development of plans. Police work does get in the way of 
that. We are usually pressed to meet the actual workload out there. 
7.3 SYSTEMIC COMPETITION 
“The for-profit agencies are out to make a buck… I pretty much view them as a competitor...” 
(Respondent 35)  
 
Several forms of systemic competition  inhibit collective action.  Competition cultivates rivalries 
and grudges that ingrain in organizational culture and impede cooperation.  Competition for 
power and authority on a response scene, competition between EMS agencies for revenue, and 
competition between fire departments for “prestige” limit interorganizational cooperation.    
Respondent 22 spoke of the competition for power and authority on scene.  “There’s a 
little bit of competition between EMS, the fire service, and law enforcement when you get to a 
critical incident…”  Generally, respondents indicated that their agencies adhere to a unified 
command structure that enables coordination through a divided command structure.  Many first 
responders interviewed make a determination on scene regarding the type of incident and install 
the relevant service chief as the primary incident commander.  However, there are some 
instances where competition for power and authority limit coordination.   
EMS agencies increasingly find themselves competing for revenue.  In Allegheny 
County, municipalities choose their emergency transport providers and County 9-1-1 reaffirms 
these decisions by only dispatching the primary provider.  “On the emergency side, there is not 
as much of an issue because the 9-1-1 center does a very good job of dispatching the home 
service to a call in its area.”  However, there is not the same level of supervision regarding non-
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emergency activities.  This competition for non-emergency patient transports creates tension 
between agencies (private, nonprofit, and public) competing for business.  
On the non-emergency side, there are two things that we see.  One there are private EMS 
services… some of the agencies that are in the business of non-emergency transports, 
they will come in and cherry pick these transport calls out of somebody else’s home 
territory.  That creates a tremendous amount of unhappiness.  The other thing on the 
nonemergency side is when patients are being discharged from a hospital coming back to 
a home district that home service very often wants the chance to go get them. They don’t 
want somebody else bringing one of their residents back to their home service area 
(Respondent 38).   
 
Competition, or at least suspicion, clearly exists between for-profit and not-for-profit 
agencies.  Respondent 35 explains the dynamic.  “The for-profit agencies are out to make a buck. 
I think they are purely driven by the bottom line.  I pretty much view them as a competitor...  
They wouldn’t be someone who I would pick up the phone and call to ask if they’ve seen this or 
that issue. They have a different mindset. Their decisions process is a lot different than ours.” 
There is a certain degree of competition among nonprofit and public EMS agencies also.  
“I think that the services that do non-emergency transport are less likely to work with their 
neighbors.  Because I know there are services out there who have occasionally tried to steal 
business off of each other.  I think they have harbored some bad blood” (Respondent 35). 
The fire discipline is an apparatus and equipment-intensive service.  Analysis of semi-
structured interviews clearly identifies the pride that personnel take in their equipment and 
competition for prestige that exists.  “Departments try to stay ahead of the curve for bragging 
rights.  Sometimes it hurts relationships too.  For that department that maybe doesn’t have all the 
resources available, sometimes they take offense at that bragging” (Respondent 8).  This 
competition may also lead to personality conflicts and inhibit collective action.  
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7.4 GEOGRAPHY AND DISCIPLINE 
Geographic location and discipline (fire, police, and EMS) positively correlate with the extent to 
which agencies cooperate.  Univariate ANOVA was used to determine mean differences between 
the numbers of partners (degree centrality) based on discipline (fire, police, and EMS) and 
geography (council of government regions).  Findings indicate that cooperation correlates with 
specific disciplines and geographic regions, showing that police cooperate more than other 
disciplines (an average of 7.949 more agencies than EMS and 3.784 more than fire) and that the 
northern suburban regions (of the field study area) are more likely to cooperate than other 
geographic areas.  EMS agencies interact with more agencies on average (4.165) than fire, 
confirming the analysis of Chapter 6.29  Table 41 reveals these mean differences by discipline.    
 
Table 41: Mean Differences in Degree Centrality by Discipline (Municipal Agencies Only) 
 
 
(I) Discipline# (J) Discipline# 
Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 




Police -3.784* 1.255 .008 -6.74 -.83 
EMS 4.165* 1.325 .005 1.05 7.28 
Police 
dimension3 
Fire 3.784* 1.255 .008 .83 6.74 
EMS 7.949* 1.557 .000 4.29 11.61 
EMS 
dimension3 
Fire -4.165* 1.325 .005 -7.28 -1.05 
Police -7.949* 1.557 .000 -11.61 -4.29 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
                                                 
29 Using the results of the interagency cooperation index survey, a second analysis (while not producing 
statistically significance) supports the hypothesis that police are more likely to cooperate than other agencies.   
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The prominence of police agencies (municipal, county, and state) is visually depicted in 
Figure 21.  Police nodes (red circles), sized by degree centrality, are centrally located in the 
network’s core surrounded by EMS agencies and fire departments on the periphery.  Figure 21 
visually supports the analysis of network data in Chapter 6, which statistically shows the 
prominence of police agencies in the network.  Allegheny County Police, including their 
detective unit (Degree 282, Nrm Degree 63.5) and their photo lab (Degree 165, Nrm Degree 
37.2), the Shaler Township Police (Degree 125, Nrm Degree 28.2), and Northern Regional 
Police (Degree 120, Nrm Degree 27.0) sit at the center of the network.  They have four of the top 
six system degree centrality scores.  Fire departments are more likely to have fewer partners as 
they generally focus on a limited geographic area.   
 
Figure 21: Diagram of Interacting Agencies by Discipline, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania 
Square (yellow) = EMS; Up triangle (blue) = Fire; Circle (red) = Police; 
Down triangle (white) = Emergency Management 
   
  199 
Certain geographic areas demonstrate a higher rate of cooperation than others.  Agencies 
in Allegheny North Valley and the North Hills COGs, on average, cooperate with more agencies 
than agencies within several other COG areas.  Those two COG areas possess more agencies 
than others.  Coupled with the propensity of agencies in close proximity to cooperate, findings 
may lend credence to previous studies that indicate that increased density of agencies within a 
geographic area increases the likelihood of cooperation (LeRoux 2006; Feiock 2007).  
7.5 GEOGRAPHIC AND CONCEPTUAL PROXIMITY 
“It’s hard to explain taking someone off the run card for somebody farther away…” (Respondent 
10) 
 
Analysis of the social network data reaffirms complex adaptive systems (CAS) research that 
indicates that the proximity of actors both in terms of physical space (geography) and conceptual 
space (discipline) increases the likelihood of interaction (Axelrod and Cohen 1999).  Actors 
exhibit the tendency to interact with others who share similar characteristics (Holland 1995), a 
phenomenon known as homophily (Merton and Lazarzfeld 1954).  Spatial and conceptual 
proximity (or homophily) increase the likelihood for interaction and the opportunities for 
feedback.  The present study identifies homophily based on geographic location as an indicator 
and to a lesser extent discipline (or conceptual proximity).  A visual analysis of the fire, police, 
and EMS network maps as well as findings from a clique analysis reaffirm these conclusions.     
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7.5.1 Geographic Proximity 
To what extent do agencies interact with one another on the basis of geographic location?  
Analysis of the semi-structured interviews and spatial analysis of the 9-1-1 call data reveal the 
prominent role of geography.  Close proximity increases the likelihood of cooperation, 
particularly during response operations.  Most agencies interact in dense patterns with their 
immediate geographic neighbors and other close agencies.  This trend reaffirms the 
neighborhood-centered network model described in Chapter 6.   
Homophily analysis demonstrates the positive influence of geography as a forecaster of 
cooperation during response activities.  Table 42 presents the total number of relationships 
(11,564) between municipal-level agencies in the field study area and demonstrates these 
agencies work with others within their geographic region (dispatch zone) more often than 
agencies from other locations.  For example, agencies in the North dispatch zone interact with 
others from the same zone at a rate of 89.38 percent.  The same trend holds in the east (82.44 
percent) and south (73.36 percent) dispatch zones.  The central dispatch zone is comprised of 
agencies from just two municipalities: the City of Pittsburgh and the Mt. Oliver Borough.    
 
Table 42: Homophily by Location, Dispatch Zone (Complete Network) 
  
South North East Central Total 
N % N % N % N % N % 
South 1834 73.36 302 5.52 337 9.53 27 50 2500 21.62 
North 302 12.08 4892 89.38 268 7.58 11 20.37 5473 47.33 
East 337 13.48 268 4.9 2916 82.44 16 29.63 3537 30.59 
Central 27 1.08 11 0.2 16 0.45 0 0 54 0.47 
Total 2500 21.62 5473 47.33 3537 30.59 54 0.47 11564 100 
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Figures 22, 23, and 24 (below) visually confirm the positive role that homophily (or 
collocation in the same geographic region) plays in influencing cooperation, which validates 
previous research on inter-municipal cooperation (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991; Krueger and 
McGuire 2005).  Figures 22, 23, and 24 reveal how collocation in the same area (9-1-1 dispatch 
zone) increases cooperation during response.  Clearly, the colors and shapes (symbolizing 
location) cluster together, which demonstrate that agencies are more likely to interact with others 
from within their dispatch zone.  Respondent 29, a police chief, explains the phenomenon.  
“Depending on the size of the incident, a department will call the closest departments and then 
start calling out…”  Figures 28, 29, and 30 visually demonstrate the resulting patterns of 




  202 
 
Figure 22: Diagram of Interacting Fire Departments by Dispatch Zones 
Nodes sized by degree centrality statistics. 
Isolates and pendants removed. 
 
Square (yellow) = North; Circle (red) = South; Down Triangle (blue) = East; 
Triangle (white) = County Agency 
 
*The central dispatch zone (Pittsburgh and Mt. Oliver) play a peripheral role in this network. 
  
 Figure 22 visually depicts the patterns of interaction among fire departments, 
distinguishing the departments based on their dispatch zone.  The large white triangle in the 
center of the network represents the county fire marshal’s office.  Chapter 6 identifies this 
agency as the center of the network.  Surrounding the fire marshal’s office are three distinct 
clusters of agencies based on geographic location: the north dispatch zone (represented by 
squares), the south dispatch zone (represented by circles), and the east dispatch zone (represented 
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by down triangles).  These patterns of interaction visually confirm the homophily statistics in 
Table 42. 
 
Figure 23: Diagram of Interacting Police Departments by Dispatch Zones 
Nodes sized by degree centrality statistics. 
Isolates and pendants removed. 
 
Square (yellow) = North; Circle (red) = South; Down Triangle (blue) = East; 
Triangle (white) = County Agency 
 
*The central dispatch zone (Pittsburgh and Mt. Oliver) play a peripheral role in this network. 
 
 Similar to the fire network, Figure 23 (police) and Figure 24 (EMS) visually demonstrate 
the clustering of agencies based on geographic location.  The white triangles in Figure 23 
represent core, county-level agencies such as county police divisions and the county sheriff’s 
office.  The EMS network (Figure 24) lacks a central county influence during response 
operations, but nevertheless demonstrates the same pattern of interaction seen in the police 
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(Figure 23) and fire (Figure 22) networks.  Even though EMS agencies generally cover larger 
geographic areas across multiple jurisdictions, they still demonstrate the propensity to work with 
others in their same geographic area. 
 
 
Figure 24: Diagram of Interacting EMS Agencies by Dispatch Zones 
Nodes sized by degree centrality statistics. 
Isolates and pendants removed. 
 
Square (yellow) = North; Circle (red) = South; Down Triangle (blue) = East; 
Triangle (white) = County Agency 
 
*The central dispatch zone (Pittsburgh and Mt. Oliver) play a peripheral role in this network. 
 
Another strategy used to demonstrate the role of geographic proximity is visually 
depicting the patterns of interaction on a fixed map.  Figures 25, 26, and 27 identify the 
geographic positions of fire, police, and EMS agencies and illustrate the patterns of interaction 
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that exist within the network. 30  A closer inspection reveals that most agencies are connected to 
their immediate neighbors (as opposed to random connections throughout the networks).  These 
findings support the homophily analysis above as well as past research on the positive role of 
adjacency in promoting cooperation between municipal governments (LeRoux 2006; Carr, 
LeRoux, Feiock, and Shrestha 2007; Feiock 2007).   
 
 
Figure 25: Diagram of Interacting Fire Depts. by Location, Allegheny and Surrounding Counties 
Nodes Sized by Degree Centrality 
                                                 
30 Figures 24-26 were created using UCINET and ESRI’s ArcGIS 9.3 by Dr. Leonard Huggins using the 
Allegheny County 9-1-1 emergency call records.  The author extends his gratitude.   
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Figure 26: Diagram of Interacting Police Depts. by Location, Allegheny County 
Nodes Sized by Degree Centrality 
  
Clique analysis of the fire, police, and EMS networks confirms the positive role played 
by geographic proximity.  Scott (2005) defines a clique as “a sub-set of points in which every 
possible pair of points is directly connected by a line and the clique is not contained in any other 
clique” (p. 114).  The minimum size for a clique is three.  An inspection of the fire, police, and 
EMS clique configurations by discipline demonstrates the strong influence of geographic 
location.  While there are boundary spanners such as the Shaler Police Department (shalp) that 
frequently interact across geographic clusters, the vast majority of cliques are based on 
geographic location.  These findings reaffirm the small-world model found in the complete 
network (see Chapter 6).  Many of the fire network’s cliques are neighborhood-based clusters.  
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For example, the North Braddock, Forest Hills, Wilkins 2, United FD Swissvale 2, and Rankin 
(all neighbors) make up just one of the many cliques based on geographic position.  Because of 
the nature of EMS agencies, i.e. their coverage of multiple-municipal jurisdictions, they are more 
likely to boundary span.  However, even their cliques follow a geographic-based pattern.  
 
 
Figure 27: Diagram of Interacting EMS Agencies by Location, Allegheny County 
Nodes Sized by Degree Centrality 
 
7.5.2 Conceptual Proximity 
To what extent do agencies interact with one another on the basis of discipline?  Organizations 
that share ideas, missions, and goals are more likely to cooperate (Axelrod and Cohen 1999).  
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Findings indicate that fire and police departments demonstrate homophily, while EMS agencies 
are less likely to be responding with others of the same discipline.  Table 43 reveals the degree of 
homophily based on the total number of partnerships (15,236).  Of fire’s 7,052 interactions 4,498 
(63.78 percent) are with other fire departments.  To a lesser percentage, police work with other 
police (55.50 percent).  The plurality of EMS relationships, however, exist between fire 
departments (36.85) as opposed to other EMS (35.82 percent) and police (27.33 percent).  These 
findings reaffirm EMS agencies’ role as boundary spanners that are more likely to serve several 
municipalities, working more with municipal-based police and fire rather than other EMS 
agencies.  These patterns of interaction may also be explained by the routine incidents dealt with 
on a day-to-day basis.  EMS cooperation with other EMS is generally limited to larger-scale, less 
regular incidents such as mass causalities.  EMS agencies are more likely to work with fire and 
police on a regular basis due to the regularity of their incidents and the sparser geographic 
distribution of EMS agencies. 
 
Table 43: Homophily by Discipline (Complete Network) 
  
Police Fire EMS Total 
N % N % N % N % 
Police 2816 55.50 1408 19.97 850 27.33 5074 33.30 
Fire 1408 27.75 4498 63.78 1146 36.85 7052 46.29 
EMS 850 16.75 1146 16.25 1114 35.82 3110 20.41 
Total 5074 33.30 7052 46.29 3110 20.41 15236 100 
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7.6 INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
 “When we are working an operation, we have to be able to talk to one another” (Respondent 
27).   
 
The formal information infrastructure in the field study area is made up of technical systems (i.e. 
radios, cell phones, mobile data terminals (MDTs), etc.) as well as the rules and regulations 
governing who has access to information, when, and in what contexts.  The infrastructure 
constrains the availability of information and shapes the decisions of agency leaders.  
Organizations depend on technical systems for communication and information processing 
(Hutchins 1995; Simon 1996; Fountain 2001).  Timely, accurate information facilitates decision 
making in emergency management (Comfort 1999).  The extent to which agencies access and 
disseminate relevant information influences whether they recognize opportunities to cooperate 
and develop effective strategies for collective action.  The information infrastructure in the field 
study area positively influences cooperation during most response incidents as agencies receive 
and exchange timely, accurate information related to their operations.  However, limitations in 
technology and organizational design inhibit cooperation in certain circumstances, such as large-
scale incidents and many non-response activities. 
Knowledge systems, which facilitate collective cognition (and collective action), obtain 
information from several sources.  Analysis of semi-structured interviews reaffirms Graber 
(2003) and Comfort (1999) regarding organizational information-gathering strategies.  Figure 28 
visually demonstrates the sources of information that generate knowledge systems.  Agencies in 
Allegheny County rely on both their short and long-term organizational memory, information 
search and exchange tactics, and to a lesser extent reading and research to acquire information 
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relevant to decision making.  For example, the role of scientists, engineers, and journalists is 
apparent leading up to a major storm.  First responders monitor television news, online weather 
reports, online stream-level information, and even interact directly with the National Weather 
Service’s local office in an effort to asses risk and develop appropriate strategies for action.   
 
Figure 28: Sources of Knowledge Systems 
SOURCE: Adapted from Doris Graber, The Power of Communication: Managing Information in Public 
Organizations (CQ Press: Washington, D.C.), 32. 
 
Figure 29 presents the various means through which agencies acquire and share 
information with other agencies.  An array of face-to-face, phone, email, radio, and faxing tactics 
are used to communicate before, during, and after cooperation.  Mailing information is used in 
non-urgent, administrative settings.  Increasingly, agency personnel refer to other agency 
websites for information, particularly about available equipment.  To a much lesser extent, 
decision support information technology is employed to search for and exchange information.   
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Figure 29: Means through which Agencies Search for and Exchange Information with Each Other 
 
The sections that follow argue that some elements of organizational design, i.e. stand-
alone municipal dispatch centers and the assignment of radio frequencies to municipal-level 
departments, limit situational awareness and may impede cooperation.  It also suggests that 
online sources and other information technologies contribute to whether agencies receive and 
recognize relevant data regarding their vulnerability to risk. 
7.6.1 Organizational Design  
When decision makers do not have access to information or if information is no longer valid then 
decision making suffers.  While the field study’s information infrastructure is bolstered by a a 
number of technical systems, information asymmetry is perpetuated by certain elements of 
organizational design.  Although county-level agencies develop and maintain robust information 
systems, municipal level systems appear to be relatively weaker.  Stand-alone municipal dispatch 
centers and the assignment of radio frequencies to agencies in limited geographic areas (at times) 
impede cooperation during response.  First responders operating on different radio frequencies or 
dispatched by different call centers may develop uneven situational awareness in the face of 
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rapidly, evolving dynamic events.  What appears to be urgent to one decision maker may not be 
recognized by another based on the uneven distribution of available information.  Without a 
common operating picture, agencies fail to recognize the need for collective action. 
A central dispatch center acts as a repository of available information.  The field study 
area’s county 9-1-1 dispatch center facilitates communication throughout those municipalities 
who participate in the system.  Some municipalities maintain independent dispatch centers with 
the rational that “the dispatchers know their own streets. They know the areas. They know the 
individuals calling sometimes.  When somebody calls and indicates an incident in a specific area 
that is not labeled or marked, our dispatcher will know where it is” (Respondent 3).  During 
multi-municipal incidents independent dispatch centers can impede communication. A police 
chief, Respondent 28, indicated the potential for delay and failure when working through 
multiple actors to communicate with mutual aid partners.  “If [our neighbor who self-dispatches] 
has a robbery, I’m not going to know.  They will call [their municipal] dispatch, who will call the 
county [dispatch], who will give it to me on the radio.  That might be five minutes before the 
information comes up.  There are all of these links that have to take place.  It causes delay” 
(Respondent 28).   
Critical pieces of information about potential incidents such as a gunman, a hazardous 
material spill, or a mass causality shape life and death decisions made by emergency managers.  
The omission of this information, which increases in likelihood with the number actors relaying 
information, exposes first responders to unnecessary risks and limits the extent to which backup 
or mutual aid is requested.   
The field study’s central dispatch system maintains “run cards,” or preplanned mutual aid 
preferences, that provide guidance to dispatchers regarding what agencies to send for automatic 
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mutual aid.  Independent dispatch centers do not maintain this information for all mutual aid 
agencies.  Agencies have the technical ability to bypass fragmented dispatch centers, if needed.  
“I can take my portable radio and just change channels to [agencies that are self-dispatched] and 
talk directly to them” (Respondent 28).  To achieve this communication, the first responder must 
know with whom they want to talk and when. 
Agencies operating on the same frequency monitor each other’s activities and develop 
situational awareness of each other’s needs and capabilities.  “Being on the same channel is like 
talking face-to-face.  I can hear what’s going on in your community” (Respondent 18).  
Monitoring radio communications across municipal borders increases situational awareness.  
Radio frequencies, however, are assigned by county emergency services.  Several communities 
operate on frequencies other than their neighbors.  “It’s harder to communicate with other 
municipalities if they are on different frequencies” (Respondent 3).  This division of municipal 
agencies per their radio frequency assignment inhibits collective action.  Figure 30 visually 
depicts the different scales of radio levels of radio assignments available to certain agencies in 
the field study area.  Many agencies are limited to their particular scale and unable to 
communicate with other levels.  Some municipal police departments, for example, exclude fire 
departments from being able to communicate on their frequencies, which creates information 
asymmetry.      
Increasingly, first responders and other emergency managers in the field study area have 
the option and technical capacity to monitor multiple radio frequencies.  While the rules 
governing interoperability limit communication to some extent, available technology is 
increasing organizations’ ability to communicate.  Federal and state grants following the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 increased the technical interoperability of the field study’s radio equipment.  
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Respondent 22, a police chief, explained the scalable levels of radio communication available to 
police (and other first responders).  “We have our own frequency…  We can switch over to all of 
our neighboring police departments frequencies. And there is a central County frequency… ‘the 
pursuit frequency.’  Everybody can switch over to this frequency and communicate.” 
 
Figure 30: Scale of Available Radio Frequencies to County and Municipal Agencies 
7.6.2 The Role of Information Technology in Promoting Cooperation 
Departments use information technology in several ways to facilitate cooperation and 
coordination, including activities centered on resource management, intelligence gathering, and 
risk assessment.   
The use of online resource lists supports joint resource management and educates first 
responders per available equipment and services within the field study area.  Semi-structured 
interviews reveal an increasing use of websites (and to a lesser extent decision support software) 
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to communicate available resources in order to promote cooperation during response, 
preplanning, and training.  Regarding decision supports software, use is limited predominantly to 
county and a large city.  Despite access to a county-purchased online system, most departments 
are unaware of its availability.  The majority of agencies who manage their resources collectively 
depend on email lists or websites.   
Police departments use email to share intelligence.  Respondent 20, a police chief, 
described the arrangement.  “There’s a new thing out called SPIN. You join and share 
information and intelligence.  If we have surveillance photos of a shoplifter we can post them 
and ask for them to be identified.”  The coordinating effect that information technology affords 
to departments is considerable.  “In a small department, sometimes intelligence can get lost.  
With SPIN, we can more easily find information.  Things don’t fall through the cracks” 
(Respondent 20).   
Finally, a small number of agencies use mobile data terminals to access shared risk 
assessments and situational awareness.  Mobile data terminals (MDTs) and computers 
increasingly have access to the county’s real-time computer aided dispatch (CAD) information.  
Respondent 14, a fire chief, described shared data sources, including GIS and other information.  
“All they have to do is punch in the address and it brings up a GIS map of how to get to it. And it 
gives you pictures [of the location].”  Respondent 8, a fire chief, said “we’re using preplan 
software with laptops and all of the vehicles. We are using a software system called First Look 
Pro. It’s preplanning software. Basically you enter in an address and you get all the information 
that we’ve entered about that address.” 
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7.7 INFLUENTIAL ACTORS, RULES AND INCENTIVES 
What formal control do actors at various levels of the system exert over other participants?  What 
rules, laws, and procedures do agencies at various levels of government generate to govern the 
public safety/emergency management system?  What policies specifically promote 
interorganizational cooperation?  Analysis indicates that several influential (outside) actors 
incentivize or at least lessen barriers to collective action, reaffirming Ostrom’s (2005) basic 
contention that the rules and policies created by external actors influence the decisions made by 
system participants.   
Influential actors operate at all levels of government: federal, state, and local.  Federal 
and (to a lesser extent) state grant programs incentivize cooperation, particularly joint 
purchasing.  Also, as “creatures of the state,” municipal agencies are governed by state statutes.  
A series of recent legislation (in addition to established statutes) enable emergency management 
and first response agencies to work together more freely without liability concerns.  While 
uncommon, one statute (Title 35 of the Pennsylvania Codes) mandates cooperation, requiring 
municipalities to create and update municipal emergency operations plans (MEOPs) and submit 
them to county and state agencies.  Recent state legislation that limits liability during mutual aid 
is seen as a major factor facilitating cooperation.  Not all policies and actions promote collective 
action.  While not common, some municipal leaders, skeptical of the benefits of sharing 
resources, balk at the prospect of giving resources away. 
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7.7.1 Federal Actors 
Federal actors influence the field study area willingness and ability to cooperate through several 
policies and programs.  First, DHS and FEMA grants provide an incentive for action to some 
extent.  Second, NIMS and NRF (federal policies) promote cooperation as a core competency of 
emergency management.  Third, DHS funds the counterterrorism task force infrastructure, which 
facilitates trans-jurisdictional cooperation in the field study area through Region 13.  Fourth, the 
Post-Katrina Reform Act may create a more operational FEMA, which may provide additional 
resources and encourage expanded coordination between federal, state, and local entities. 
7.7.1.1 Federal Grants 
Respondents recognize grant money as a strong incentive for action.  “Although I do 
think that a lot of these folks are altruistic and they do things for the right reasons…  I think that 
funding is their biggest motivator” (Respondent 55).  This comment underlies the potential that 
grants serve in promoting interorganizational cooperation.  First responders recognize the 
opportunities for funds based on the precondition of cooperation.  “Grants are becoming more 
and more difficult to get.  The government is pushing for more cooperation or mergers between 
departments.  They are willing to reward departments for cooperation or mergers because they 
see our dwindling resources” (Respondent 13).  While federal and state emphasis still focuses on 
grants programs that grant funds to individual departments, respondents recognize the increasing 
incentives for cooperation. 
Local first responders identify FEMA’s Assistance to Firefighters Grants (AFG) as an 
incentive for collective action, particularly joint and coordinated purchasing.  The program funds 
fire and EMS apparatus, equipment, and protective gear acquisition as well as some training 
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initiatives.  FEMA also administers Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Grants 
(SAFER) and Fire Prevention and Safety Grants (FP&S) to fund recruitment and incident 
prevention programs (Federal Emergency Management Association 2010).  FEMA promotes 
cooperation by offering a “regional application” in which agencies propose joint purchases or co-
ownership for the purpose of cost savings.  A popular joint purchase has been “communication 
equipment such as portable and mobile radio” (Respondent 43).  This underlies DHS and 
FEMA’s programmatic focus on promoting interoperability between communication systems, 
but again the bulk of grant funds is not dependent on cooperation, which allows first responders, 
by in large, to pursue funds independently. 
7.7.1.2 The National Incident Management System and the National Response Framework 
Two federal policies, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the 
National Response Framework (NRF), promote cooperation as a core competency of emergency 
management.  DHS (and FEMA) request minimum NIMS education qualifications in order to 
qualify for certain grant programs.  While NIMS training may not be a direct form of 
interorganizational cooperation, it does promote it by emphasizing the Incident Command 
System (ICS) and a common lexicon of emergency management terms aimed at improving 
interorganizational interoperability during response activities.  Generally, NIMS promotes the 
idea of cooperation.  Occasionally, NIMS courses are held in classroom settings that are jointly 
sponsored and attended by first responders, which may foster networking and relationship 
building. 
With respect to interdisciplinary cooperation, fire departments tend to integrate well into 
larger incident response systems.  One explanation is that the values of the Incident Command 
System (ICS) have been ingrained into fire’s culture and correspondingly into their operational 
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routines.  Respondent 28, a police chief, compared fire’s ability to cooperate with other 
disciplines.  “They do the coordination thing better.  They have a ‘more the merrier’ mentality.”  
“They fold into [operations] very well regardless of where they are from,” Respondent 39 added.  
Respondent 21 attributed this core competency to ICS.  “Traditionally, fire has embraced the 
incident command structure.  They integrated it into their discipline and their daily operations,” 
(Respondent 21).   
7.7.1.3 Counterterrorism, All-Hazards Task Forces 
DHS demonstrates another commitment to interorganizational cooperation by funding 
Pennsylvania’s regional counterterrorism task forces.  The administrative (and operational) 
entities increasingly emphasize an all-hazards approach to emergency management.  Region 13, 
introduced in Chapter 4, is the field study area’s regional task force.  Through PEMA, DHS 
distributes $48 million of federal funds annually throughout the commonwealth.  “Part of the 
agreement to participate in a task force is that any resource has to be shared task force wide.  
And planning has to be done regionally as opposed to locally.  That really promotes a regional 
approach” (Respondent 57).  In the case of Region 13, respondents from the federal to the 
municipal level spoke of the task force’s role in promoting cooperation across counties and 
municipalities, particularly, in the areas of resource management and preparedness.   
7.7.1.4 Post-Katrina Reform Act of 2006 
Although not yet recognized in the field study area by first responders, the Post-Katrina 
Reform Act of 2006 made FEMA “become more of an operational agency and not just a check-
writing agency” (Respondent 48).  FEMA now coordinates information flow and intelligence 
during federal emergency management operations.  The legislation enables FEMA to invest in 
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preparedness, i.e. contingency planning, training, and large-scale exercises.  It also reestablished 
FEMA’s previous focus on hazard mitigation activities with state and local actors, which may 
promote increased interaction between federal and local actors.    
7.7.2 State Actors 
State governments exert statutory authority over county and municipal-level agencies.  While 
state policies incentivize cooperation to some extent through grants and other programs, the 
state’s considerable influence over the system is demonstrated primarily by several laws that 
create the rules under which agencies operate.  State legislation and funding, for example, 
enables the task force infrastructure.  These task forces help to regionalize some emergency 
management activities.  Several statutes and policies mandate minimum levels of professional 
qualifications for police and EMS and encourage them for fire personnel as well.  Personnel 
obtain these qualifications by participating in an educational system that brings people together 
from across agencies.  The opportunity to interact outside of a response situation promotes 
information exchange and networking.  Respondents indicate that several preparedness 
initiatives have development out of networking during classroom situations.  Analysis of semi-
structured interviews indicates that recent legislation eliminating many concerns about liability 
during mutual aid promotes collective action during response activities.  In addition, state 
planning mandates (Title 35) generate intra-municipal interaction as well as limited interaction 
between those municipalities and county and state actors.  
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7.7.2.1 Counterterrorism, All-Hazards Tasks Forces    
 While the federal government contributes to the operations of the task force structure, 
state legislation defined their boundaries after 9/11.  They were created to “promote 
collaboration among counties within the region and municipalities within the counties” 
(Respondent 59).  Task forces provide another level of government useful in coordinating action 
across an array of activities (mitigation, preparedness, response, etc.) and are mentioned in more 
detail above. 
7.7.2.2 State Grants 
The role of state grants in promoting cooperation between first response agencies is 
minimal as compared to the funding streams for the tasks forces.  First response grants, whether 
administered through PEMA, the Bureau of EMS, or DCED, do offer some incentives for 
consolidations and mergers, though.  One grant program, enabled by the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, does facilitate cooperation across sectors to 
facilitate preparedness activities.  Funded by private-sector chemical producers, the Local 
Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) plan for HAZMAT incidents.  Allegheny County 
Emergency Services also use the group of public, private, and nonprofit agencies “in creating a 
broader, all-hazard plan to mitigate, respond, and recover from an array of potential hazards.  
(Allegheny County Emergency Services 2010b).   
7.7.2.3 Qualifications as Opportunities for Interaction 
 Respondents at the state level maintain that minimum qualifications for emergency 
managers improve the efficacy of their work, while also promoting interaction between levels of 
government.  Respondent 55 indicated that “organizations have a responsibility to get a certain 
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amount of training for response and recovery.  The county has responsibility to educate those 
folks.  We have the responsibility to educate and provide the resources for counties to do their 
jobs.”  The Pennsylvania EMS Act (Act 37 of 2009 that amends Act 45 of 1985) outlines 
minimum standards to be met through participation in Bureau of EMS sanctioned-continuing 
education courses facilitated through hospital medical command and other entities.  The 
Municipal Police Officer's Education and Training Commission (enabled through Act 120) set 
basic police standards.  The state, however, does not mandate minimum qualifications for fire 
personnel; rather, the State Fire Commissioner recommends curricula taught by the state fire 
academy, community colleges, and county fire academies.  These educational and state 
minimum qualification standards and venues provide opportunities and incentives for interaction 
and networking that occasionally spark professional relationships that lead to some type of 
interorganizational cooperation.    
7.7.2.4 Immunity from Liability 
 Respondents indicated that concerns about liability in the past prevented cooperation in 
some instances.  With no state-sponsored template, mutual aid agreements were costly in terms 
of time and money depending on the extent to which municipal solicitors were involved.  Two 
recent pieces of legislation, Act 93 and the Statewide Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act, 
however, give outside fire and police departments immunity from liability if they are requested 
by home agencies.  Act 93, Respondent 9 explained, “allows local governments to request the 
assistance of other local governments without the worry of who is responsible for workers 
comp…  Departments now [mutual aid] without formal, signed mutual aid agreements.”  
Statewide Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act performs the same function for police departments.  
EMS also mutual aid without signed agreements.  “We used to have to have a written contract 
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signed by the outlying municipalities for mutual aid,” Respondent 32 indicated.  “We are not 
required anymore to have them signed.  We just get called…”    
7.7.2.5 Mandated Municipal Planning 
Title 35 mandates that municipalities draft and update emergency operations plans per state-
created templates.  Analysis finds that agencies invest varying amounts of time and resources in 
complying with the statute.  The statute requires formalized, written plans, but does not force the 
municipalities to work with their agencies to generate documents.  Municipalities also vary in the 
extent to which their agencies work together in drafting and updating their plans.  The state 
mandate offers an opportunity for municipality emergency management coordinators and others 
to work together.  Findings are clear, however, that all agencies are aware of the process and 
most take part in it.  While state and county personnel do not evaluate the plans, they do by law 
receive them from the municipality. 
7.7.3 County Actors   
As outlined in Chapters 4 and 5, County Emergency Services exert significant influence over 
response operations through the county 9-1-1 dispatch center.  The section below will outline 
how they influence communications (and situational awareness) through the assignment of radio 
frequencies to first response agencies.    Emergency Services play a major role programmatically 
in coordinating emergency management and EMS meetings as well as large-scale 
(multidisciplinary) training exercises.  As defined in Title 35, they distribute and collect the 
state-mandated municipal emergency operations plan template.  
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7.7.4 Municipal Actors 
The disposition of municipal management toward cooperation is generally quite positive.  
However, a small minority of decision makers demonstrate hostility toward the allocation of 
resources (time, personnel, material, etc.) to neighboring municipalities.  Respondent 10’s 
comment underlies this position.  “Our elected officials’ viewpoint was that we are paying all 
this money for you to work here, why do you keep running to [our neighbors]?”  Respondent 50 
indicated the same problem among neighbors.  “I’ve heard stories of fire departments catching 
heat from their municipal fathers who didn’t want them going to other communities because it 
made them a busier department and created more of a risk for injury.  It was more costly on their 
workmen’s comp insurance provider.”  Act 93 and the Statewide Municipal Police Jurisdiction 
Act should help to eliminate concerns about liability and reduce insurance rates.  While 
municipal leaders could direct first responders, either formally or informally, to limit mutual aid, 
most appear to support mutual aid for nothing else than as an insurance policy in case of a large-
scale incident in their jurisdiction.        
 The interaction between first responders and their municipal governments appears to be 
escalating.  Municipalities increasingly coordinate administrative activities with their nonprofit 
fire and EMS agencies.  In 2008, state Acts 7, 8, 9, and 31 officially put the responsibility of 
providing fire and EMS services in the portfolios of local governments.  Chapter 5 illustrates the 
increasing contributions of municipal governments to nonprofit first responders.  This municipal 
policy shift increases the levels of cooperation between municipal governments and first 
responders.   
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7.8 CONCLUSION 
Components of administrative structure range from rules to resources to technical infrastructures.  
The demands of the external environment shape and constrain organizational action.  Problems 
create certain needs that foster common cause and complementary goals that are either formally 
espoused through organizational policies or informally pursued.  Analysis of the network data 
shows the positive roles played by geographic location and conceptual proximity.   
This chapter demonstrates the influence of actors situated from the federal to municipal 
levels of government.  Influential actors create rules that promote collective action.  In particular, 
state legislation has reduced liability concerns and promoted cooperation.  At the same time, 
policies at the county and municipal levels place limitations on who has access to the 
information infrastructure and when.  Analysis of semi-structured interviews indicates that the 
field study area’s information infrastructure, while on a positive trajectory in reducing 
information asymmetry, limits the extent to which agencies receive and exchange data critical to 
decision making regarding collective action.    
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8.0  COMPONENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS THAT INFLUENCE 
COOPERATION 
“It all boils down to communication” (Respondent 10). 
 
Chapter 7 suggests that access to information creates a common operating picture that promotes 
cooperation.  This access is facilitated by an information infrastructure, by rules that permit 
participation, and by geographic and conceptual proximity to other agencies.  Components of 
administrative structure, however, are not the only factors that influence the formation of a 
shared knowledge base and a common operating picture.  What are the components of 
administrative process that affect interorganizational cooperation?  A key element of 
administrative process is communication or as Simon (1997) defines it, “any process whereby 
decisional premises are transmitted from one member of [a system] to another” (p. 208).  The 
components of administrative process, explored in this section, affect the extent to which 
communication takes place, which shape and constrain decision making regarding collective 
action.  Culture, leadership, management skills, preexisting relationships, and individual and 
group incentives all influence communication and the policy decisions agencies make regarding 
whether to pursue strategies of interorganizational cooperation.   
The creation and maintenance of relationships stands out as critical processes that 
facilitate information exchange and trust building so vital to cooperation.  This chapter also 
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identifies “multiple hatters” or boundary spanners who possess multiple organizational 
memberships and connect agencies together, promoting interaction.  The alternative to 
cooperation, as outlined in this chapter, is a siloed pattern of activity perpetuated by turf 
protection and a “go-it-alone” mentality that dominates some organizational cultures. 
8.1 CULTURE 
“Inherently emergency management is cooperative in nature” (Respondent 55). 
 
Analysis of semi-structured interviews indicates that several components of organizational 
culture influence the particular dispositions of managers toward cooperation.  The comment 
above reflects the idea that organizational culture in emergency management is inclined to 
support cooperation.  While mutual aid is a generally accepted practice, organizational culture is 
more or less supportive of cooperation depending on particular cooperative activities and 
partners.   
8.1.1 Types of Culture that Promote Cooperation 
Schein (1992) describes organizational culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the 
group learn[s]” and is “taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel” (p. 
12).  These patterns of basic assumptions regarding interorganizational cooperation include: 1.) 
The extent to which agencies value information sharing, 2.) Their openness to new information, 
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3.) Their commitment to emergency management as a mission, 4.) Their commitment to other 
personnel, and 5.) Their commitment to the public good as a whole.   
 Agencies that value learning and information exchange may be more willing to explore 
strategies for collective action.  Agencies that exhibit a commitment to solve problems through 
flexibility and hard work provide a motivating force for cooperation.  “The fire service that I’ve 
experienced over the past 30 years is that we have a can-do attitude,” Respondent 50 stated.  “No 
matter what the problem is or what the issue is, we are going to find a way to solve it because we 
never want to say that we failed.”  The commitment to problem solving described above may 
lead to information search and exchange.  If decision makers recognize strategies for collective 
action as a solution to a specific problem, agencies open to new strategies and ideas are more 
willing to interact with others. 
Respondents referred to emergency management as a “family,” a “fraternity,” and a 
“brotherhood.”  The perception of emergency management as a single system in which 
interdependent personnel operate facilitates an openness to collective action.  It promotes a 
reciprocal notion among personnel that they ought to protect each other, a mentality of “I’ve got 
your back” (Respondent 22).  Personnel demonstrate commitment to organizational missions as 
well as to members of their disciplines and emergency management as a system.  As cooperation 
is increasingly a norm within emergency management, professionalism promotes 
interorganizational cooperation (McGuire 2009).  Several respondents (three fire chiefs, three 
police chiefs, one EMS director, and one federal-level personnel) cited their mission as specific 
disciplines or emergency management as a cultural impetus to cooperate. 
Some agencies demonstrate a strong commitment to others in their discipline.  For 
example, a police chief described his support of other police in need of assistance.  “When it 
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involves another police department, we are policemen.  It doesn’t matter where you work.  In 
situations where there is a policeman hurt or down, it doesn’t matter” (Response 26).  Mutual aid 
demonstrates personnel’s commitment and loyalty to each other.  It has become an accepted 
practice among fire, police, and EMS.  For practical reasons, in addition to loyalty, “[our 
department] appreciates the help” Respondent 39, a fire chief, indicated.  “You aren’t getting 
beat to death.  Our initial attack crew might only get in one time, but it’s better than getting beat 
to death and dragging ass.” 
Agencies that demonstrate a commitment to emergency management in addition to their 
individual disciplines, generally, are more willing to participate in cooperative activities.  The 
remarks of one police chief, Respondent 26, reflect the commitment to first response.   “We are 
considered first responders, so we go on all of the calls.  Whether it’s a fire or an automobile 
accident, we are usually there.”  Respondent 25 spoke to the commitment of emergency 
personnel to protect one another.  “That brother fraternity environment that people talk about is 
there.  We assist each other as best we can.”   
The commitment to protection and support of other agency personnel promotes 
cooperation.  “If a person puts their hands on a paramedic… if they pushed or punched a 
paramedic, they were in a county jail two minutes later.  EMS knew we backed them up” 
(Respondent 22).  Chapter 5 outlines other forms of protection that first responders provide one 
another.  This type of support generates good will and dependence, which helps to link the 
system together. 
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8.1.2 Types of Culture that Inhibit Cooperation 
“When an opportunity to simply join a [collaborative] project comes up, people’s defenses come 
up because they fear loss of control, loss of pride, loss of integrity,” Respondent 51 remarked.  
“Sometimes it gets all the way down to the local officials feeling that cooperation diffuses 
prestige or power in the local community,” he added.  This comment speaks to the fear of 
agencies (ingrained in a basic set of shared assumptions) that cooperation reduces control, 
power, authority, and prestige.  In the face of these fears, agency decision makers may focus on 
their existing routines and rely on their existing bases of knowledge, which reinforces established 
practices and patterns of interaction (or lack thereof).  
The present study supports the extant literature that recognizes turf protection and 
suspicious organizational cultures as factors that reduce the likelihood for cooperation (Bardach 
1998).  I identify cultural misperceptions between disciplines, the animosity between some paid 
and unpaid personnel, the existence of “pride,” and the unwillingness to share information as the 
manifestations of cultures that inhibit interoganizational cooperation. 
8.1.2.1 Turf Protection  
 
“Turf protection… first responders are worried about losing their authority” (Respondent 31). 
 
Acts of “turf protection” inhibit collective action.  Why do agencies exhibit turf 
protection?   Fears of forced consolidation, loss of organizational identify, and the loss of power 
and authority motivate turf protection or territorialism in the field study area.  Four fire chiefs, 
three EMS director, two police chiefs, one regional-level personnel, and one state-level 
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personnel cited these factors in some way contributing to turf protection.  “People have concerns 
about other agencies taking you over,” Respondent 34 explained.  A council of governments’ 
administrator spoke of the suspicion of local departments toward cooperative activities.  “There 
was concern that we as a COG would take over departments and it took several months for the 
chiefs to become comfortable with what we were trying to do” (Respondent 51).  An EMS 
director, Respondent 37, identified the same suspicion.  “For years and years [a large 
neighboring agency] and [my agency] were considered threats...  But neither of us went out and 
tried to get anybody else.  We still provided mutual aid…  We could interact… but [smaller 
agencies] kept their distance from us.”  This weariness or fear of forced consolidation inhibits 
more robust cooperation. 
With no externally-mandated consolidations, the fear of a forced “take over” appears to 
be unfounded.  Why then the suspicion of regional administrative programs?  One reason is 
simply the loss of identity and control.  “The smallest volunteer fire department; their chief is a 
chief.  I believe their biggest fear is loss of power both as a chief and as a membership group. 
And they fear the loss of their identity,” Respondent 5 explained.  “They fear that their 
department identity will be lost and that 70 years of tradition will be lost.” 
Turf protection comes at a price.  “There could be so much more in terms of partnerships 
to make the system better, but it just comes down to egos and taking away my power.  It drives 
me crazy,” Respondent 31 concluded.  “With all of the headaches out there, we are own worst 
nightmares in the discipline.  We want to maintain our own identity and autonomy instead of 
looking at the economy,” Respondent 50 offered.   
 
  232 
8.1.2.2 Paid vs. Volunteer Personnel 
 
“There is a separation of us versus them, career versus volunteer” (Respondent 28). 
 
In Pennsylvania, volunteers staff the vast majority of fire departments.  Of the 14 
municipal fire chiefs interviewed, seven chiefs plus two state-level personnel identified the 
division between paid and unpaid firefighters as a factor inhibiting cooperation.  “The paid 
personnel won’t even mess with volunteers,” Respondent 2 remarked.  The division is 
perpetuated by negative assumptions held by personnel.  The resistance of paid personnel in 
working with volunteers is a result of several factors.  Some paid personnel expect lower 
standards of performance from volunteers.  On the other hand, some volunteers insist that the 
lack of interest is due to paid personnel’s unwillingness to engage in “extra work.”   
To some extent, paid personnel expect lower standards of performance from unpaid 
personnel.  “It’s the perception that career people think they are better than the volunteers.  They 
think they are better because they get paid to do what they do” (Respondent 2).  Some paid 
personnel feel “they [volunteers] have not been trained properly” (Respondent 17). 
Some paid departments do not recognize the incentives to pursue the regional public 
good as their responsibilities focus specifically on their municipality.  Paid personnel expect 
remuneration for their work.  In the absence of municipal direction, paid personnel do not have 
the incentive for interorganizational cooperation.  “On the career side, there are people who only 
see it as their job.  They are not interested in the kind of activities like training with other 
municipalities” (Respondent 2).  Volunteer departments, with few exceptions, exhibit more 
willingness to interact with others.  They depend on others to supplement manpower and 
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equipment levels.  Paid departments generally maintain sufficient staffing levels that allow them 
to handle the majority of emergency calls independently.   
Some volunteer personnel resist supporting paid personnel on certain types of calls.   
Respondent 5 stated “you get a call at three o’clock in the morning and the volunteer says why 
should I come out and babysit the paid guys.  Why should I come out for this wire that’s down 
when that’s what you get paid for?”  Several respondents have overcome barriers between 
volunteer and paid departments.  “You have to swallow the fact that you are working with paid 
people.  I am volunteer; you are paid.  Why am I doing this?  Because I ain’t getting nothing out 
of it except the fact that I am helping citizens,” Respondent 11 remarked.  “Once you overcome 
that and that it works the other way where a paid employee says what are you doing here when 
we could have another guy out here on overtime.  You have to overcome that resistance to that 
theory of working.”  
8.1.2.3 Negative Perceptions of Other Disciplines 
 
“Let’s face it, I’ve had policeman complain about firemen and firemen complain about 
policemen” (Respondent 29) 
 
In some situations, stereotypes about other disciplines create negative assumptions about 
interorganizational and interdisciplinary cooperation.  The rivalry between fire and police in 
particular appears to inhibit the development of strong working relationships.  Some police and 
fire do not hold EMS in the same esteem as other first responders.  “To put it differently, they are 
not part of the family” Respondent 24, a police chief, proclaimed.  That opinion, however, is in 
the minority of respondents. 
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Divisions between disciplines are evident.  “Some police look down on volunteer 
firefighters.  They even have funny names for them.  They call them ‘wackers’ or ‘blue lighters.’  
That doesn’t really happen here because we see a good group of dedicated guys who are really 
fast at coming out” (Respondent 22).  The negative cultural perception across disciplines can be 
exacerbated by the lack of existing relationships to dispel misnomers.  Respondent 50 indicates 
that “when you have a department with no relationships, it’s easier to perceive a department as 
just dumb volunteer firemen.  Or an overbearing cop…” 
I asked a police chief whether he thought that cultural perceptions of other disciplines 
were based on attributes such as paid versus unpaid personnel or high standards of performance 
versus low standards.  His answer was instructive:  
It could be that. But it could also be when someone is different than you, you just look at 
them differently.  Does the FBI look down on the state police?  Does the state police look 
down on local police?  Do we look down upon the [university] police?  It seems like 
someone is always looking to look down on someone else because you are different… 
You think you’re the best.  It’s just like that word ethnocentricity. I’m from one culture 
you’re from another.  I look down on you.  It’s just differences sometimes I think people 
look down on other services (Respondent 22).    
 
These negative perceptions can be overcome by developing relationships, interaction, and 
positive organizational learning.  Also, negative perceptions can be overcome by the belief that 
each discipline is part of a larger first response community.  “Everyone here [in the municipality] 
considers themselves as part of a family.  So there is none of this fighting in between the fire and 
police” (Respondent 22). 
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8.1.2.4 Pride 
 
“They feel like they are strong enough on their own” (Respondent 5). 
 
Six fire chiefs and two state-level personnel who work with fire departments introduced the 
concepts of “pride.”  Pride, in emergency management, manifests in different ways and 
influences agencies’ willingness to engage in collective action in different ways.  On one hand, 
an agency’s pride in their tradecraft, equipment, and professionalism increases performance and 
can engender a commitment to working with other agencies.  On the other hand, “pride” can also 
manifest in the form of fiercely independent departments that consider cooperation as an 
indication of failure.  “I think pride is the mentality that… [the department] can always do it 
better than the other guy,” Respondent 2 asserted.  Respondent 3 explained how this type of 
pride inhibits mutual aid in the fire discipline.  “They see a fire call as their call and if they give 
up that call somebody will think that I am weak or that I can’t handle it.  People don’t want to 
appear weak.  If I need help then whoever is helping will think that I am weak.”  Pride creates 
organizational rigidness that inhibits change.  “Pride means that we’ve been doing it this way and 
we think our way is the best.  That [type of thinking] is close minded to new ideas,” (Respondent 
34).  The risk of the unwillingness to change is the inability to adapt to dynamic conditions.  “I 
know a lot of things work and why change it, but if you want to do more than just get by you 
have to take some risks (Respondent 29). 
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8.1.2.5 Police as “Lone Rangers”  
 
“This is a male hormone driven position.  These guys are running alpha man 24/7” (Respondent 
18). 
 
“The police… they are kind of like the lone ranger,” Respondent 28, a police chief, 
commented.  “Everyone wants… to protect their turf and that’s how policemen are brought up…  
This is my border.  This is what I protect.”  This comment characterizes police departments that 
are focused almost solely on the day-to-day operations of law enforcement within their specific 
geographic boundaries.   
Generally, the types of law enforcement activities pursued by policy do not require 
mutual aid (or back up) for successful completion.  “Police for the most part do not use mutual 
aid very well until such time that the event is a big one.  The shooting.  The riot…  And they do 
the all-call, the all-come, and the ground-level troops in the adjoining municipalities know each 
other very well because of that fact” (Respondent 39).  However, intradisciplinary mutual aid is 
not commonplace for the majority of response calls. 
With the workload created by the demands of law enforcement, police may not have the 
time or resources to concentrate on emergency management.  In practice, police departments 
value their law enforcement function.  That is their profession, more so than any perception they 
might carry as first responders or emergency managers.  This mentality leads departments to 
focus on law enforcement activities at the expense of emergency management work.  The high 
volume of police calls explains the practicality of this policy decision. 
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 Police departments that fail to value their role as first responders or emergency managers 
exhibit less of an interest and willingness to cooperate with other disciplines.  If an agency’s 
culture only values law enforcement, their operational focus will remain with law enforcement-
related activities.   
8.1.2.6 Unwillingness to Share Information 
 
“…And information is power” (Respondent 46).   
 
Interoperability is the ability to communicate as necessary.  However, interoperability is 
not only the technical ability to share information or the rules that govern information exchange; 
it also encapsulates the willingness of agencies to share.  Examination of the data from the 
interviews identifies three reasons why agencies are unwilling to share information, 1.) 
Information is power and some agencies hoard power; 2). Some agencies are constrained by 
regulations such as restrictions in sharing law enforcement-related information, and 3.) Some 
agencies are not in the habit of sharing.  They do not have regular contact with other agencies or 
they do not have the appropriate information technology to share relevant information.  Agencies 
may be reluctant to share information because they are complacent with their established 
routines.  “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” Respondent 29 asserted, characterizing the mentality of 
some siloed departments.  “There are those who will always rather… tightly control information. 
They won’t want to let it get out there.  Because they perceive that they will control it.  And 
information is power” (Respondent 46).  The inability or unwillingness to search for and 
exchange information limits agencies’ ability to recognize cooperative opportunities.   
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8.2 LEADERSHIP 
“You can’t have a paper fire chief.  You have to have somebody with their boots wet and hands 
dirty” (Respondent 11). 
 
Leadership is the “ability to step outside the culture that created the leader and to start 
evolutionary change processes that are more adaptive” (Schein 1992, p. 2).  An effective leader 
recognizes a problem, articulates a goal, and communicates an action strategy to solve the 
problem.  Leadership that recognizes the value of cooperative activities and will challenge 
organizational barriers to cooperation increases the likelihood for cooperation (Bardach 1998).  
“It all starts with the chief,” Respondent 16 summed up.  Respondents recognized the importance 
of leadership as characterized by the following statement made by a municipal police chief.  
“Everything starts at the top, in my opinion.  If you have a chief that sets the example that we are 
all brothers out here in the public safety community; let’s work with each other, let’s respect 
each other, let’s help each other...” (Respondent 22).  As the public safety and emergency service 
personnel, generally, respect the chain of command, the directives and examples set by 
management influence the actions of frontline personnel.31   
The experience and disposition of leaders toward cooperation varies within the field 
study area.  Exercising visible leadership offers personnel an example to be emulated.  In 
                                                 
31 Culture and the values of priorities of agency personnel are particularly germane to policy decisions 
whether to cooperate in volunteer fire departments.  Because membership makes decisions, “internal department 
politics and desires” directly affect decision making “because… most fire departments are run by their membership 
at large… A chief can very easily be overruled by his membership” (Respondent 12). 
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conditions characterized by change, personnel may not recognize what organizational routines 
should be employed, so emulation of leadership represents a common sense alternative (Axelrod 
and Cohen 1999).  Many respondents indicated the positive role chiefs and agency directors play 
in promoting mutual aid and joint preparedness activities.   
Some leaders promote cooperation; others impede it.  Regarding the fire discipline, some 
respondents indicated that while most volunteer fire chiefs are tactically accomplished, their 
vision and scope as emergency managers may be limited to the types of fire calls that take place 
on a regular basis.  The inability to recognize vulnerability to less frequent, more destructive 
threats inhibits preparation and other types of cooperative activities.  Without the justification to 
engage in new activities, fire chiefs already constrained by operational and administrative 
responsibilities are less likely to pursue joint activities.     
Some fire chiefs come about their positions as a result of “popularity contests” as 
volunteer departments generally elect their chiefs from their general membership (Respondent 
17).  Respondent 12 indicated that the election process is “not necessarily based on firefighting 
experience, fire science knowledge, administrative and ability.”  In cases where chiefs are “not 
managers” and “don’t have those innate leadership qualities,” the inability of a chief to articulate 
support of interorganizational cooperation may impede cooperation.32 
Another component of organizational leadership that influences cooperation, according to 
respondents, is the rate of turnover of leadership.  Four fire chiefs and a state official cited 
                                                 
32 Respondents indicated the wide range of experiences and abilities demonstrated by personnel across the 
emergency management disciplines.  For example, “today emergency coordinators are diverse.  We have them all 
the way from people who have barely finished elementary school to doctors and people who do postdoc work and 
who have many experiences” (Respondents 46). 
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turnover as a barrier to collective action.  Respondent 55 commented that “in some areas, 
historically, there is a political culture where there is a turnover of staff.  And that harms 
collaboration.  The counties that see more stability, where they have 10-year coordinators, they 
seem to be more collaborative.”  Respondent 8 explained why.  “I think it’s much better to have 
steady leadership.  I think that continuity is beneficial to the department.  You know what to 
expect.  You can put plans together.  The experience is just invaluable” (Respondent 8). 
8.3 MANAGEMENT SKILLS 
“We try to avoid the cookie-cutter approach to having everything be exactly the same.  We 
would like to have the same outcome, but how one gets there can be different” (Respondent 55). 
 
The ability of a leader to step outside of the constraints of organizational culture and lay out a 
supportive vision plays a role in promoting cooperation.  Once a policy is made, however, what 
types of management skills facilitate the creation and maintenance of cooperative activities?  
During response operations, rigid command and control models of emergency management often 
break down.  Managers who take a more flexible approach to coordination achieve higher levels 
of efficacy (Mendonça 2007; Comfort 2002; Neal and Phillips 1995).  Management skills that 
support flexibility facilitate collective action.  Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) lay out several traits 
that facilitate the management of interorganizational networks, including “big-picture thinking, 
coaching, mediation, negotiation, risk analysis, contract management, ability to tackle 
unconventional problems, strategic thinking, interpersonal communications, project and business 
management, and team building skills” (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, p. 158).  Analysis of semi-
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structured interviews confirms the presence of these traits (especially risk analysis, negotiation, 
and interpersonal communication) in network relationships throughout multiple-levels of 
government.  
Interpersonal communication skills that facilitate information search and exchange 
represent key characteristics of strong emergency managers promoting cooperation.  “When you 
look at interpersonal skills, team building skills, those are the kind of skills that an emergency 
manager needs,” (Respondent 57).  One strategy to develop interpersonal communication is to 
reach out to other agencies prior to situations characterized by urgent need.  “You have to spend 
the time upfront building relationships, and be diplomatic,” (Respondent 42). 
The ability to delegate promotes cooperation.  The inability or unwillingness to delegate 
during an incident inhibits cooperation.  “The division of work is the biggest issue.  Somebody 
needs to be there and aware of the situation who can effectively and appropriately divide the 
work, [so] teams can work together more efficiently,” (Respondent 33). 
The ability to delegate depends on an emergency manager’s cognition, or his or her 
ability to recognize need and develop strategies for action.  “Emergency managers have to have 
the ability to think in levels of complexity.  A good emergency manager can see complexity and 
can see how that complexity interrelates with each other and is able to come up with solutions” 
(Respondent 56).  
During response operations, emergency managers balance the operational efficacy of 
command and control with the flexibility of open communications and problem solving 
strategies.  Information exchange and effective interpersonal communication is critical.  “When 
we get to the scene of a fire, we cooperate with one another.  We consult with one another and 
give suggestions back and forth, but the local chief makes the final decision” (Respondent 16).   
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8.4 ROLE OF RELATIONSHIPS 
“It comes down to the relationships” (Respondent 10). 
   
“This stuff isn’t rocket science.  It’s about developing relationships and knowing each other.  
The better you know the group you are working with, the better off things go especially during 
emergencies” (Respondent 50).   
 
Respondents identified a number of factors related to interpersonal relationships that influenced 
collective action.  First, friendships and acquaintanceships promote cooperation by establishing 
trust.  Personality conflicts, conversely, inhibit collective action.  More formal relationships that 
occur by the way of cross organizational membership promote interaction.  A specific type of 
boundary spanner within the field study area commonly referred to as a “double” or “multiple 
hatter” participates in multiple agencies as either paid or volunteer staff.  Their multiple 
memberships help to cross pollinate the existing bases of institutional knowledge with 
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8.4.1 Positive Relationships 
“If a friend does something stupid… it softens the blow and it makes [the problem] go away 
easier” (Respondent 50).  
 
Preexisting relationships facilitate information search and exchange.  Positive relationships 
between members of different agencies clearly help to minimize barriers to collective action and 
promote interaction in the field study area.  Respondents overwhelmingly cited the role of 
positive relationships in promoting collective action (fourteen fire chiefs, six police chiefs, four 
EMS directors, two county-level personnel, two state-level personnel, and a regional official).  
Table 44 demonstrates the breakdown of respondents by discipline.  The high percentage of fire 
personnel (77.78 percent) indicates the particular importance of positive relationships in the fire 
discipline.   
 




Total # of 
Respondents % Total 
Fire 14 18 77.78 
Police 6 14 42.86 
EMS 5 13 38.46 
Emergency Mgmt 3 13 23.08 
Other 1 5 20 
Total 29 63 46.03 
 
Several factors help to develop and maintain strong relationships.  Mutual respect, trust, 
reciprocity, and the expectation for future interaction promote interaction (reaffirming Axelrod 
1984 and Putnam 2000).  Positive personal relationships, while not necessary for mutual aid, 
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promote interorganizational cooperation across multiple activities.  Respondents vary in their 
opinion regarding the extent to which maintaining positive relationships facilitates cooperation.  
On the one hand, most respondents emphasize the importance of strong relationships.  
Respondent 4 argued the importance of preexisting relationships.  “If you don’t get along with 
them they are not going to come and help you.”  Respondent 14 echoed those comments.  “You 
can’t work together if there were any animosities.  You won’t get the help out of them.”  
Respondent 9, a fire chief, explained how he was introduced to a chief who later provided 
his department with a rapid intervention team.  “This old fire chief introduced me to him, and I 
met him in a drinking establishment…  He introduced me to his guys.  He told me about his 
rapid intervention team... which got me interested.”  The informal encounter described above 
prompted the two departments to recognize an opportunity for collective action and formalize 
their relationships with a policy decision to mutual aid on rapid intervention.   
Preexisting relationships may facilitate communication about controversial subject 
matter.  Where other managers may sidestep confrontation, managers with preexisting 
relationships may feel freer to address controversy.  Respondent 10 explained how preexisting 
knowledge of how his colleagues interact encourages him to address matters directly.  “If I’m 
angry, I’m going to get on the phone and say ‘hey, what the hell is going on here?’  You see 
people that hold it in then bear a grudge for the next 30 years.  I don’t hesitate to get on the 
phone to air a problem.” 
On the other hand, some agencies rely on standards of performance such as 
professionalism to ensure at a minimum, mutual aid support.  “People have to remain at a 
professional level when they are out here,” Respondent 13 argued.  “You can have a personal 
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relationship with somebody on your own time, but it comes down to people knowing their roles 
and responsibilities.  It’s about knowing that when incident occurs, it’s all business.”   
“I always say you want to develop relationships with people long before anything 
happens” (Respondent 10).  This comment supports the notion that preparedness facilitates 
operational success.  Knowing who to call for what and knowing how to approach people 
effectively in conditions of urgent stress is facilitated by information gained during previous 
interaction.   “I think it is sort of personality driven.  If the chiefs are friends or at least collegial, 
there is less of an issue [coordinating]” (Respondent 35).   
8.4.2 Personality Conflicts 
“There are people in this business that don’t like each other” (Respondent 23). 
 
Personality conflicts negatively affect the levels of cooperation achieved on activities other than 
mutual aid.  Several respondents acknowledge that while the vast majority of their relationships 
are positive, personality disputes inhibit cooperation, particularly activities in which urgent need 
is not recognized such as preparedness, incident prevention, and administration.  According to 
Table 45, EMS dominates the respondents who mentioned personality conflicts.  Six managers 
singled out its negative role as did two fire chiefs, two police chiefs, and two state-level 
personnel.  While the relatively low percentage of respondents (19.05 percent) who recognize 
personality conflicts as a barrier does not indicate a widespread problem, personality conflicts 
still cause problems within the system, particularly among certain EMS agencies. 
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Total # of 
Respondents  % Total 
Fire 2 18 11.11 
Police 2 14 14.29 
EMS 6 13 46.15 
Emergency Mgmt  1 13 7.69 
Other 1 5 20 
Total 12 63 19.05 
 
Mutual aid occurs in a different context where need is clear.  “I’ve got guys here that 
don’t like guys in [in our neighboring department].  And vice versa.  It’s just personality 
conflicts,” Respondent 23 indicated.  “But when it comes down to when you need help, all of 
that shit is set aside.  Some guys drive a little slower, some guys drive a little faster, but they get 
there.”  While agencies work together in conditions of urgent need, Respondent 23’s comments 
about “driving slower” are instructive because personality conflicts still exist in the face of a 
pressing event.  
8.4.3 The Maintenance of Relationships 
Respondents identified several factors that help develop and maintain relationships.  Knowing 
how to read people, developing respect and trust, engendering reciprocity, and interacting with 
others outside of an incident command environment are identified as factors.  These factors help 
to maintain governance networks and facilitate work on a large scale.      
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8.4.3.1 Knowing How to Read People 
 
“You can’t yell and scream and fight with them” (Respondent 4).   
 
“You really got to be able to read the person you are dealing with and know what 
approach to take with them.  One of the other fire chiefs that I routinely deal with is quite the hot 
head.  You have to be careful.  You have to know when to talk to him,” Respondent 8 offered.  
Communicating through preferred media also facilitates continued interaction.  “I communicate 
with some of the chiefs via e-mail.  I communicate with some of the other ones via cell phone.  I 
think it’s easier to get a hold of people through e-mail sometimes.  People have their different 
preferences.  And learn them” (Respondent 8).   
Respondent 4 emphasized “just getting along.”  He suggested that chiefs at times do not 
agree about tactical decisions at an incident.  “You can’t yell and scream and fight with them,” 
Respondent 4 asserted.  “When they call, you go and help them…  Afterwards you say hey our 
guys have been doing another way.  Sometimes the chief says okay next time we will too.” 
(Respondent 4). 
8.4.3.2 The Development of Trust and Mutual Respect 
 
“I think it’s just mutual respect and knowing that we are all in the same boat” (Respondent 35). 
 
Cooperation is more likely when potential participants desire to reciprocate for past 
interaction (Axelrod 1984).  Trust develops in situations where actors are familiar with each 
other, interact overtime, and develop respect for one another (La Porte and Metlay 1996).  Trust 
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lowers transaction costs and other barriers to cooperation (Feiock 2007).  Analysis of semi-
structured interviews identifies the positive role that “mutual respect” and trust plays in 
promoting cooperation.  Respect is developed during interactions.  “I think it's about sharing 
experience, sharing knowledge, asking about things that they might have occurred… that’s the 
easiest way that the relationships have developed and been maintained. You earn some respect” 
(Respondent 35). 
Analysis of the semi-structured interviews identified that agencies generally consider 
trust to be the preexisting demonstration of professional standards of performance.  Agencies can 
trust others to get the job done and meet expectations.  Like trust, agency personnel develop 
respect for one another and their professional abilities.  I explore these standards of professional 
performance (or “professional capital”) in the Chapter 9.     
8.4.3.3 Reciprocity 
“It comes down to you scratch my back and I’ll scratch your back…” (Respondent 13). 
 
Axelrod (1984) finds that reciprocity in anticipation of future interaction facilitates 
cooperation.  To maintain cooperation, two key conditions include that “cooperation [is] based 
on reciprocity, and that the shadow of the future is important enough to make this reciprocity 
stable” (Axelrod 1984 p. 173).  Analysis of the semi-structured interviews clearly identifies 
reciprocity as a driver for cooperation.  Maintaining strong relationships “starts with working 
together every day and assisting on mutual aid” (Respondent 21).  Emergency managers, 
especially those who interact on a regular basis, anticipate future interaction.  “It’s not that we 
are just giving somebody else something.  Down the road, they can help us” (Respondent 23).  
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Respondents expect a good turn in the future.  That expectation, in part, motivates the decision to 
cooperate. 
8.4.3.4 Interacting outside of an Incident Response Environment 
“Some chiefs socialize.  You get together.  You talk” (Respondent 12). 
 
Analysis of the semi-structured interviews reveals that many agencies create and 
maintain relationships outside of an emergency response environment.  These opportunities 
include both formal organizational settings and more informal settings.  Like the story of the fire 
chiefs establishing a rapid intervention, mutual aid agreement over a beer, personnel develop 
relationships in informal, as well as formal, environments.  Respondent 12 outlined planned, 
non-operational settings in which agency personnel would interact.   
We used to have cookouts at the station. We would call up other departments and say ‘if 
you’re not doing anything, come over to the station.’  I would talk to chiefs to find out if 
they had guys who needed certain levels of training and I would pair them up with people 
in my station who needed the same level.  If we needed the same amount of training I 
would organize a class and call some instructors in and have it at the station. That sort of 
thing will help to build relationships with chiefs from other departments.   
 
 Interaction also occurs in more formal venues.  Chief meetings, county-sponsored local 
emergency management coordinator meetings, the Allegheny County EMS Council meetings, 
Region 13, and other meetings provide opportunities where “you network, you talk, you pass 
along information.  [People] are able to put a face to a voice to a name” (Respondent 27).  
Respondent 16, a fire chief, organizes annual department banquets with networking in mind.  
“We invite our mutual aid companies.  We invite the county chief in.  This is an evening... we 
reward the membership for hours attended.  And we give out awards for things of this nature.  A 
few beers and talk.” 
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8.4.4 “Multiple Hatters” as Boundary Spanners 
In 2007, Robert Agranoff identified “interorganizational boundary spanners” as actors that 
facilitate cooperation in administrative settings.  The present study identifies a specific type of 
boundary spanners, “multiple hatters,” who are either paid or volunteer personnel participating in 
the activities of more than one agency as members.  For example, a paid police who takes his or 
her cap off after a shift and dons a volunteer fire helmet at night is a “double hatter.”  Twenty 
two respondents cited multiple hatters as a positive influence in promoting collective action.  
Fire (nine chiefs) and EMS (six directors) in particular identify multiple hatters, which indicates 
that these types of personnel play a significant role in promoting cooperation in these two 
disciplines.  Police (three chiefs) are less likely to employ these boundary spanners even though 
they still play a role in several police agencies.  Other state, county, regional, and municipal 
agencies recognized the positive contribution of multiple hatters.   
 




Total # of 
Respondents  % Total 
Fire 9 18 50.00 
Police 3 14 21.43 
EMS 6 13 46.15 
Emergency Mgmt   3 13 23.08 
Other 0 5 0 
Total 21 63 33.33 
 
What role do “multiple hatters” play in promoting cooperation?  Several organizational 
affiliations facilitate the “cross pollination” of the emergency management system; that is they 
increase information exchange between agencies and increase the likelihood of cooperation.  
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Agranoff (2007) defines his “interorganizational boundary spanner” as someone who “works 
within an organization but whose primary and often exclusive duties are engagement of 
personnel of external organizations” (p. 18).  Large agencies generally are more likely to have 
the personnel to dedicate to cooperative activities.  In the field study area, some large agencies 
dedicate personnel to emergency management planning or mutual aid and preparedness 
coordination.  Some personnel are formally appointed to serve as liaisons with other agencies or 
as representatives to municipal, regional, and county-wide planning sessions.  However, many 
smaller agencies lack the resources to devote personnel exclusively to cross-boundary purposes.  
Instead, relationship building depends on less former roles.  The presence of “multiple hatters” or 
personnel that participate as members of other agencies is more prevalent than formally assigned 
boundary spanners.  Both types of personnel increase the flow of information from one agency to 
another.  With increased information comes the recognition of potential points for collaboration. 
Analysis of semi-structured interviews identifies several types of joint membership that 
cross pollinate the field study area.  Police, particularly part-time police, also work as 9-1-1 
dispatchers and paramedics.  Some serve as volunteer firefighters and HAZMAT responders.  
Volunteer firefighters participate in similar activities more frequently.  Police, fire, and EMS 
agency heads from across the field study area serve as their municipality’s local emergency 
management coordinator.  With respect to other levels of government, some emergency 
managers volunteer as first responders to stay close to the problems and professional skill sets of 
the disciplines.  With respect to operational teams and task forces, emergency managers 
generally wear several hats.   
There is some criticism of multiple hatters, particularly of those with high ranking 
positions.  One perspective mentioned by more than one respondent was that multiple hatters 
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during a large-scale incident must choose where to concentrate their efforts, which may leave 
other areas unattended.  “I’m not sure that any chief of an emergency service should be the 
coordinator for the municipality. The reason I feel that way is it takes away from 
interorganizational coordination.  The chief of police, the fire chief, the chief of the EMS have 
enough on their plates to worry about” (Respondent 12). 
8.5 INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP INCENTIVES 
 
Individual personnel may be motivated to facilitate cooperative activities to advance their 
careers, increase their organization’s resources, or simply create public value (Bardach 1998).  
Thurmaier and Wood (2002) argue that local government personnel are motivated, not solely by 
cost benefit ratios, but by their desire to help their neighbors (a public value creating incentive).  
Analysis of semi-structured interviews identifies this type of value-creating incentive as a major 
influence.  On the first responder-level, individual goals center on meeting the demands of the 
external environment.  Chapter 7 highlights how the immediate need for manpower and other 
resources drive interorganizational cooperation.  Understanding how individual incentives 
augment policy decisions to work together increases the understanding of the factors that 
promote and inhibit cooperation. 
Interorganizational cooperation (mutual aid, in particular) offers personnel opportunities 
to be more active in their discipline.  An individual who seeks operational activity finds it 
regularly in mutual aid.  Respondent 4, a fire chief, spoke to opportunities that cooperation 
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creates.  “We’re running about 300 calls a year… about half of which are mutual aid calls.  
People get to do things a lot instead of just waiting and doing nothing.”    
 In addition to individual incentives, group incentives motivate personnel to pursue 
interorganizational cooperation.  Firefighters exhibit strong loyalty to their departments.  There is 
a notion that if a job is not completed someone else in the department will be tasked with it.  
There is a loyalty to their brothers (not only in their departments but also throughout their 
discipline) which promotes interorganizational cooperation.  Incentives motivate people to act in 
a certain way.  Individually, some personnel do not have an individual incentive to participate in 
interorganizational cooperation, but when they think about their colleagues and they realize that 
their participation will support their brothers, action is more likely.  This loyalty ties back to the 
commitment personnel exhibit to their disciplines and emergency management as a system. 
8.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter identifies the role of administrative process in facilitating collective action.  The 
creation and maintenance of relationships stands out as critical processes that facilitate 
information exchange and trust building that are vital to cooperation.  This chapter also identifies 
“multiple hatters” or boundary spanners that connect agencies together, promoting interaction.  
The alternative to cooperation, as outlined in this chapter, is a siloed pattern of activity 
perpetuated by turf protection and a “go-it-alone” mentality.  Chapters 7 and 8 lay out several 
components of administrative structure and process.  Chapter 9 focuses on the threshold factors 
that influence decision making on collective action and introduces the concept of professional 
capital. 
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9.0  THRESHOLD POINTS IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
The policy decision to cooperate is constrained and shaped by elements of both structure and 
process.  The decisions that are made are the outcomes of information exchange and cognition.  
Elements of either structure or process individually are insufficient in identifying the factors that 
affect cooperation without acknowledging cognition because cognition offers a glimpse into a 
person or group’s ability to evaluate potential cooperative partners and decide whether to work 
together.  
This chapter argues that cognition and the process of decision making integrate the 
components of administrative structure and process.  Using a complex adaptive systems 
framework, I have demonstrated the variation among agencies in terms of abilities and strategies 
for action.  I have modeled their patterns of interaction.  I have also identified key factors that 
influence their decision making.  Finally, this chapter identifies the process of selection used to 
determine whether agencies cooperate. 
What are the threshold points in the decision-making process regarding whether to 
cooperate?  This chapter identifies the criteria people use to make their decisions.  During the 
interview process, respondents identified a set of professional norms used in deciding whether to 
interact.  These norms when demonstrated engender confidence, confidence that promotes 
cooperation even in dangerous environments.  Conversely, the failure to demonstrate these 
norms inhibits collective action.   
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Professional capital represents the standards of professional performance that signal 
competence and justify the decision to work together.  The concepts are demonstrated across 
disciplines and jurisdictional boundaries.  They serve as a basis for a professionalism that 
appears in different situations varying in terms of intensity and stress.   
The recognition of urgent need largely drives cooperation in the field study area.  The 
ability to recognize need is developed through past experiences and the search and exchange of 
critical information.  Once a need is recognized, decision makers determine whether to cooperate 
with others or rely on their agency’s internal capacity to cope with need.  Close proximity 
(geographic and conceptual), as outlined in Chapter 7, influences this decision.  However, cases 
exist in which adjacent agencies fail to work together despite the recognition of need.   
While factors such as competition between agencies and personality disputes influence 
the failure, the present study argues that key standards of professional performance are used by 
decision makers to decide whether to cooperate.  Elements of professional capital, as identified 
in the semi-structured interviews, include the condition of equipment, the appearance of the 
personnel, the interaction of personnel, and the operational experience.  Respondents identified 
several emergent topics that influence individual decisions.  To a certain extent, transaction costs 
inhibit cooperation particularly in administrative settings.  The present study argues that asset 
specificity validated through a third-party facilitates the decision to work together. 
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9.1 URGENT NEED AND PROXIMITY 
“I think the biggest reason [for interorganizational cooperation] is need.  You just need to work 
with people nowadays,” Respondent 8 stated.  “The departments who have recognized that need 
are the ones who are working together.  It is all need driven.  The departments that are smart 
enough to recognize that need are the ones who are working together.”  The comment above 
emphasizes the role of not just need as a driving force behind interorganizational cooperation, 
but the ability of an agency to recognize need.  Once an agency recognizes a need, they search 
for a partner for assistance.  The analysis of semi-structured interviews and network data clearly 
demonstrates that close proximity (spatial and to a lesser extent conceptual) plays a major role in 
the selection process (see Chapter 7).  How do agencies recognize need and how do they select 
their partners?  Other than the strategy of selecting their closest neighbor, the concept of 
cognition helps to explore these questions. 
9.2 COGNITION 
“The emergency manager should see what it takes to get the incident under control” (Respondent 
55). 
 
“A critical component of emergency response is cognition—that is, the capacity to recognize the 
degree of emerging risk to which a community is exposed and to act on that information,” 
(Comfort 2007, p 189).  Determinants based on either structure or process are insufficient in 
identifying the factors that affect cooperation without acknowledging cognition because 
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cognition offers a glimpse into a person or group’s ability to problem solve.  Identifying 
cognition facilitates the detection of a person’s priorities and thresholds that tell us what a person 
or group will tolerate in terms of the status quo and conversely what motivates a person to act, 
including entering into cooperative arrangements.  “Cognition provides the initial content and 
activating link to the subsequent processes of communication, coordination, and control” 
(Comfort 2007, p. 193).   
Managers exhibit varying levels of cognition.  High levels enable decision makers to 
recognize problems, effectively develop solutions, and communicate strategies throughout the 
system.  Lower levels inhibit the process of recognition.  The ability to recognize shared risk and 
formulate strategies for joint-action depends on experience and training (Klein 1993; 2004).  
Decision makers with positive experiences and/or training with respect to cooperation are more 
likely to pursue cooperative activities, according to the analysis of the semi-structured 
interviews.  Cognition is facilitated by shared knowledge and the creation of a common 
operating picture. 
“In the language of practice, building a ‘common operating picture’ is essential for clear 
communication and coordination of actions among emergency response organizations” (Comfort 
2007, p 191).  Agencies that search for and exchange information about risk and strategies for 
action from a common knowledge base are more likely to reach similar conclusions.  Chapters 7 
and 8 identify components of administrative structure and process that influence communication 
and the knowledge system in the field study area: the information infrastructure, the system’s 
rules, and informal relationships that influence the flow and feedback of information.  The flow 
of information is the dynamic that drives the decision making process.  Chapters 4-8 demonstrate 
  258 
how heterogeneity of agencies and information asymmetry shape and constrain multilateral 
decisions to cooperate.   
9.2.1 Recognition 
“The first responder has to recognize the hazard” (Respondent 33).  The initial assessments of 
first responders shape and constrain decisions regarding mutual aid.  If a responder recognizes 
the need for backup, he or she is more likely (obviously) to request aid.  If an emergency 
manager recognizes risk (potential flooding, landslides, etc.), he or she is more likely to work 
with other agencies to mitigate that risk.  How then do personnel recognize risk and the need for 
cooperation? 
People make sense of ambiguity by considering history, interacting with others, and 
taking cues from their surroundings.  They focus on making plausible interpretations that 
facilitate problem recognition and corrective action (Weick 1995).  People link what they are 
witnessing with pieces of prior experiences or things they have seen in the past.  They take what 
they recognize and put the pieces together in a new way that helps them to interpret a given 
situation (Klein 2004).  It is only after they recognize a situation that they develop a strategy for 
action, which may include cooperation.   
9.2.2 Experience 
Exploring the experience of leaders and frontline personnel alike make possible an understanding 
of the role that intuition (and experience) play in decision making.  Decisions to cooperate in 
certain situations are made by personnel whose experiences, whether positive or negative, 
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influence their choices.   Without experiences that validate risk, agencies are less inclined to act.  
One respondent explained how the lack of experience increases the likelihood that an agency will 
fail to recognize risk.  “Nothing has happened to their service or to them where they believe they 
can’t handle [an incident] or need anybody to help with a large incident” (Respondent 39).  In 
explaining why an agency fails to cooperate, the respondent emphasized the role of past 
experience in formulating decisions regarding collective action.  Experience, obtained during 
operations, training, or other types of educational activities, drives decision making (Klein 2004; 
Flin 1996).   
Not only does experience provide positive and negative views regarding cooperation; it 
brings different repertoires of action to draw upon when faced with a problem or opportunities to 
act.  Agencies with limited operational experience may rely on a narrow set of established 
strategies to respond to a threat.  “This is the way that we have always done it” is a mentality that 
characterizes the culture of an agency with limited strategies according to Respondent 9.  
Conversely, open and active agencies may have more strategies upon which to draw.   
9.3 TRANSACTION COSTS 
In the field study area, agencies engage in cooperative activities characterized by informal, 
nonbinding types of activities.  Mutual aid and occasional joint training and planning represent 
the bulk of interactions.  Specific administrative activities in which resources are jointly owned 
and operated are rare.  The costs of negotiating and enforcing financial agreements (transaction 
costs) represent major barriers to decision makers who consider collective action.  The present 
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study finds that asset specificity (information regarding the level of unique investment needed in 
joint agreement) facilitates the decision to enter into more formal, asset specific arrangements.   
Brown and Potoski (2002) and Feiock (2007) argue that critical information useful in 
making an informed decision regarding joint service provision or the co-production of a public 
good include asset specificity and measurability.  The ability to clearly identify asset specificity, 
i.e. the level of unique investment needed to produce a good or service, and measurability, i.e. 
the ability to measure that good or service, reduces uncertainty and, in turn, lowers transaction 
costs (Williamson 1975; Andrew 2006).   
The few agencies in the field study area that jointly own and operate assets rely on a 
council of governments to reduce transaction costs and facilitate these cooperative arrangements.  
This third-party entity clearly identifies asset specificity as well as enforces the joint agreements.  
With respect to measurability, access to shared equipment as needed is the major criterion valued 
by participants.  Measurability, in this case, concerns questions of access.  As agencies feel 
confident that they will have access to equipment when needed, they are more willing to enter 
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9.4 PROFESSIONAL CAPITAL 
“I would hope that they can come in and do the same job that we do.  No one is perfect, but you 
do have some standards” (Respondent 41).  
 
Social capital describes how trust and norms of reciprocity link communities together (Coleman 
1988; Putnam 2000).33  In many instances, trust and norms of reciprocity facilitate collective 
action without hierarchy (Axelrod 1984; Putnam 2000).  However, the present study argues that 
trust and reciprocity fail to make possible cooperative relationships in some situations in which 
actors fail to recognize (in potential partners) standards of professional performance that signal 
competence and justify the decision to work together.  These standards serve as key threshold 
points in the decision making process regarding cooperation.  They represent the recognized 
components of structure and process that facilitate collective action.   
What concepts constitute professional capital?  More specifically, what are the 
recognized standards of performance in the field study area that influence the policy decisions of 
agencies to cooperate?  Analysis of semi-structured interviews identifies ten types; physical 
appearance, customer service, effort, type and status of equipment, experience and training, 
leadership, operational performance, the use of proper protocols and terminology, and response 
time.  The demonstration of one or several types of professional capital may be enough to 
prompt cooperation.  On the other hand, failing to demonstrate one or several types discourages 
                                                 
33 “Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to the properties of 
individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity 
and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam 2000, p. 19). 
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others from entering into cooperative relationships.  Respondent 13 identifies several standards 
of professional performance, which have inhibited cooperation between his agency and others:  
I have seen a fire company taken off our run hard because of previous performance. The 
reasons are manpower issues, showing up with inadequate crew, showing up with junior 
firefighters who cannot form inside the building, the equipment that they are coming on 
and how well prepared the equipment is, and the overall level of coordination with the 
company.  Those were the factors that led to our department to take off another 
department from our record.  
 
It is rare for agencies not to work with their neighbors, particularly during response operations.  
The lack of resources and personnel alone is insufficient to explain why and when agencies work 
together.  There are instances where these conditions exist, but managers still refuse to 
cooperate.  Why?  In many cases, it is because their prospective partner fails to demonstrate 
competence in their field.  This notion of professional capital depends on decision-makers 
recognizing competence across disciplines and across jurisdictions.  The following criteria 
represent an emergent list of standards identified by several respondents.   
9.4.1 Appearance of Personnel 
Three respondents, two EMS directors and a fire chief, cited the appearance of personnel as a 
standard of professional performance that they use to decide whether to continue working with 
an agency.  “The person who is the paramedic on the call if he has on greasy hair you ask ‘do I 
want that person working on me?’ just based on appearance” (Respondent 34).  Respondent 41 
added “It comes down to what you look like when you come through the door.  You have to look 
like you can do the job.”  Respondents recognize the appearance of uniforms as a standard.  For 
example, fire turnout gear, is not necessarily expected to be clean.  Instead, limited wear and tear 
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(within reason) indicates operational experience and helps to justify the decision of managers to 
interact with that agency. 
9.4.2 Customer Service 
“Good customer service, that’s what we’re looking for” (Respondent 41).  This comment 
indicates that certain standards of customer service are important to agencies, particularly EMS 
agencies (two EMS directors).  EMS agencies interact with patients (customers) on a daily basis.  
How patients perceive agencies, whether they are comfortable with the care provided by 
personnel, weighs on the decisions of directors to request agencies for mutual aid.  If an agency 
does not demonstrate a suitable level of customer service, others are less likely to request their 
assistance.  Respondent 41 outlined several indicators that focus on how paramedics interact with 
patients: 
Certainly the care and the compassion that they show… If we think it’s all about saving 
somebody’s life, it’s not.  It’s also about how you put a towel around somebody’s head in 
the middle of winter so you can take grandma outside and she doesn’t get cold.  We call 
it the ‘South Hills babushka.’  How we handle people.  How we talk to people.  How we 
take their hand.  That’s what they are going to tell.  The medication that we are putting in 
their names, we could be totally wrong.  They wouldn’t know the difference.  But they 
know if we handle them roughly.  They know how we managed their pain.  Pain is one of 
those things…  It doesn’t matter what kind of care that you are giving them, if they don’t 
entrust their faith in you, they won’t feel like you’re giving them a good service.  
 
The recognition of adequate customer service may be prompted by formal complaints by 
patients, observation during an incident, or informal feedback.  Respondent 40 suggests that the 
ways agencies measure customer service is more anecdotal than empirical.  “We haven’t really 
followed up with any patient surveys.  We have talked about it in implementing a customer 
service policy.  We just haven’t had time to expound on it.” 
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9.4.3 Effort 
Extant literature suggests that actors are less likely to cooperate if they suspect potential partners 
of free riding (Olson 1965) or cost minimizing (Bardach 1998).  With respect to mutual aid, 
agencies, specifically fire, identify consistent effort as a positive factor (four fire chiefs).  On the 
one hand, some respondents have minimal expectations for effort, particularly volunteer 
agencies.  A fire chief, Respondent 12, offered an example of these low expectations.  “It’s a 
volunteer organization.  You get what you get.”  However, few agencies (paid and unpaid) will 
continue to work with others who are “dogging it” or “not putting in fair share.”  Generally, 
however, examples of poor effort are not commonly cited.  “I can’t think of a time when I 
thought a company was honestly just dogging it…  There are times when there were calls when I 
thought staffing of a mutual aid company wasn’t enough… but they were not dogging it,” 
(Respondent 12). 
9.4.4 Equipment 
The appearance and working order of equipment represent another cited standard of professional 
performance (three fire chiefs and two EMS directors).  Respondent 34, an EMS director, 
explained how he inspects apparatus and how he draws conclusions about a mutual aid partner.  
“When they opened the door of their ambulance, does it open or does it only partially open?  
Look at the truck… is it filthy?  The equipment appears to be in disrepair.  You kind of hesitate 
to bring them in to take care of your residents because you want to maintain a good standard of 
care for them.” (Respondent 34).  On the other hand, well-maintained equipment in working 
order provides justification for decisions makers to decide to cooperate.   
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9.4.5 Experience and Training 
Several respondents indicated a considerable degree of comfort with agencies with which they 
train on a regular basis or who have demonstrated experience (six fire chiefs and one police 
chief).  They also indicated more of a willingness to request those agencies over others during 
response operations.  Outside of one-on-one training, respondents recognize who trains and who 
does not.  Informal patterns of information exchange often inform chiefs regarding who 
participates in various drills, classes, or exercises.  One emergency manager, Respondent 44, laid 
out the choice faced by first responders: “There are other [agencies] out there who will do class 
after class… And then there are other departments that don’t bother…  Now, who’d you rather 
work with?”  On the other hand, agencies without proper training or experience may prompt 
other agencies to avoid working with them.  “There are fire departments that we don’t like to 
work with because we don’t feel like they train adequately,” Respondent 8 admitted.    
9.4.6 Leadership 
Four respondents (three police chiefs and one EMS director) identified the need for “proper 
supervision” and the openness of chiefs to coordinate during critical incidents as standards of 
professional performance that influence their decisions to cooperate with other agencies.  Police, 
in particular, are cautious of participating under the command of other departments whose 
leadership may be problematic.  In situations in which tactical decisions are questionable, “the 
last thing we do is that we say okay we’re out of here. You don’t want to do that. That’s our last 
option,” Respondent 21, a police chief, indicated.   
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Respondent 9 identified a situation in which another chief refused to coordinate.  “We 
had an incident where another chief just took his guys and went [into a burning apartment].  He 
just walked past us…  He didn’t know what the conditions were or whether we were doing fire 
suppression or rescuing people.  He just walked right in.”  This type of behavior indicates an 
unwillingness to coordinate and inhibits future cooperation.   
   
9.4.7 Performance 
The ability to complete basic tasks related to the discipline and perform to expectations is a 
critical standard that influences the decision to cooperate according to four fire chiefs, three 
police chiefs, one EMS director, and one county official.  If an agency cannot do the job, they are 
less likely to be asked to mutual aid.  Several respondents identified poor performance as 
justification for the discontinuation of cooperative relationships.  “It’s been poor care,” 
Respondent 41 said.  “It’s literally the medic didn’t do the right thing.  Or just didn’t treat the 
patient correctly.”  Respondent 8 identified a basic competency in the fire discipline as a 
standard, hitting the hydrant.  “We were on a call a couple of months ago where one crew could 
not even hit the hydrant.  You have four guys try to hook up to a hydrant.  In our department, day 
one, it’s the first thing that we trained eyes on.  How to hit the hydrant.”  
 Agencies have removed cooperative partners from their run cards for not demonstrating 
basic standards of professional performance.  “The reason was a lack of showing up with 
qualified people.  It’s not like it was just one single incident where I got ticked off and said I 
don’t want to have these guys on anymore.  It happened several times,” (Respondent 1).   
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9.4.8 Proper Protocols and Terminology 
Appearance of personnel and equipment demonstrate certain standards as does performance 
during an incident.  How an agency looks and what an agency does indicate basic competence.  
So too does how personnel in an agency communicate.  “You can tell the professionalism of a 
department on how they handle themselves on the radio.  You hear these departments talking on 
the radio and they can’t put two syllables together” (Respondent 8).  Five police chiefs, two EMS 
directors, and one fire chief cited professionalism and the use of proper terminology on the radio 
as a key standard. 
9.4.9 Response Time 
The ability of first responders to quickly muster personnel and equipment and arrive on a scene 
is widely recognized as a key standard of professional performance and one that is measurable.  
While adjacency is positively correlated with faster response times, some agencies are able to 
muster and arrive faster from farther distances.  Whether police, fire, or EMS, response times 
matter.  Seconds and minutes can make the difference between adequately managing an incident 
and losing control.  Patients depend on quick response from emergency medical services.  
“When there are long response times, these EMS service chiefs hear about it,” Respondent 38 
emphasized.    
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9.4.10 Staffing Levels 
Chapter 7 outlines the need for manpower during response operations.  The ability to staff an 
adequate crew in the fire discipline specifically is a recognized standard of performance that 
influences decision makers according to nine fire chiefs, nine police chiefs, and one EMS 
director.  Table 47 shows that 64.29 percent of police chiefs and 50.00 percent of fire chiefs 
identify staffing levels as a key standard. 
 
 
Table 47: Frequency Distribution of Respondents Identifying Staffing Levels by Discipline 
Discipline   
# Identifying 
Concept 
Total # of 
Respondents  % Total 
Fire 9 18 50.00 
Police 9 14 64.29 
EMS 1 13 7.69 
Emergency Mgmt   0 13 0 
Other 0 5 0 
Total 19 63 30.16 
 
Operational success often depends on adequate levels of staffing.  “On the volunteer 
[fire] side, there’s instability in their personnel and maybe you can’t predict the quality of their 
personnel from one call to the next,” Respondent 24, a police chief, explained.  Respondent 9 
explained why the inability to staff an adequate crew prevents him from working with certain 
agencies.  “It’s just they couldn’t give what we were looking for.  It was nothing personal.  I 
needed fire fighters.”  However, the inability to field crews does not permanently inhibit 
cooperation.  “Many of our mutual aid partners are top notch departments. I would put them up 
against some of the best volunteer fire departments in the country.  But you still never know 
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what you are going to get [in terms of manpower] on any given time of day” (Respondent 12).  
“Everybody is very light on manpower on daylight,” Respondent 16 acknowledged.  “If a 
company can’t crew, I don’t take it personally because tomorrow it could be me.” 
9.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter identifies the key components of administrative structure and process as identified 
during the semi-structured interviews.  Urgent need and close proximity drives the decision of 
managers to cooperate, specifically at the municipal and county levels.  However, examples of 
agencies in close proximity failing to cooperate exist.  Personality conflicts, as outlined in 
Chapter 8, is one explanation, but another is professional capital.  Professional capital represents 
the standards of professional performance that demonstrate competence and justify the decisions 
of managers to interact.  Professional capital transcends the political and disciplinary boundaries. 
It provides a set of norms based on practice that facilitates the integration of the system. 
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10.0  FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
I present a polycentric system of governance within a set of public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
agencies operating in the policy domain of emergency management.  Using a complex adaptive 
systems framework (Axelrod and Cohen 1999), I identify among agencies their patterns of 
variation, interaction, and the choices that determine whether agencies work together.  Decision 
makers depend on available information to formulate strategies for action.  Available 
information is a product of various knowledge systems that are created and maintained by 
communication and interaction with other agencies.  Variation among agencies leads to disparate 
strategies for action.   
Interaction facilitates the identification of common cause and opportunities for joint 
action.  It also creates a larger knowledge commons (Hess and Ostrom 2007) that facilitates 
situational awareness and a common operating picture.  The policy decision to cooperate is 
constrained by and shaped by elements of both structure and process.  Urgent need, proximity, 
and professional capital heavily influence when and how decision makers choose to cooperate.  
Collective action, facilitated by the choices of managers, represents the building blocks for 
polycentric systems of governance, ranging in levels of intensity and commitment from brief 
interactions to operationally consolidated groups who plan, train, and respond together while 
retaining separate administrative structures and organizational identities.      
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10.1 MAJOR RESEARCH FINDINGS 
10.1.1 Variation 
Emergency management is a multi-organizational system characterized by a nested set of actors.  
The present study identifies agencies on the federal, state, regional, and local levels.  A critical 
challenge to these emergency management agencies is creating and maintaining the ability to 
manage effectively both the daily activities of public safety operations and the demands 
generated by extreme events.  This balancing act is exacerbated by the varying demands of the 
external environment such as exposure to risk and the vulnerability of the various socio-
economic, built, and geophysical systems.     
The composition of the system in terms of agencies, activities, strategies for action, and 
the demands of the external environment provides the field study area with considerable 
variation.  Variability in terms of emergency management agencies’ roles, responsibilities, and 
internal capacities as well as the differing levels of urgency and stress experienced during 
operations lead to information asymmetry, which inhibits cooperation and coordination across 
agencies.   
10.1.2 Interaction 
The present study identifies the types of cooperative activities that occur in the field study area, 
the levels of integration achieved, and the architecture of the network.  I argue that cooperative 
activities are the building blocks for polycentric systems of governance.  I present a model of an 
  272 
integrated, interdependent system of emergency management, as opposed to the established 
sequential cycle of disaster response.   
10.1.2.1 Types of Cooperative Activities and the Levels of Integration Achieved 
The present study describes cooperative activities as the building blocks for operational 
and administrative systems.  It presents a model of an integrated, interdependent system of 
emergency management.  Analysis of the semi-structured interviews identifies risk assessment, 
mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery, evaluation and corrective action, and 
administrative activities as core systemic functions.  Each cooperative activity varies in terms of 
required time, resources, manpower, and information sharing.  Analysis confirms that 
information exchange (through multiple channels) and creation of common bases of knowledge 
facilitate these activities.  All of these activities are pursued by both formal and informal 
strategies for action and range in intensity of linkages, which supports Cigler’s (1999) notion of a 
continuum of interorganizational cooperation.  
The levels of integration in terms of agencies and agency types vary according to the 
activity.  Patterns of interaction range from dense to sparse.  The extent to which integration 
occurs affects system performance as different knowledge and resources are brought to bear in 
certain contexts and expectations for performance are established.   
The present study demonstrates that activities interrelate to form 1.) systems based on 
single cooperative activities, 2.) interdependent activities that create subsystems, and 3.) an 
overall emergency management system.  The action arena in the present study (Allegheny 
County) is also a building block of regional, state, and national systems.  The recognition of 
scale in Chapter 5 acknowledges the variation of both organizations and functions, but also the 
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interaction that takes place as actors select their strategies for action based on available 
information.    
10.1.2.2 The Architecture of a Response Network 
Analysis determines that the emergency management network displays both scale-free 
and small-world model effects.  The dense clustering and short mean distances demonstrated by 
the field study area (inherent to the small-world model) reveal a neighborhood-centered network 
for emergency management and public safety.  In addition, the scale-free nature of the field 
study area indicates that there are several highly connected, prominent agencies that span 
jurisdictional and disciplinary boundaries.  These boundary spanners (county agencies, regional 
EMS agencies, and large municipal police departments) weave the regionally-based, 
neighborhood-centered clusters of interactions into the larger emergency management system.  
In all, findings depict a dense network with a robust capacity for information exchange necessary 
for the detection and response to risk. 
10.1.3 Selection 
The present study identifies several factors that influence the policy decision of agencies 
to engage in collective action.  Analysis identified elements of both administrative structure and 
process.  In particular, urgent need, proximity, and professional capital, a concept developed in 
this dissertation, promote and sustain collective action.  The present study offers an initial 
description of professional capital to describe how recognized standards of professional 
performance demonstrate competence and justify the decisions of managers to interact.  
Elements of professional capital, as identified in the semi-structured interviews, include the 
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condition of equipment, the appearance of the personnel, the ability of personnel to work 
together effectively, and operational experience.  Professional capital transcends disciplinary 
boundaries, influencing the confidence of decision makers and shaping judgments based on 
expectations of performance.  This concept adds a missing component to social capital theory, 
which currently focuses on the roles of pre-established trust and reciprocity in promoting 
collective action.  
Influential actors and the rules they generate from throughout the nested set of actors 
influence collective action.  Particularly, state statutes that grant immunity from liability during 
mutual aid are recognized throughout the field study area.  It is a major factor promoting 
cooperation.  The law eliminates the information and other costs of negotiating and drafting 
mutual aid agreements.  In order to establish mutual aid agreement previously municipalities had 
to sign documents, so there were costs in terms of information, time, and financial resources. 
This state legislation limits these costs in terms of time, resources, and money. 
Information flow and feedback is critical to create a common operating picture in which 
agencies recognize risk and opportunities to interact.  The present study identifies “multiple 
hatters” as actors that increase information exchange across organizational boundaries.  Similar 
to the notion of bridging social capital (Putnam 2000), they informally link organizations and 
personnel.  They recognize opportunities to exchange information and therefore significantly 
reduce information costs during the coordination of any joint action. 
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10.2 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The promotion of information exchange, the introduction of positive incentives to cooperate, and 
the increase in the number of opportunities to interact all promote interorganizational 
cooperation.  The following policy recommendations represent steps based on the present study’s 
findings that agencies can take to increase the extent to which collective action occurs.  First, 
agencies can develop and improve their professional capital through training, education, and 
experience.  Second, the information infrastructure, both informal and formal, can be enhanced 
to more effectively communicate levels of professional capital and other relevant information 
throughout the system.  Third, the mandates and imperatives of key actors within the field study 
area can be expanded to facilitate more effective preparedness and response activities across 
jurisdictional boundaries.  In all, increased training and access to this information infrastructure 
will increase professional capital and the likelihood for collective action.    
10.2.1 Database of Real-time Threats and Available Resources 
Once professional capital is strong, agencies should be able to communicate their competence 
across jurisdictional boundaries in order to crate a more robust, resilient system.  The present 
study focuses on the role of valid, relevant information during decision making in both normal 
and uncertain conditions.  It identifies several areas in which information asymmetry occurs.34  
Examples include an uneven awareness of available resources and potential threats throughout 
                                                 
34 Information asymmetry occurs when certain actors possess more pertinent information than others 
(Comfort 2007). 
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the system.  Information technology provides platforms to eliminate (or reduce) existing 
information asymmetries, communicate professional capital, and improve system performance.  
Region 13 and County Emergency Services are in a position to create and maintain an 
interoperable database of real-time threats and available resources accessible at all levels of 
government.  Region 13 and County Emergency Services currently maintain a resource 
management platform known as the “Knowledge Center.”  However, its ability to communicate 
real-time threat data is limited.  The semi-structured interviews reveal that the vast majority of 
municipal-level agencies are unaware that Knowledge Center is available for their use.       
Providing relevant information such as equipment and service lists provides for more 
efficient resource management during preparedness, response, and administrative activities.  
Real-time data on threats (flood levels, etc.) empower decision makers to make more effective 
decisions about mitigation, preparedness, and response activities.  With respect to response 
operations, personnel in the field study area depend on County 9-1-1 for information.  In large-
scale incidents, the capacity of County 9-1-1 (and County Emergency Services) to field requests 
for manpower and other resources may be limited.  Understanding who to call, for what 
resources, and when, are critical pieces of information during “communication on the fly” 
(Respondent 56).  An accessible database listing available resources and personnel would 
support effective response operations and guard against any potential malfunction at the County 
9-1-1 level.  It also demonstrates professional capital across jurisdictional boundaries and 
justifies the decisions of managers to work together. 
Outside of response activities, departments rely on word of mouth information regarding 
threats, vulnerabilities, available equipment, facilities, and training status.  Relevant information 
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would facilitate (potentially) the self-organization of collective action on several activities and 
help to expand the currently area-bound clusters of interactions.     
10.2.2 Social Networking Site to Promote Interaction, System Awareness 
The present study demonstrates the role of existing relationships in facilitating 
interorganizational cooperation.  These relationships, however, are generally centered on spatial 
proximity (by geographic location) and conceptual proximity (by discipline).  Agencies at the 
federal or state levels can bridge these “neighborhood-centered” clusters of interaction by 
creating and maintaining a social networking site for emergency managers.  Findings reveal that 
increased familiarity and trust among agencies increase the likelihood for cooperation.  
Information technology, like the social networking platforms Twitter and Facebook, can be used 
to share information quickly and inexpensively, while creating new relationships and reinforcing 
existing ones.35  The intelligence functions of emergency management (i.e. the gathering, 
analyzing, and distributing of relevant information) can be more effectively and efficiently 
facilitated through this type of information technology.   
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence recently created “A-Space” (Analytic 
Space), a social-networking site for intelligence analysts, to more effectively connect analysts 
from the disparate agencies of our intelligence community.  A similar application for emergency 
managers at all levels of government would facilitate information search, exchange, and 
networking.  The types of self-organization facilitated by such information technology range 
                                                 
35 Undoubtedly, new platforms will improve the existing capacity of Twitter and Facebook to network and 
share information. 
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from administrative activities to quick and efficient personnel searches during an extreme event.  
For example, the platform would communicate professional capital and allow agencies to 
coordinate continuing education and training initiatives without direction (and resources) from 
central authorities.   
The social networking site should also influence low-professional capital agencies in a 
positive way.  These agencies potentially have the most to gain from participating in joint 
activities, but are the least likely to recognize the need.  A social networking site not only 
reduces information costs in terms of identifying opportunities to work together, but it also can 
communicate examples of high professional capital, i.e. documentation of previous training and 
past performance as well as current equipment status.  The recognition of these various standards 
of professional performance may motivate low-professional capital agencies to adopt smart 
practices and become a more engaged player within the emergency management system.       
10.2.3 Invest in Hardware to Access Data 
The present study recommends that federal, state, and municipal governments increase access to 
information through the adoption of information technology and compatible hardware.  Leaders 
should work to create environments where information can easily be shared, relationships can be 
built as well as reinforced, and mindsets focused on turf protection can be changed.  The 
adoption of information technology can significantly increase information search and exchange 
and transform organizational operations.  Miller and Page (2007) find that as opportunities for 
people to obtain information increases so will their ability to learn quickly and their willingness 
to share information throughout their system.  Increasing the points of access for information, i.e. 
introducing information technology available both in administrative and operational settings, will 
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help to challenge existing norms and patterns of interaction.  Mobile data terminals, specifically, 
are rare for personnel in the field study area.  In order to take advantage of computer added 
dispatch (CAD) and any new information technology platforms, personnel must have access to 
the hardware—whether they are mobile data terminals, iPhones, etc.—to access available 
information. 
10.2.4 Gap Analysis 
State and county agencies can conduct semi-regular gap analyses with municipal-level agencies 
to identify threats, build a common operating picture, and promote collective action.  
Municipalities within the field study area are mandated by state statute to draft and submit 
emergency operational plans to county and state agencies.  However, there is little feedback from 
those agencies per the plans.  Emergency management personnel engage in gap analyses at 
varying rates, most frequently informal analyses.  Personnel conduct gap analyses by comparing 
an agency’s existing plans and resources with scenarios based on potential hazards.  Any needs 
not accounted for in their preplans are the “gaps” (Respondent 25).  The identification of these 
gaps allows for adjustment prior to an extreme event.     
10.2.5 Additional Resources and Personnel for Preparedness Activities 
Policies and appropriations can increase the extent to which FEMA, state, and regional/county 
governments conduct multi-organizational training and simulation exercises, including large-
scale exercises and small-scale table top simulations.  More opportunities to interact as well as 
specific threat-focused simulation exercises would increase the extent to which agencies 
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cooperate.  More resources and attention can be directed toward low-professional capital 
agencies to improve and integrate the system by prompting their participation.  These exercises 
along with individual-level training increase professional capital across agencies.  At these 
events, relationships are created and strengthened and specific threats and vulnerabilities are 
recognized by creating a common operation picture.  FEMA hazard mitigation programs and the 
new National Exercise Simulation Center offer examples of opportunities to coordinate activities 
among emergency management agencies.   
Regional, county, and municipal governments are in a position to increase opportunities 
for both formal and informal interactions among system personnel.  Increased familiarity and 
trust among agencies coupled with the demonstration of professional capital increase the 
likelihood for interorganizational cooperation.  The creation of either formal associations or 
informal working groups facilitated by champions of cooperation at various levels can help to 
foster future interaction. 
10.2.6 Cooperation as Precondition for More Federal and State Grants 
Currently, federal and state government grants for public safety and emergency management do 
not leverage their largess of appropriations to promote interorganizational cooperation.  Federal 
and state grant programs ought to increase the extent to which grants are tied to cooperation.  
Findings reveal that the realization of benefits, like grant money, motivate interorganizational 
cooperation.  However, most grant opportunities do not require collective action.   
Increasing grant allocations to incentivize interorganizational cooperation is possible by 
amending existing state and federal programs, specifically in state equipment allocation 
programs and the following DHS and FEMA initiatives: FEMA’s Assistance to Firefighters 
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Grants (AFG), Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Grants (SAFER), and Fire 
Prevention and Safety Grants (FP&S); the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG), 
the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP); the Commercial Equipment Direct Assistance 
Program (CEDAP); the Competitive Training Grants Program (CTGP); the Nonprofit Security 
Grant Program (NSGP); the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP); and the Pre-Disaster 
Mitigation (PDM) program. 
10.2.7 Regional Administrative Structures to Facilitate Cooperation 
Regional administrative structures (councils of governments, chiefs associations, etc.) facilitate 
various types of interorganizational cooperation.  In the field study area, one council of 
government, in particular, provides the staff and expertise to coordinate both an operational 
forum for collective action and opportunities for administrative cooperation (joint purchasing, 
coordinated purchasing, etc.).  Third parties, such as this COG, help to overcome the transaction 
costs that come with negotiating and administering multiparty agreements.  State financial 
support for these third parties would enable more of a focus on creating regional public safety 
and emergency management forums to promote interorganizational cooperation.    
10.2.8 Expand the Imperative, Mandate, and Resources of Key Agencies 
Within the field study area, the present study identifies two county-level agencies—the county 
police and fire marshal—that interact with a large number of agencies across jurisdictions and 
sectors.  These two organizations currently are constrained with respect to their interactions with 
others based on the legal roles, their mandates, and their resources.  While the current focus is on 
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identifying the cause of structure fires and general law enforcement support, these agencies could 
do more to organize the county’s emergency management system if they were more integrated 
into the county emergency service’s mission and mandate.  Due to their relatively frequent 
interaction with municipal-level agencies, they are in a unique position to organize training and 
support operations during an incident.  County-level direction from elected officials and the 
assignment of personnel as liaison officers across organizations may facilitate this coordinating 
role.    
10.2.9 Incorporate the Metropolitan Center More Fully into the System  
Chapters 5 and 6 identify the City of Pittsburgh as a relatively inactive partner within the field 
study area’s response system.  A commitment from the City of Pittsburgh to engage in more 
response and preparedness would go far in filling in the hole that currently exists in the 
metropolitan center of the network.  The system would almost certainly increases its level of 
resilience by incorporating this influential entity that is currently not as engaged as it could be.  
10.3 THEORETICAL QUESTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
10.3.1 Expand the Sample Size to Increase Variance and Pursue External Validity 
A limitation of the present study is that while it includes hundreds of organizations it does so in a 
field study area of only one county.  This limitation raises variance questions, particularly the 
present study’s ability to explore the effects of different sets of laws and rules on inter-
  283 
organizational cooperation as well as the effects of varying contexts, i.e. biophysical 
environments and political cultures.  
While the present study’s thorough investigation of one county is a contribution to the 
field, an expanded study of multiple MSAs will offer a more valid set of observations to account 
for the effects of multiple state and county ordinances as well as the effects of multiple political 
cultures, biophysical attributes like social, built, and natural systems, and the role of political 
fragmentation.  Also, an expanded study will likely show that larger emergency management 
systems demonstrate scale-free tendencies.    
10.3.2 Statistically Explore Relationships between Cooperation and Factors 
With the exception of the ANOVA models in Chapter 7, the present study focuses on exploration 
as opposed to explanation.  The use of multivariate statistical methods to determine correlation 
between measures of interorganizational cooperation and other factors will test the propositions 
identified by the present study.  Gazley, Brudney, and Schneck (2009) regress vulnerability 
measures against county-level emergency management preparedness and planning variables.  
Carr and LeRoux (2005) regress public safety service agreement measures against various 
municipal characteristics.  A future study would expand on the present study’s work by modeling 
the effects of variables such as trust, respect, and professional capital as well as institutional 
variables such as proximity and need.  
Statistically with an “N” of one it is difficult to pursue causation.  The present study does 
not employ a causal design.  Instead, it offers an exploratory design intended to provide 
propositions for future research.  With new propositions for causal inferences, the improved 
availability of data across metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) will facilitate other research 
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methods more appropriate for investigating correlations between cooperation variables and other 
factors.  
Another limitation is the age of the data used (U.S. Census, 2000; DCED, 2006; 9-1-1 
data, 2007).  The present study deals with rapidly evolving systems, including changing technical 
systems.  Upgrades in communication equipment and other pieces of information technology 
potentially have the effect of changing existing patterns of interaction.  Disciplined survey work 
will serve an important role in validating the findings from the present study and will achieve a 
higher standard of reliability.      
10.3.3 Explore the Role of Time 
Short, medium, and long-term temporal analysis of the field study area will provide several 
implications regarding the influence of time on cooperation.  First, a temporal analysis of the 
existing network data will determine if the network architecture changes by week and by month.  
It will identify specific agencies and types of agencies that perform at varying rates based on 
time of year.  Second, a comparison of 2008 and 2009 data will identify any statistical impact 
that Act 93 and the Statewide Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act immediately had on 
interorganizational cooperation.36  Third, an investigation of the same field study area in five 
years will help map the rate of change and identify the factors that determine change in 
emergency management networks.  It will investigate the role of information technology and the 
effect of increased information sharing on the evolution of the network.   
                                                 
36 The two pieces of legislation grant fire and police departments immunity from liability if they are 
requested by home agencies. 
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10.3.4 Simulation Modeling 
Another area for future research is agent-based simulation modeling.  Modeling complex 
adaptive systems will help to identify critical relationships and processes that affect performance.  
Agent-based models are an appropriate framework (Miller and Page 2007).  “A major part of the 
modeling effort for any (complex adaptive system)… goes into selecting and representing stimuli 
and responses, because the behaviors and strategies of the component agents are determined 
thereby” (Holland 1995, p. 8).  The present study will identify appropriate stimuli and responses 
as identified by the domain experts (the presence of critical information, rules that affect 
information exchange, etc).  Using simulation modeling (Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999) to explore 
systemic effects of policy interventions such as the introduction of information technology will 
offer empirical implications for managing emergency management networks and increasing the 
rate of cooperation. 
  
  
   








1. What’s the mission of your agency? 
 
2. With what agencies does your agency work?   
 
Factors that Promote 
3. What factors facilitate your agency working with other agencies? 
a. What are the benefits of cooperation? 
b. What factors help your agency keep these partnerships going? 
 
Factors that Inhibit 
4. What obstacles/barriers keep your agency from cooperating with other agencies?   
a. What are the costs of working with other agencies? 
b.  What kind of problems have you encountered in trying to keep partnerships 
going? 
 
5. Has your agency ever been in a situation where another agency didn’t contribute their fair 
share?  Did this discourage your organization from working with that agency and other 
agencies? 
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6. When your agency works with another agency, how does it assess the value of the 
partnership?  Does this assessment affect whether your agency will cooperate with that 




Factors that either Promote or Inhibit 
7. What laws, rules, and policies affect whether you cooperate?  How so? 
 
8. What are the incentives for personnel in your agency to work with other agencies?  
 
9. What do personnel in your agencies think about working with other agencies?  
a. What gains do they expect from working with other agencies? 
b. What costs do they expect from working with other agencies?  
 
 
10. What professional standards of performance does your agency expect while working with 
other agencies?   
 
11. When your agency extends mutual aid, how confident is your agency that the other 
agency will reciprocate? 
 




13. Who (what external actor or agency) influences your agency’s decision to cooperate or 
not cooperate?  How so? 
 
14. What criteria do your agency use in deciding with what agencies to interact and what 
agencies to avoid? 
a. Do those criteria change under conditions of stress?  If so, why? 
b. Do those criteria change overtime in normal conditions?   
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Information Search and Exchange 
15. What means does your agency use to communicate with personnel from other agencies?   
a. How does your agency determine who to contact and under what conditions? 
b. Are there formal and informal ways to communicate?  Please explain. 
c. How often does your agency communicate with other agencies? 
 
16. What kinds of information are important to your agency while working with other 
agencies?   
a. Where do you get information from? 
b. How do you manage (store and update) your information? 
 
17. What types of information do you share with other agencies?  Under what conditions 
does your agency share that information?   
 
Networks 
18. Which agencies are the most important to your agency’s operations? 
a. How did your agency develop relationships with personnel from those agencies? 
b. What are the most effective ways to maintain and extend those relationships? 
c. What factors inhibit those relationships?   
d. How does your agency expand your network to include new people from other 
agencies?   
 
19. What memberships in professional associations or informal relationships influence 
whether your agency works together with others? 
 
Conclusion 
20. What is your general position with your agency? 
 
 
21. Please estimate your years of experience with your agency. 
      0-5 yrs ____ 6-10 yrs ____ 11-15 yrs ____ 16-20 yrs _____ 21-25 yrs _____ > 25 yrs  
 
22. Please estimate your years of experience in your discipline. 
      0-5 yrs ____ 6-10 yrs ____ 11-15 yrs ____ 16-20 yrs _____ 21-25 yrs _____ > 25 yrs  
 
  289 
23. What are your agency’s major sources of funding? 
 
 
24. What is your level of educational achievement? 
 
25. What is the level of training that you have completed for your discipline? 
 
26. Is there anything that you would like add?   
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APPENDIX B  
SURVEY DEFINITION 
Cooperative Activity Definition 
Risk Assessment 
Any joint activity related to the identification of hazards, the 
monitoring of those hazards, the likelihood of their occurrence, and 
the identification of the vulnerability of people, property, the 
environment, and your agency to those hazards. 
Incident 
Prevention/Mitigation  
Measures taken to reduce vulnerability, i.e. limit or control the 
consequences, extent, or severity of an incident that cannot be 
reasonably prevented.  And activities or strategies to prevent an 
incident that threatens people, property, and the environment.     
Planning 
Any joint-planning regarding potential activities during the 
mitigation, preparedness, response, or recovery phases of disaster 
management. 
Resource Management 
Development of procedures with other agencies to locate, acquire, 
store, distribute, maintain, test, and account for services, personnel, 
resources, materials, and facilities.   
Developing an Incident 
Management System 
Joint activities to develop an incident management system to direct, 
control, and coordinate response and recovery operations, i.e. ICS.   
Developing Operations and 
Procedures to Support 
Programs and Execute Plans 
Activities to develop, coordinate, and/or implement operational 
procedures to support the program and execute plans. 
Communication and Warning 
System Testing and/or Use 
Joint testing or use of communication equipment and warning 
systems. 
Training Training, exercise-related, and/or educational activities 
Response                                               
(Mutual Aid 
Received/Rendered) 
Joint response to emergency incidents with outside agencies. 
Recovery Efforts Joint recovery efforts with outside agencies to restore and rebuild communities. 
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Evaluation and Corrective 
Actions 
Evaluation and/or post-incident analysis of program plans, 
procedures, capabilities, and performance 
Finance and Administration Activities related to joint purchasing, accounting, etc. 
Grant and Financial Aid 
Applications 
Any request for external funding or consideration of giving. 
Equipment/Resource Sharing Any lending or borrowing of equipment and resources with other agencies for actual use. 
Community Events Events such as parades, fish fries, festivals, etc. 
Others? 
Fire: Inspection, Investigations, Public  Education (Fire Safety), Fire Hydrant 
Maintenance, etc.                                                                                                              
Police: Officer Training, Patrol, Detectives/Crime Investigations, Canine Unit, 
Crime Laboratory    
* Survey modified from the NFPA 1600 "Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and 
Business Continuity Programs" 2007 Edition        
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APPENDIX C  
SURVEY: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COOPERATION INDEX 
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APPENDIX D  
FIRE DEPARTMENTS IN THE FIELD STUDY AREA 
Acronym Department 
alp101f Aleppo 
alv318f Allegheny Valley 
apw102f Aspinwall 
arn345f Arnold #1 
arn346f Arnold #2 
asr324f Air Search Rescue 
avn103f Avalon 
bau259f Bauerstown (Shaler Twp) 
bav109f Ben Avon 
bdk113f Braddock 
bel307f Big Sewickley Creek (Bell Acres) 
bfl375 Buffalo 
bfw115f Bradford Woods 
bkh114f Braddock Hills 
bkr106f Becks Run 
bln105f Baldwin #1 
blv108f Bellevue 
bnx111f Blawnox 
bow255f Bower Hill (Scott Twp) 





ccl365f Cecil Twp. #1 
ccl366f Cecil Twp. #3 
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cft128f Crafton 
chc122f Churchill 
che260f Cherry City (Shaler Twp) 
chl120f Chalfant 
cln123f Clairton 
clw321f USS Clairton Works 
cng118f Carnegie 
cnt129f Crescent Twp 
coc258f Cochran Hose (Sewickley) 
col124f Kirwin Heights (Collier Twp) 
col125f Presto (Collier Twp) 
col126f Rennerdale (Collier Twp) 
cra364f Cranberry Twp. 
crg348f Curtiss Wright  EMD 
crl357f Carroll Twp. 
crl362f Valley Inn (Carroll Twp) 
crp127f Coraopolis 
csh119f Castle Shannon 
cst212f Crestas Terrace 
ctz167f Citizens Hose #2 
cwk121f Cheswick 




dxn210f North Versailles (Dixon) 
eca256f East Carnegie (Scott Twp) 
ecm370f Economy 
edr134f East  Deer 
EFD East Fire Dispatch Area 
elf261f Elfinwild (Shaler Twp) 
elz142f Blaine Hill (Elizabeth Twp) 
elz143f Elizabeth Twp. #1 
elz144f Greenock (Elizabeth Twp) 
elz145f Buena Vista (Elizabeth Twp) 
elz146f Victory (Elizabeth Twp) 
elz147f Central (Elizabeth Twp) 
elz323f Elizabeth Twp Disaster 
emk135f United FR (East McKeesport) 
ems148f Emsworth 
ept136f East Pittsburgh 
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etn149f Etna 
evc391f Evans City 
ewd137f Edgewood 
ewh138f Edgeworth 
ezb139f Elizabeth Boro 
fnl152f Imperial (Findlay Twp) 
fre398f Freeport 
frh153f Forest Hills 
frp158f Franklin Park 
fwd154f Gallatin-Sunnyside (Forward Twp) 
fwd155f Forward  Twp. 
fwd156f Bunola (Forward Twp) 
fwn150f Fawn #1 
fwn151f Fawn #2 
fxc157f Fox Chapel 
fzr159f Frazer #1 
fzr160f Frazer #2 
gle257f Glendale (Scott Twp) 
gls161f Glassport #1 
gpa100f GPIA Fire Dept 
gtr163f Green Tree 




hmp165f North Hampton (Hampton Twp) 
hmr166f Harmar Twp 
hnh169f Harrison Hills 
hrm371f Harmony 
htp168f Hilltop Hose 
igm176f Ingram 
ind172f Dorseyville (Indiana Twp) 
ind173f Indianola (Indiana Twp) 
ind174f Middle Road (Indiana Twp) 
ind175f Rural Ridge (Indiana Twp) 
irv322f USS Irvin Works 
jfh178f Floreffe (Jefferson Hills) 
jfh179f Gill Hall (Jefferson Hills) 
jfh180f 885 Area (Jefferson Hills) 
jfr177f Jefferson Fire Rescue 
klb182f Kilbuck Twp 
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knd181f Kennedy Twp 
lbu336f Lower Burrell #1 (Kinloch) 
lbu337f Lower Burrell #2 (Braeburn) 
lbu338f Lower Burrell #3 (Bonnaire) 




ltp308f Fair Oaks (Leet Twp) 
mcd186f Highland (McCandless) 
mcd187f Ingomar (McCandless) 
mcd188f Peebles (McCandless) 
mcd310f McDonald 
mdn369f Madison 
mhl200f Munhall #1 
mhl201f Munhall #2 
mhl202f Munhall #3 
mhl203f Munhall #4 
mhl204f Munhall #5 
mid373f Middlesex 
mkp190f McKeesport 
mkr189f McKees Rocks 
mnt197f Moon Twp 
mnv192f Monroeville #1 
mnv193f Monroeville #3 
mnv194f Monroeville #4 
mnv195f Monroeville #5 
mnv196f Monroeville #6 
mon359f Monongahela 
mrs374f Adams Twp (Mars) 
msl185f Marshall Twp 
msn383f Monessen 
mtl198f Mt. Lebanon 
mto199f Mt. Oliver 
mtp379f Hickory/Mt.Pleasant 
mur332f Murrysville 
mur333f Sardis (Murrysville) 
mur334f White Valley (Murrysville) 
mvl191f Millvale 
mwy392f Midway 
myf319f Mon Yough Fire Defense Council 
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nbk207f North Braddock 
neg360f New Eagle 
nft209f North Fayette 
nhd331f Hartford Heights (North Huntingdon) 
nhr351f North Huntingdon Rescue 8 
nht349f Circleville (North Huntingdon Twp) 
nhu367f Larimer (North Huntingdon) 
nhu380f Fairmont Hahntown (North Huntingdon) 
nke340f New Kensington #1 
nke341f New Kensington #2 
nke342f New Kensington #3 
nke343f New Kensington #4 
nke344f New Kensington #5 
NOFD North Fire Dispatch Area 
nor313f Northwest EMS 
nst378f North Strabane 
nvl205f Neville 
nvs213f North Versailles (Sunset-Central) 
nvs214f North Versailles (Green Valley) 
ohr217f Pleasant Valley (O'Hara) 
ohr218f Parkview (O'Hara) 
ohr219f Guyasuta (O'Hara) 





plu232f Pleasant Hills 
plu233f Unity #1 (Plum) 
plu234f Renton #2 (Plum) 
plu235f Logans Ferry #3 (Plum) 
plu236f Holiday Park #4 (Plum) 
plu395f Plum Fire Police 
pnh221f Penn Hills #1 
pnh222f Penn Hills #2 
pnh223f Penn Hills #3 
pnh224f Penn Hills #4 
pnh225f Penn Hills #5 
pnh226f Penn Hills #6 
pnh227f Penn Hills #7 
pnh516f Penn Hills Fire Marshal 
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pnr112f Pioneer Hose (Brackenridge) 
ptc229f Pitcairn #1 
ptc230f Pitcairn #2 
ptr361f Peters Twp. 
ptv237f Port Vue 
ran238f Rankin 
res239f Mt. Troy (Reserve Twp) 
res240f Spring Garden (Reserve Twp) 
ric241f Richland Twp 
ric242f Valencia (Richland Twp) 
rob243f Forest Grove (Robinson Twp) 
rob244f Groveton (Robinson Twp) 
rob245f Moon Run (Robinson Twp) 
ros246f Evergreen (Ross Twp) 
ros247f Berkeley Hills (Ross Twp) 
ros248f Perrysville (Ross Twp) 
ros249f Quaill (Ross Twp) 
ros250f Fairview (Ross Twp) 
ros251f Seville (Ross Twp) 
ros252f Keathing (Ross Twp) 
ros253f Laurel Gardens (Ross Twp) 
ros254f Ross Twp Fire Police 
ros312f Ross Westview EMS 
ros510f Ross Twp Fire Marshal 
rsv350f Collinsburg (Rostraver Twp) 
rsv352f Webster #1 (Rostraver Twp) 
rsv353f Rostraver Central (Rostraver Twp) 
sar376f Sarver 
sax377f Saxonburg 
sbn104f South Baldwin 
sdb273f Springdale Boro. 
sdt274f Springdale Twp. 
sft266f Cuddy (South Fayette Twp) 
sft267f Sturgeon (South Fayette Twp) 
sft268f Fairview (South Fayette Twp) 
sft269f Oak Ridge (South Fayette Twp) 
sha262f Shaler Village (Shaler Twp) 
sha263f Sharps Hill (Shaler Twp) 
sha264f Underclff (Shaler Twp) 
sha325f Shaler Fire Police 
sha513f Shaler Fire Police 
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shb265f Sharpsburg 
SOFD South Fire Dispatch Area 
spt270f Broughton (South Park Twp) 
spt271f Library (South Park Twp) 
stw275f Flemming Park (Stowe Twp) 
stw276f West Park (Stowe Twp) 
stw277f Presston (Stowe Twp) 
sut354f Sutersville VFD 
svt272f Coulter (South Versailles Twp) 
swi278f Swissvale #1 
swi279f Swissvale V.F.D. #2 
swk381f Herminie (Sewickley Twp) 
swk382f Lowber (Sewickley Twp) 
sww368f Rillton (Sewickley Twp) 
tar280f Highland Hose (Tarentum) 
tar281f Eureka Hose (Tarentum) 
tar282f Summit Hose (Tarentum) 
tra311f Trafford 
tur283f Turtle Creek 
ubt335f Upper Burrell Twp. 
uni330f Elrama (Union Twp) 
usc284f Upper St. Clair 
ver285f Verona 
vsl286f Versailles 
wal287f United FR (Wall) 
wde288f West Deer #1 
wde289f West Deer #2 
wde290f West Deer #3 
wdg306f Wilmerding 
wel291f West Elizabeth 
wex228f Wexford (Pine Twp) 
whi298f Whitaker 
whi301f Whitehall 
whs292f West Homestead 
wil302f Wilkins #1 
wil303f Wilkins #3 
wil304f Wilkins #4 
wil305f Wilkinsburg 
wil514f Wilkins Twp Fire Marshal 
wmi293f Homeville #1 (West Mifflin) 
wmi294f Duquesne Annex #2 (West Mifflin) 
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wmi295f West MIfflin #3 
wmi296f Skyview #4 (West Mifflin) 
wmi297f West View 
wnw365f West Newton 
woa299f White Oak #1 
woa300f Rainbow (White Oak) 
wsh347f Washington Twp 
wsh363f Washington Twp. 
wvi298f Whitaker 
wwm211f West Wilmerding 
zlp372f Zelienople 
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APPENDIX E 
POLICE DEPARTMENTS IN THE FIELD STUDY AREA 
Acronym Department 
asp Aspinwall 
avp Avalon  
baldp Baldwin Twp 
belp Bellevue 
bhp Braddock Hills 
blawp Blawnox 








colp Collier Twp 
cp Clairton 
craftp Crafton/Thornburg 
csp Castle Shannon 
dorp Dormont 
dravp Dravosburg 
duqp Duquesne  
ebp Elizabeth Boro 
edgep Edgewood 
emp East McKeesport 
emsp Emsworth 
epp East Pittsburgh  
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etnap Etna 
etp Elizabeth Twp 
fcp Fox Chapel 
forp Forest Hills 
forp Forward 




harp Harmar Twp 
heip Heidelberg 
homp Homestead 
htp Harrison Twp  
indp Indiana Twp 
ingp Ingram 
jefp Jefferson Hills 
kenp Kennedy Twp 






mlp Mt. Lebanon 
moonp Moon Township  
mop Mt Oliver  
mrp McKees Rocks 
munp Munhall  
nbp North Braddock  
nfp North Fayette 
nvp North Versailles Twp  
oakdp Oakdale 
oakmp Oakmont  
ohiop Ohio Twp 
ohp O’Hara Twp 
pghp Pittsburgh City  
php Penn Hills 
php Pleasant Hills 
plump Plum  
pvp Port Vue 
ranp Rankin 
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resp Reserve Twp 
richp Richland Twp 
roslynp Rosslyn Farms 
rosp Ross Twp 
sbp Sharpsburg 
scotp Scott Twp 
sewp Sewickley 
sfp South Fayette 
shalp Shaler Twp 
spbp Springdale Borough 
sptp South Park Twp 
sptp Springdale Township 
stowep Stowe Twp 
swisp Swissvale 
tarp Tarentum 
tcp Turtle Creek  
vp Versailles 
vrnp Verona  
wdp West Deer 
whitp Whitaker  
whomp West Homestead  
whp White Hall  
wilp Wilkins Twp 
wmp West Mifflin  
wop White Oak 
wp Wilkinsburg 
wvp West View 
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APPENDIX F  
EMS AGENCIES IN THE FIELD STUDY AREA 
Acronym Agency Service Type 
alq102m Aspinwall (QRS) QRS 
baq259m Bauerstown (QRS) QRS 
bhq247m Berkeley Hills (Ross Twp) (QRS) QRS 
bla192m Northwest EMS, Bellevue (ALS) ALS 
bnq142m Blaine Hill (Elizabeth Twp) EMS ALS 
bra530m Brentwood EMS (ALS) ALS 
bwa510m Baldwin EMS (ALS) ALS 
cga715m Carnegie EMS (ALS) ALS 
clq272m Coulter (QRS) QRS 
cna550m Clairton EMS (ALS) ALS 
crq128m Crafton (QRS) QRS 
cwa6900 Canonsburg EMS ALS 
cza110m Citizens EMS (ALS) ALS 
dqa565m Duquesne EMS (ALS) ALS 
eaa310m Eastern Area Pre-Hospital Services (ALS) ALS 
ebq139m Elizabeth Boro EMS ALS 
eda125m East Deer EMS (ALS) ALS 
etq149m Etna (QRS) QRS 
eua280m Eureka EMS (ALS) ALS 
eza520m Elizabeth Twp Area EMS (ALS) ALS 
fda594m Forward Twp EMS (ALS) ALS 
fra330m United Fire Rescue (ALS) ALS 
fwa140m Foxwall EMS (ALS) – Volunteer ALS 
gaa970m Guardian Angel (ALS) ALS 
gyq219m Guyastua (O’Hara) (QRS) QRS 
hib750m Heidelberg (BLS) BLS 
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hma145m Hampton Twp EMS (ALS) ALS 
hpq236m Holiday Park (Plum) (QRS) QRS 
ina760m Ingram Ambulance (ALS) ALS 
jfa595m Jefferson EMS (ALS) ALS 
kha770m Kirwan Heights (ALS) ALS 
knnywdm Kennywood EMS BLS 
lbq183m Liberty (QRS) QRS 
lbw130m Lower Burrell EMS ALS 
lnb610m Lincoln Boro EMS (BLS) BLS 
lva150m Lower Valley Ambulance (ALS) ALS 
mca130m McCandless-Franklin Park EMS (ALS) ALS 
mhm630m Munhall EMS ALS 
mka625m McKeesport EMS (ALS) ALS 
mra191m Northwest EMS, McKees Rocks (ALS) ALS 
mra780m Medical Rescue Team South (ALS) ALS 
mrq174m Middle Road (Indiana) (QRS) QRS 
murry Murrysville Medic One ALS 
mvm350m Monroeville EMS ALS 
nfa195m Northwest EMS, North Fayette (ALS) ALS 
nkw120m New Kensington EMS ALS 
nvm369m North Versailles EMS ALS 
oaq215m Oakdale (QRS) QRS 
orq269m Oakridge (QRS) QRS 
pha380m Penn Hills EMS (ALS) ALS 
pit100m Pittsburgh EMS ALS 
pma485m Plum EMS (ALS) ALS 
prm270m Pulsar EMS ALS 
prq125m Presto (QRS) QRS 
psa670m Prism (ALS) ALS 
pua675m Prism (ALS) Sub-Station ALS 
pva180m Parkview EMS (ALS) ALS 
qvalley Quaker Valley Ambulance Authority ALS 
rba730m Robinson EMS *REMS (Crafton) ALS 
rba810m Robinson EMS *REMS (Robinson Twp) ALS 
rda260m Richland EMS (ALS) ALS 
ria193m Robinson/Ingram EMS (ALS) ALS 
rnb775m Rennerdale (BLS) BLS 
rsa210m Ross-West View EMS (ALS) ALS 
sba815m Southbridge EMS (ALS) ALS 
sca740m Scott Twp EMS *STEMS EMS (ALS) ALS 
sgq240m Spring Garden (Reserve) (QRS) QRS 
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shq263m Sharps Hill (Shaler) (QRS) QRS 
slq251m Seville (Ross Twp) (QRS) QRS 
sma265m UPMC St. Margaret Paramedic Response Team (ALS) ALS 
sna160m Seneca Area EMS (ALS) ALS 
spb230m Springdale EMS (BLS) BLS 
sra170m Shaler Area EMS (ALS) ALS 
stq267m Sturgeon (QRS) QRS 
svq262m Shaler Villa (QRS) QRS 
swq278m Swissvale (QRS) QRS 
tsm820m Tricommunity South ALS 
twa6200 Tricommunity Washington County ALS 
unq233m Unity (Plum) (QRS) QRS 
valley Valley Ambulance Authority ALS 
veb650m Versailles EMS (BLS) ALS 
vlq242m Valencia (Richland) (QRS) QRS 
wda240m West Deer EMS (ALS) ALS 
wdq289m West Deer VFC #2 (QRS) QRS 
wha340m Woodland Hills EMS (ALS) ALS 
woa645m White Oak EMS (ALS) ALS 
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